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This report examines the effect that ECA-zone regulation 
has on the optimal vessel fuel strategies for compliance. 
The findings of this report are trifold, and this report is 
coupled with a calculation tool which is released to assist 
ship-owners in the ECA decision making. 
 
The first key insight is the substantial impact of the current 
and future oil price on the optimal compliance strategies 
ship-owners choose when complying with the new air 
emission requirements for vessels. The oil price 
determines the attractiveness of investing in asset 
modification for compliance, given the capital investment 
required. Operating on low-Sulphur fuels remains 
favourable with a low oil price, as the price spread 
between high- and low-Sulphur does not outweigh the 
price of asset investments. Ship-owners who are 
contemplating future compliance strategies should monitor 
the developments of the global oil price, and consider how 
much time their operated vessels navigate the ECA in the 
future.   
 
The second insight covers the economic considerations of 
ship-owners, considering the expected enforcement level 
by authorities and the punishment imposed on violators. 
The report shows that the rational ship-owner has a 
significant incentive to not comply with the new regulation 
when fine sizes and risk of being audited are low. This is 
an important point for both the ship-owner and the public 
officials that seeks to enforce the regulation effectively to 
provide the correct incentives for compliance. 
The third insight reveals that ship-owners can play an 
important role in the formulation of regulation in the IMO. 
Regulation is not just something that is imposed but rather 
rules that are a product of those who participate. Three 
political cases illustrate the power ship-owners potentially 
can have by being proactive and collaborative in the 
policymaking process. Coupled with ship-owners insight 
into how regulation impacts the cost structure of 
operations, the potential for proactive ship-owners in 
regulation is huge in creating a future competitive 
advantage. 
 
From the economic insights, a calculation tool is 
developed and provided for ship-owners. The calculation 
tool allows the user to input data about their vessels or 
fleet, after which the tool provides estimates for the 
optimal solutions to compliance. This tool should provide 
guidance for any ship-owner interested in the future of 
green shipping and determining their optimal ECA 
compliance strategy.   
 
The calculation tool can be downloaded by following this 
link. 
EXCUTIVE SUMMARY  
THIS REPORT PROVIDES THREE MAIN TAKEAWAYS: FIRST, THE OIL PRICE PLAYS A CRITICAL 
ROLE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF GREEN SHIPPING STRATEGIES BECAUSE IT INFLUENCES 
WHICH COMPLIANCE STRATEGY IT IS LESS COSTLY TO DEVELOP. SECOND, LOW 
ENFORCEMENT AND PENALIZATION INCENTIVIZES SHIP-OWNERS TO DISREGARD ECA-ZONE 
REGULATION. THIRD, THIS REPORT SHOWS THERE IS A POTENTIAL FOR SHIPPING FIRMS 
SEEKING TO INFLUENCE THE ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS 0F SHIPPING. 
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International shipping is a special industry, as seaborne 
trade has existed for thousands of years and is a vital part 
of economic development worldwide. The Viking trade 
ships bartered along the entire European coast, and vast 
empires based their power on trade fleets that sailed to and 
from the New World while the Far East connected to 
Europe via long sea routes. At sea, dominion over an area 
could only be enforced by a sizeable fleet, which rendered 
control and regulation of the high seas impossible. 
 
The basic idea of the freedom of the seas can be traced 
back to the Dutch jurist and philosopher Hugo Grotius, 
who first formulated the ideas in his book ‘Mare Liberum’ 
(English: ‘The Free Sea’) (Grotius, Hakluyt, Welwood, & 
Armitage, 2004) (Vieira, 2003). His argument was that the 
sea was international territory and all nations could use it 
for seafaring trade without being restricted by national 
rules of other countries. This was specifically aimed at the 
Portuguese empire, which in the early 17th century claimed 
monopoly over trade routes with the East Indies. Grotius 
argued that no nation could claim control over 
international sea routes nor regulate them. 
 
In 1625, a Portuguese priest named Serafim de Freitas 
published the book ‘De Iusto Imperio Lusitanorum 
Asiatico’ (English: Of the just Portuguese Asian Empire).  
In this book, de Freitas countered Grotius’ arguments 
systematically to eventually conclude that there were 
moral reasons why the Portuguese empire could control 
the sea and trade routes. He rejected the idea of ‘freedom 
of the seas’ and argued that sea territory could be 
controlled by states just as land territory could. This 
position became known as Mare Clausum (Vieira, 2003).  
 
Eventually, the international community came to adopt the 
idea of Mare Liberum in the spirit of Grotius, but the basic 
tension between the two points of view still stands. On one 
hand, the idea of the freedom of the seas is still pervasive 
and has influenced international treaties and conventions 
since the 17th century. On the other hand, transnational 
problems and issues arising from modern challenges, such 
as protection of the environment or safety, has forced 
stakeholders to consider how to strike a balance between 
the Mare Liberum and the Mare Clausum. 
 
This report places itself squarely within this tension. 
Modern challenges and discussions on international 
seaborne trade regulation is a constant struggle between 
those who argue that regulation is legitimate and 
necessary, and those who argue that regulation limits the 
benefits of free trade. The latter argue that the market will 
solve problems more efficiently that state regulation, while 
others suggest that states must intervene due to negative 
externalities from the industry. 
 
The basic premise of the report is that decisions to regulate 
international seaborne trade has real and tangible effects 
on ship-owners, ship operators and the shipping market in 
general. However, the report also contends that the view 
on these tangible effects and the regulation depends on the 
perspective of the observer. There are therefore possibly 
infinite ways of looking at regulation and the shipping 
economy. The report serves two main purposes, providing 
1 INTRODUCTION 
THIS REPORT PROVIDES  MARITIME STAKEHOLDERS THE OPPORTUNITY TO UNDERSTAND 
HOW DIFFERENT THEORETICAL LENSES CONCEPTUALIZE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME 
REGULATION. SHIP-OWNERS CAN LEARN THAT ISSUES CAN BE VIEWED FROM DIFFERENT 
PERSPECTIVES AND HOW TO IMPROVE THEIR OPPORTUNITY AND PROACTIVELY INFLUENCE 
AND RESPOND TO REGULATION. MEANWHILE, REGULATORS NEED TO UNDERSTAND HOW 
REGULATION AFFECTS SHIP-OWNERS TO OBTAIN THE CORRECT BEHAVIOUR IN THE MARKET 
AND HOW DIFFERENT ACTORS INFLUENCE REGULATION. 
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the reader with different analytical lenses to understand the 
maritime industry.  
First, the report intends to analyse the effect of regulation 
on the ship operators. Concretely, this analysis will be 
centred on the recent standards for Sulphur emissions in 
Emission Control Areas (ECAs) and determine how 
business actors can respond efficiently to new regulation. 
The analysis also seeks to elaborate on the inherent 
problems that are associated with this perception. This is a 
concrete and quantitative approach to science and it results 
in tangible recommendations for both industry and 
governmental actors. 
 
Second, the report illustrates how the substantive 
regulation agreed upon in the International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) can be analysed from a social 
constructionist perspective. Concretely, this will be done 
by reviewing the process leading up to three major 
decisions in IMO regulative history, interpreting the 
process from the analytical position of Actor Network 
Theory (ANT). The three cases are explained in detail in 
the next section. 
 
Reading this report should provide a deep understanding of 
the effects of concrete international regulation on ship-
owners and operators, as well as how an analytical position 
based on theory shapes perception and approach to a given 
object of analytical interest. This understanding is closely 
tied to the ongoing discussion regarding the extent of 
international shipping regulation. This report aims to 
broaden the readers’ perspective on how regulation can be 
perceived and conceptualized from different angles. 
 
The guiding research questions for this report takes 
departure in considerations on the regulatory process and 
the effect the output (i.e. substantive regulation) has on 
business. The first part of the report, which deals with the 
substantive environmental regulation, explicitly seeks to 
explain what the effect of regulatory output is on business 
operations. The second part of the report analyses the 
possibilities for enforcement of the regulation. The third 
part of the report examines how a specific theoretical lens 
provides a specific perspective of international maritime 
regulation, including how non-state actors engage in the 
process in this perspective. 
 
The report will also explain the economic rationales that 
exist in favour of regulating international shipping. Using 
the notions of social cost and social benefit, the first part of 
chapter 3 explores what conventional economic theory 
concludes about the need for international regulation. It 
adds a crucial perspective to the aforementioned tension 
between freedom of the seas and regulation. 
 
 
 
 
Source: Scanpix / Iris  
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1.1 CIRCULATED APPROACH TO ANALYSIS 
The seminal work done by Allison (1999; 1971), in which 
he examines the same object with different theoretical 
lenses, inspires the structure of this report. The point of 
having multiple perspectives is to challenge the idea that 
there is a ‘correct’ way to assess regulation and its effects 
on society. Applying multiple analytical lenses on the 
same issue provides valuable insight into how we can 
think about things such as the formation of regulation, the 
effect of regulation, and the impact of different 
stakeholders.  
 
In addition to Allison’s ideas of multiple perspectives, 
Berger & Luckmann’s (1966; 1991) notion of the “socially 
constructed reality” has influenced this report. Berger & 
Luckmann argue that humans construct the idea of reality 
or the social world. In turn, they argue, humans forget that 
the social world is constructed and it is taken for granted 
as reality or, in some cases, as fundamental laws. This 
accepted reality then affects societal actors, whom take it 
for granted and act on its premise. 
 
This report takes the perspective that regulation is a 
process determined by various political actors. Regulation 
has important effects on shipping, and this ‘social reality’ 
is something that firms must take into account when 
conducting operations.  
 
When a macro level social reality is constructed, it is 
defined as an objectification, which then has tangible 
effects on the individual micro level actors; such as firms, 
states, and persons. This process is called ‘internalization’, 
which denotes the fact that actors internalize the social 
reality, taking it for granted and acting accordingly. 
Conversely, when actors at the micro level shape and 
construct social reality, it is called ‘externalization’, 
whereby practices and ideas are raised to object reality. In 
our report, we consider regulation or international rules for 
shipping as the macro level reality, and individual actors 
are states and firms. Internalization is the effect that 
regulation has on firms and states, and externalization is 
the process in which actors shape new regulation or amend 
existing.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Adapted from Berger & Luckmann (1966) 
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Using this perspective, we are able to say something 
substantive not only about the way regulation affects 
actors and how regulation is formed, but also about the 
overall way of understanding regulation of international 
shipping as something that is continually constructed, 
objectified, taken for granted, and acted upon, eventually 
feeding in to how new regulation is formed.  
 
1.2 CHOICE OF POLITICAL CASES 
To examine the process of establishing regulation, three 
political cases that unfolded within the IMO arena have 
been chosen for analysis using the network perspective, as 
this perspective allows us to understand regulation as a 
process. Even though the scope of the report applies to all 
ECA-zones across the world (or regulation that imitates 
the effect of an ECA) the empirical study takes departure 
in the Baltic and North Sea ECAs. 
 
The cases chosen are definition and geographical scope of 
SOx regulation, the allowed pH-value of wash-water 
discharge from scrubbers, and the effective date of NOx 
limits in ECAs. 
 
The political cases are included because they all represent 
different aspects of regulation. The case of substantive 
SOx limits tells the story of the spatial scope of regulation, 
detailing the battle between those who wanted uniform 
global regulation and those who wanted stricter rules 
inside ECAs. In this case, a significant number of actors 
are active and present, ranging from groups of states to 
individual firms. 
 
The case of effective dates for NOx ECAs is about time 
rather than space. This is a story about how the timing of 
regulation was contested and how states and firms 
scrambled to influence the process to push the temporal 
element of regulation in their favour.  
 
Finally, the case concerning wash-water discharge values 
was chosen because it is a technical aspect of regulation 
that has huge impact on the industry. This is a story of how 
science plays a political role and how seemingly technical 
details can be politicized and drawn out due to deliberate 
actions by involved parties due to the effect on them 
respectively. 
 
The three themes – spatial, temporal, and technical aspects 
of regulation – together form a basis on which a central 
argument is built: Regulation is constructed in the political 
process and all elements are politicized because of the 
conscious strategies employed by involved actors. By 
using the lens of Actor Network Theory in all three cases 
coupled with an excavation of the actual processes, it 
becomes clear that regulation is not automatic. 
This is why the central tension between Mare Liberum and 
Mare Clausum is still relevant. Even though there may be 
good cases for regulation or de-regulation from economic 
point of view, the actual regulation only emerges after 
countless actions taken by those involved. Incremental 
shifts toward Mare Clausum or Mare Liberum are thus not 
automatic in any sense, but a result of the strategies 
employed by those benefiting from one or the other. 
 
1.3 UNDERSTANDING ACTORS 
There are many actors in the world of shipping. 
Conventionally, actors are the different stakeholders 
relevant to a firm or a specific operation and are grouped 
as such. However, given that this report takes departure in 
the idea that the same object can be viewed from different 
theoretical angles, we contend that actors can be many 
things depending on your point of view. 
 
When we view actors from the market perspective, we 
consider them either sellers or buyers in a market setting. 
Actors are grouped in categories that correspond to one of 
these market positions. When we view actors from the 
hierarchical perspective, we see instead regulators and 
those being regulated. Actors are then either those who 
create and enforce rules, or those who have to decide 
whether and how to comply. Finally, from a network 
perspective, we think of actors as embedded in networks 
across categories, creating alliances and collaboration to 
achieve certain goals regardless of categories. The figure 
below illustrates these different layers of understanding. 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Actors from different perspectives 
The figure illustrates how the actors (black dots) can be 
viewed as belonging to certain category or as establishing 
network links to other actors. 
Adapted from Hansen (2005a) 
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The empirical object of this report is the regulation of ship 
emissions in the Baltic Sea, as well as the conditions for 
competition that are derived from this regulation.  
The principal point of departure is the idea that different 
paradigmatic approaches applied to the empirical object 
imply different conclusions and implications. Elzen 
(Elzen, Geels, & Green, 2004) identify three approaches to 
regulation: Market-based approaches, hierarchical 
approaches, and network-based approaches. We employ 
the market perspective first, because it is much more 
useful for the reader to grasp the economic effect of 
regulation before discussing how to enforce it. 
 
Market-based approaches assume that the world is best 
characterized as an efficient market place, where state 
interference is inherently undesirable. Actors are assumed  
to be efficient and rational, and instead of a principal-agent 
relationship between regulator and regulated, market 
approaches examine financial incentives to determine to 
what extent regulation changes behaviour.  
This paradigm originates from neo-classical economics 
associated with the Chicago School of Economics and the 
work done by Stigler, Friedman and other economists 
(Friedman, 2009; Stigler, 1971). In the economic analysis 
of this report, we approach the empirical object using the 
idea of an ‘economic man’ – an actor that is perfectly 
rational and maximizes profit. The economic man 
responds to financial incentives regardless of moral or 
societal considerations, and only acts to maximize the 
profits of the firm. This means we treat ship-owners and 
the decisions they face from a purely economic 
perspective, examining how new regulation changes their 
optimal strategies. The economic analysis is carried out in 
chapter 3. 
 
The hierarchical approach to regulation originates in the 
peace of Westphalia where nation-states with clearly 
defined boundaries became the dominant actors in 
international politics. Hierarchical approaches thus tend to 
see regulative issues as principal-agent relationships, 
where the principal (the state) regulates non-state actors 
(the agents) through formal rules. This perspective is borne 
2 READERS GUIDE 
THIS CHAPTER OUTLINES THE STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT. THE REPORT TAKES A 
DIFFERENTIATED ANALYTICAL APPROACH TO A CENTRAL EMPIRICAL OBJECT. THE FIRST 
PART OF THE REPORT EXAMINES THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND THE FINANCIAL 
IMPACT NEW REGULATION HAS ON THE INDUSTRY. THE SECOND PART EXAMINES 
MARITIME REGULATION FROM A HIERARCHICAL PERSPECTIVE, HIGHLIGHTING THE EFFECT OF 
RULE ENFORCEMENT. THE THIRD PART EXPLORES THE POLITICAL BACKGROUND BEHIND 
THREE NEW POLICIES DISCUSSED BY THE INTERNATIONAL MARITIME ORGANIZATION. 
 
 
 
 
Foto 2.1: The market, hierarchy, and network perspectives illustrated 
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out of the classic political science literature such as Max 
Weber. Newer approaches within sociology, political 
science, and economics break with this paradigm, but it is 
important to understand the traditional view to appreciate 
the theoretical developments since then. 
 
Network-based approaches constitute newer academic 
thinking about regulation. Building on hierarchical, state-
centric theories, more recent work emphasizes how state 
and non-state actors work together to establish systems of 
governance (Abbott, Genschel, Snidal, & Zangl, 2012; 
Abbott & Snidal, 2009; Lister, Poulsen, & Ponte, 2015a). 
Others examine the influence on policies using strategic 
networks and alliances, and seeks to understand how 
individuals and professionals impact policymaking and 
regulation (Carpenter et al., 2007; Seabrooke & Tsingou, 
2015; Seabrooke, 2014). 
 
Based on this network approach, this report examines how 
networks of actors give identity to regulation and 
regulative entities. This is done by using the framework of 
Actor Network Theory (ANT) and applying it to three 
political cases, as described in the introduction (Latour, 
1987, 2005). This will be presented in the last chapter of 
the analysis. Finally, the implications of analysing across 
perspectives and the impact this has on the regulation of 
 
 
Foto 2.2 Different Theoretical Approaches to the Same Empirical Object 
A figure to define the structure of this report. 
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international shipping is explored in the final chapter of 
this report. 
2.1 OVERVIEW OF THE ACTORS 
Following the above logic that different perspectives 
entails different realities and societal structures, it depends 
on the deployed perspective what kind of actors we 
perceive. However, to assist the reader in understanding 
the world of shipping the report will introduce the most 
important organizations in the regulative mesh. These 
organizations are examples of the ones affected by 
regulation as well as the ones that affect regulation, and as 
such, the actors are referred to at various points throughout 
the report. It is important to keep the introduction in mind 
and be prepared to view these actors from different points 
of view. 
 
When defining all stakeholders for the regulation of the 
Baltic Sea it is useful to operate under a framework of the 
following five sub-categories: Bodies of 
international/regional co-operation, Industry 
Organizations, Firms/Owners/Operators, Suppliers and 
Non-Governmental Organizations. Due to the very nature 
of these stakeholder types, overlaps in membership will be 
defined within each stakeholder section. The overlapping 
memberships will focus only on those relevant for this 
study. Oil and bunker companies are omitted from this list 
as their operations are ad-hoc linked to case-by-case 
demand, thus there is a high mobility of these assets 
traversing in and out of the SECA. At the same time this is 
not a complete overview, given the very nature of how to 
define stakeholders.  
 
2.1.1 Bodies of international and regional regulatory co-
operation 
The International Maritime Organization 
The IMO is the specialized agency of the United Nations, 
where states cooperate to provide standards related to 
vessel security, safety and environment. It is the only 
institution with the governance mandate to adapt global 
regulation for vessels, yet it relies on individual states to 
implement regulation. Thus, states have to ratify, 
implement and enforce legislation of the IMO. Ensuring a 
level playing field for the maritime industry is thus tied up 
on successful negotiations within the IMO and that states 
implement the agreed legislation in an effective manner. 
  
The decision-making of the IMO is based on a system of 
consensus, allowing for maximum implementation with 
member states. Measures adopted should have a wide 
impact, and not only be secluded to a narrow segment of 
states wanting high standards. Therefore, the IMO should 
be seen as a maritime organ securing minimum standards, 
given the regulatory space and its member’s power. 
Influence within the IMO is limited to national 
delegations, yet they can invite any stakeholder deemed 
relevant for the delegation (IMO, 2015). The IMO has 
agreed upon multiple conventions since its inception in 
1959. the three major ones being the International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), the 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution 
from Ships (MARPOL) and the International Convention 
on Standards of Training, Certification and Watch keeping 
for Seafarers (STCW). In recent decades, IMO has started 
to tackle problems arising from pollution and has amended 
MARPOL to reflect these new policy objectives (IMO, 
2015). 
 
European Union (EU) 
The economic and political partnership of the European 
Union has a high regional mandate, due to the regulatory 
powers of the commission. It is based on the rule of law, 
with voluntary and democratically treaties providing 
binding targets for member states. The single market in the 
union is an example of the mandate allocated to the EU, 
and the harmonization of countries. It can therefore be 
defined as a catalyst for uniform interpretation and 
enforcement of Sulphur regulation by Baltic EU member 
states, as seen in Directive 2012/33/EU (European 
Parliament & Council of the European Union, 2012). The 
EU Commission is an observer in IMO with no voting 
power, but retains the ability to submit documents and 
proposals. 
 
HELCOM 
The Baltic Marine Environmental Protection Commission 
is the governing body of the Helsinki Commission 
(HELCOM). Its members comprise of the states around 
the Baltic Sea, where the commission seeks to increase 
intergovernmental cooperation to protect the marine 
environment. Efforts by HELCOM to further increase 
environmental protection have recently been halted by 
Russian policy makers, who disagreed that HELCOM 
should support further international restrictions in the 
Baltic Sea. This is the case of NOx emissions and how 
stringently SOx has to be enforced (International Maritime 
Organization, 2008).  
 
2.1.2 Industry Organizations 
ECSA 
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The European Community Ship-owners Association is a 
member association consisting of 21 national associations, 
within the EU and Norway. ECSA provides policy inputs 
to EU from different internal committees and working 
groups, containing representatives from the national 
organizations and industry experts. They have ten working 
group committees covering different topics within 
shipping policy. It is notable that ECSA has a task force 
only concerned with Sulphur regulation and coordination 
between members (ECSA, 2015).   
 
BIMCO 
The Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) 
is the world’s largest international shipping association, 
with 2300 corporate members representing 65 percent of 
the global tonnage. Members include firms and 
organizations from across the industry: operators, brokers, 
agents, managers and ship-owners. The core objective of 
BIMCO is to facilitate ease of commercial operation 
through promotion of harmonisation and standardisation of 
all shipping related activities. Fair business practices are 
important to the organization, seeking to achieve open 
access to all markets. BIMCO is an active member of 
IMO, and frequently submits papers to the committees in 
achieving this objective (Baltic and International Maritime 
Council, 2015). 
 
ICS 
The International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) is an 
international trade association for the shipping industry, 
representing ship-owners and operators in all sectors. Its 
members include national ship-owners association’s across 
the world, covering 80% of the world’s merchant tonnage. 
The ICS is concerned with all maritime questions 
involving technical, legal, employment or regulation. They 
strive for an international regulatory framework that 
supports safe and environmentally sound ship operations, 
opposing unilateral or regional schemes. The ICS 
represents its members in various intergovernmental 
bodies, including the IMO, and have a regional partnership 
with ECSA (ICS, 2015). 
 
World Shipping Council (WSC) 
World Shipping Council (WSC) is an industry trade group 
with 28 members, representing approximately 90 percent 
of the global liner shipping capacity. Their aim is to 
provide a coordinated voice for the liner shipping industry, 
by working with other industry groups and policymakers. 
The primary focus is maritime security, but they are also 
 
 
 
Source: Scanpix / Iris  
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involved in the development of international container 
standards, environmental stewardship and an efficient 
transportation infrastructure (Worldshipping, 2015).  
 
INTERTANKO 
International Association of Independent Tanker Owners 
(INTERTANKO) is a forum open for all independent 
tanker owners and operators. As of January 2014, 
INTERTANKO had 212 members with a combined fleet 
of 3040 tankers. On top of this, they also have 300 
associated members, which are all directly or indirectly 
related to the tanker industry. The goal of the forum is for 
the industry to meet and create statements based on 
policies on a local, regional and international level. They 
are perceived as an NGO within the IMO, and are active 
within the UN Conference on Trade and Development 
(Intertanko, 2015).  
EUROMOT 
The European Association of Internal Combustion Engine 
Manufacturers (EUROMOT) is a European organization 
for producers of internal combustion engines, yet they are 
also active worldwide in affecting different industry 
frameworks. EUROMOT’s mission is to communicate the 
added value of internal combustion engines. They seek to 
develop the right level of regulation for the minimal 
impact on the local and global environment, by providing 
technical input for policy discussions. Marine engines 
make up a sub-section of EUROMOTs focus, as they are 
also working with road, non-road and stationary engines 
(EUROMOT, 2015).   
 
INTERFERRY 
With a global scope, Interferry represents the ferry 
industry worldwide, with 225 members from 38 countries. 
The association was created to allow members to network 
and provide a forum for learning synergies across markets. 
Importantly it represents its members in the IMO and 
within the ECSA; in both organizations as a consultative 
member. It supports high safety regulation, open 
competition, consistent shipping regulation and adherence 
to environmental regulations (Interferry, 2015). 
 
TRIDENT ALLIANCE 
A coalition of 31 shipping operators and owners that 
specifically focuses on the enforcement of Sulphur 
regulation in Northern Europe. Trident seeks to create a 
robust enforcement mechanism in the region eliminating 
the incentive for non-compliance. Enforcement and 
compliance are seen as crucial in ensuring a level playing 
field for all operators. Despite being a smaller actor 
internationally, they try to position themselves as a 
regional lobbying group regarding Sulphur regulation, due 
to the member’s high activity level in the Baltic. Their 
mission is to raise awareness, ensure transparency of 
member’s compliance and encourage innovation in 
enforcement technology. Members include: Stena, 
Unifeeder, Maersk Line, DFDS, Hamburg Süd and 
Wallenius Wilhelmsen logistics (Trident Alliance, 2015). 
 
2.1.3 Firms/Owners/operators 
MAERSK 
The Maersk Group conglomerate works with logistics and 
maritime operations on a global scale: Maersk Line, APM 
Terminals, Maersk Shipping Services, Maersk Drilling and 
Maersk Oil. For a company with so many maritime assets, 
there is a high interest on how regulation influences the 
OPEX of their operations. For SOx regulation in the Baltic 
and North Sea specifically, Maersk has to consider 
implications of navigating within the SECA zone and the 
extra cost of compliance, which deviates a lot within the 
different business areas. Maersk Line only operates 
marginally within the SECA, thus having to choose a 
compliance strategy suitable for this need. On the other 
hand, Maersk Shipping Services, Oil and Drilling operates 
purely inside the SECA during their operational years. The 
prospect of the expansion of the SECA to other regions, 
Mediterranean and parts of Asia increases the interest for 
how regulation is operationalized. Maersk themselves are 
highly active within the regulatory framework, active in 
WSC and BIMCO. At the same time, they have high 
demands for their suppliers, creating a demand for certain 
assets in their pursuit of environmental and efficient 
transport solutions (Mærsk, 2015).   
 
DFDS 
Provider of shipping and ferry services primarily, within 
the SECA, DFDS has a large exposure to the new 
regulation. Operating 55 vessels, it is a challenge to define 
what the optimal compliance strategy is, given multiple 
vessel types and routes. The DFDS fleet is predominantly 
composed of Ro-Ro vessels, approximately 80% of the 
revenue generated by goods transport in 2014, and 
approximately 20% generated by its 6 million passengers 
(DFDS, 2014).  
 
STENA 
The Swedish ferry operator Stena line has a slightly 
different profile compared to DFDS, transporting 14.6 
million passengers with a fleet of 35 vessels in 2013. Thus 
Stena is geared more towards passenger transport, 
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compared to the DFDS’ focus on Ro-Ro activities. The 
regulatory exposure of the two operators is very similar, as 
Stena also has a well-developed network in the SECA and 
activities around the British Isles (Stena Line, 2015b). 
 
UNIFEEDER 
Operating a network of vessels in the Baltic, Unifeeder has 
the same exposure to the change in regulation as the two 
other major regional vessel operators, Stena and DFDS.  
As opposed to the other actors, Unifeeder operates as a 
short sea shipping service in the Baltic – using a network 
of feeder ships, trains, and trucks. This allows them to 
utilize the modular mode of transport, potentially shifting 
volumes from shipping to land based transport. Their 
network is also highly active in the Mediterranean, where a 
future SECA is also proposed, providing them an incentive 
to be a part of creating the Baltic SECA (Unifeeder, 2015).   
 
2.1.4 Suppliers 
MAN DIESEL & TURBO 
Within the market for low and medium speed marine 
engines, MAN is a lead designer and manufacturer 
worldwide. They cover approximately 50% of the power 
needed for all world trade covering engines, auxiliary 
power and turbochargers. Diversified with in the maritime 
industry, MAN provides power to vessels of many 
segments: container, cruise, tanker, support, and offshore 
services. The regulatory interest of MAN is how power 
plants can be modified directly or indirectly to provide 
compliance to the SECA and still deliver the same product 
to its customers (MAN Diesel & Turbo, 2015).    
 
WÄRTSILÄ 
Wärtsilä is a global producer of complete lifecycle power 
solutions for energy markets and the maritime sector. They 
produce scrubber exhaust cleaning systems for both these 
markets, allowing them to diversify the application of their 
technology. This allows them to be a “one-stop” solution 
for providing a SECA-compliant power solution for new 
vessels, and compatibility with vessels using their power 
solutions. For suppliers like Wärtsila, sudden changes in 
regulatory requirements are costly, so naturally these firms 
are engaged in the policy process (Wärtsila, 2015).  
 
ALFA LAVAL 
Alfa Laval focuses on saving energy and protecting the 
environment, with technological expertise in fluid 
handling, heat transfer, exchangers, separation and pumps. 
Alfa Laval is present in multiple industries, having three 
core focus areas: “Energy & the Environment”, “Food & 
Pharma” and “Marine & Diesel”. Within the Marine and 
Diesel area, their product portfolio contributes to virtually 
all elements of vessel operation. Like Wärtsila, they are 
also interested in how the regulation affects the overall 
performance of vessels, and the effect on the market for 
scrubbers, as this affects their asset portfolio (Alfa Laval, 
2015).  
 
2.1.5 Non-Governmental Organizations  
CLEAN SHIPPING COALITION 
A global environmental organization specialized 
exclusively on shipping issues. Their objective is to protect 
and restore the marine and atmospheric environment. This 
is achieved by developing operational standards for vessels 
that are sustainable, safe and make social and economic 
sense. CSC is supported by their wide knowledge base 
from their eight European climate NGOs. They have status 
as observer at the IMO since 2010, providing their member 
NGOs access to the global mandated organization. The 
CSC actively seeks to allow smaller environmental groups 
to access to the IMO, as it sees the IMO as having an 
under-representation of environmental group (Clean 
Shipping Coalition, 2015).  
 
TRANSPORT AND ENVIRONMENT 
Their mission is to promote policies that facilitate 
sustainable transport and minimize the impact and on the 
environment. The organization represents around 50 
environmental groups and campaigns (including the World 
Wildlife Foundation), working on national, regional, and 
local level. It provides ideas and knowledge for the 
members, by providing scientific and evidence based 
research for its members. The policy focus of the 
organization, and its members, is primarily processes on 
the European continent. They are members of the Clean 
Shipping Coalition, making up a majority of CSC’s the 
delegation to the IMO (Transport and Environment, 2015). 
 
GREENPEACE 
Greenpeace is known for its activist approach to questions 
of environmental protections. In the maritime world, 
Greenpeace often takes a more radical position compared 
to other NGOs, such as Transport & Environment, 
utilizing their global array of activists and three activist 
vessels. Their main mission is built around the protection 
of wildlife in the ocean, as well as the sensitive ecosystems 
and habitats of marine animals. Greenpeace retains an 
observer position at the IMO which includes the ability to 
submit papers and proposal, but not voting rights 
(Greenpeace International, 2016).  
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In the first part of this chapter, the microeconomic 
foundations behind regulation of the industry are 
introduced following an elaboration on why such 
regulation has been introduced to the maritime industry. 
The second part introduces the reader to the different 
strategies ship-owners operating in the Baltic and North 
Sea can adopt in response to the introduction of the 
Sulphur regulations. Thus follows a quantitative study 
further examining the strengths and weaknesses associated 
with adopting each of these strategies. 
 
3.1 THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 
The economics of regulation is a large and essential factor 
in determining when and how to regulate emissions and 
consumer behaviour in a modern society.  Several different 
methods of regulation exist and forming the right level of 
regulation is essential in maximizing the societal utility1. 
In most cases regulation is introduced when negative 
externalities are associated with the consumption or 
production of a god in a society, but before continuing to a 
review of the economics behind an efficient regulative 
framework, an introduction to the economic concept of 
externalities is required. 
       
3.1.1 The dilemma of externalities 
An externality is said to occur when an actor produces or 
consumes a certain good, which has a negative, or positive 
effect on the utility or profit of another actor in a way, 
                                                          
1 Utility is an economic measurement of the welfare of the 
public. That is, a higher level of social utility will improve 
the welfare of the society. Welfare is often measured in 
monetary terms but may also take unmeasurable terms 
such as happiness. 
which is not directly, intended (Perman, Ma, McGilvray, 
& Common, 2003). In the context of this study, 
externalities transform into the adverse effects on the 
environment and health of society resulting from 
emissions from international ship traffic in the Baltic and 
North Sea. While the primary purpose of the ship-owners 
is the transport of goods, the pollution is therefore a by-
product of this and consequently an externality. Negative 
externalities, such as pollution, are common amongst price 
actors in sectors such as transportation and production 
industries. Measured monetarily, the effects associated 
with these externalities may amount to huge sums. A vast 
majority of such private actors in these industries are profit 
maximizing and therefore aim to operate using the 
technologies that provide the lowest costs to the firm.  
 
In a scenario with no regulation, these external costs to 
human health and the environment from pollution are 
passed on to the public. This creates an economic burden 
for society in the form of loss of life, loss of quality of life, 
and increases in healthcare expenditure. For the 
international maritime transport industry, this means 
fuelling the ship with highly polluting heavy fuel oil and 
passing the associated costs on to the populations of the 
coastal states situated near the shipping lanes. Regulative 
measures are therefore needed in order to minimize the 
costs faced by populations exposed to negative 
externalities created by pollutants. While the emissions 
from ship traffic are an example of negative externalities, 
positive externalities may also arise during the 
consumption or production of a good. An example of these 
is the pollination of nearby plants from the bees of a 
nearby apiary.  
3 THE MARKET PERSPECTIVE: FIVE 
STRATEGIES FOR SHIP-OPERATORS 
ALTHOUGH THE PRODUCT OF POLITICS, THE SULPHUR REGULATION INTRODUCED IN 2015 IS 
BASED ON ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES OF REDUCING COSTS TO THE SOCEITY INCURRED BY 
POLLUTANTS FROM MARITIME OPERATIONS. CONSEQUENTLY, THE MARITIME INDUSTRY 
FACES A COMPLEX SET OF DECISIONS OF HOW TO MINIMIZE THE COST INCREASES 
FOLLOWING THE TIGHTENING OF ENVIRONMENTAL STANDARDS. THIS CHAPTER 
THOROUGHLY ANALYSES THESE CHALLENGES. 
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In the context of Sulphur emissions in the Baltic and North 
Sea, government intervention is required in order to 
minimize the social costs incurred by the emission of 
pollutants, from maritime traffic. This regulation must 
shift the costs, so that the polluter instead of the polluted 
bears the externality costs. Such a scenario of negative 
externalities from the maritime industry is exemplified in 
figure 3.1 below. 
 
In a scenario with a free and unregulated market, the 
market supply curve labelled “private cost” denotes the 
supply and therefore the costs encountered by the private 
maritime industry. If the supplier only takes into account 
these private costs, all the costs of negative externalities 
are passed on to society. The initial equilibrium without 
any regulation is therefore found at the intersection 
between the private demand and the supply curve labelled 
“private costs”. In this equilibrium, a large amount of 
goods is produced at a low price, which translates into a 
low level of freight rates in the Baltic and North Sea. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Negative externalities and the social optimum 
Source: Own illustration 
 
 
The private costs do not encompass the total costs for 
society that arise due to industry emissions causing 
adverse effects to the health of humans and nature alike. 
These societal total costs are reflected in the cost curve 
labelled “social costs”, which is composed of private costs 
plus cost of externalities. This implies that the area 
between the two cost curves denotes the total costs of 
pollution. The social optimum (i.e. the economically 
optimal level of production) is therefore found at the 
intersection of the demand and social cost curve, changing 
the equilibrium to a point where the price of the good is 
significantly higher and the amount produced is lower, 
depending on the price elasticity of demand2. The aim for 
the policy makers are therefore to adopt a level of 
regulation that shifts the private cost supply curve 
sufficiently such that the social optimum is achieved, 
taking potential demand alterations into account as well.  
 
3.1.2 The optimal level of regulation 
After establishing that the production of a given industry is 
causing negative externalities, regulation is required in 
order to reduce the negative external costs. To do this, it is 
required that the right level of regulation is determined, 
which is significantly more complicated. Difficult 
questions arise: What is the right level of regulation, what 
determines the social optimum and why not just ban the 
release of emissions into the atmosphere all together? In 
order to answer these questions, further economic 
reasoning and analysis is needed in order to facilitate an 
effective level of regulation of the industry. 
 
A rational assumption is that policymakers are aiming to 
maximize social utility and therefore affect either the total 
supply or demand such that an overall societal optimum is 
achieved.  Such policymakers must therefore aim to strike 
a balance between the damage done by the negative 
externalities and the benefits to society created by the good 
produced. While the pollution in itself does not presents 
any benefits to society, the primary industry sector 
emitting the pollution may provide vital services to society 
and therefore provide an increase in social welfare. In the 
context of Sulphur emissions in the Baltic and North Sea, 
international ship traffic plays an important part in the 
transport of goods between the world’s economic regions, 
thereby bolstering trade and economic growth. Such 
beneficial and disadvantageous effects of emission 
abatement along with the socially optimal level of 
regulation are illustrated in figure 3.2 on the following 
page3. 
 
The line labelled “pollution costs” illustrates the societal 
external cost of the damages to human health and the 
environment given the level of pollution. Intuitively, a 
higher level of Sulphur particles in the atmosphere will 
result in higher costs to society due to the effects of an 
increasing amount of pollution-related illness. The other 
line labelled “pollution benefit” illustrates the benefits to  
                                                          
2 For the shipping sector where such elasticity is low, the 
reduction in the amount of cargo transported is expected to 
be insignificant.  
3 For an in debt review of externalities and the social 
optimal level of regulation see Perman, et al., (2003). 
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society from the source of the pollution. The benefit is 
increasing with the level of pollution, converging towards 
a certain point where an increase in the level of emissions 
will have no beneficial effect to society. For the 
commercial shipping industry this makes sense, because an 
increase in the level of Sulphur beyond the current level of 
3.5 percent would not provide larger profits nor lower the 
operational costs of the shipping firms. Conversely, 
regulating the level of Sulphur content very strictly will 
incur significant cost to the ship-owners, in turn resulting 
in higher freight rates and reductions in sea borne trade. A 
decrease in seaborne trade leads to a decrease in societal 
utility.    
 
Because policy makers aim to maximize the societal 
utility, the optimal level of emission abatement is found 
where the vertical distance between the benefit and 
damage function reaches the greatest value. This point, 
known as the societal net benefit of pollution, therefore 
maximizes the social utility of pollution in similar ways as 
a firm profit maximizes its profit margin. 
 
Another and more convenient way of interpreting the 
societal net benefit of pollution is to use the notion of 
“marginal damage” and “marginal benefit” functions, 
respectively, as presented by the lower graph in figure 3.3. 
The "marginal pollution cost” function is increasing with 
the level of emissions while the “marginal pollution 
benefits” function is decreasing to the point where an 
increase in the level of emissions will not result in an 
increase in benefit4. The optimal emission level, where the 
societal benefit is highest, is found at the intersection 
between the marginal damage and marginal benefit curves. 
This is indicated above, where the marginal costs of 
abatement equals the marginal damage as illustrated by 
point E.  
Another important implication from the cost curves is the 
explanation of why a total ban on emissions will not 
always be beneficial to society. From figure 3.2 it can be 
seen that as the emission level is reduced to a level close to 
                                                          
4 In a scenario with an unconstrained emission level, the 
firms, assuming they are profit maximizing, will pollute at 
the point where the marginal benefits equal zero resulting 
in a high level of damage to the society and low costs to 
the firms (Line A). In such a scenario all the costs 
associated with reductions in human health and 
environmental damage is passed on the public while the 
firms experience low costs and a potential high profit 
margin. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: The optimal level of regulation 
The blue line denoted by “D(M)” illustrates the total damage caused by the pollutant while the red line denoted by 
“B(M)” illustrates the benefits arising from the polluting industries and activities. The optimal level of pollution is found 
at the level of emissions “M” where the net benefits are maximized, illustrated by the vertical line labelled “maximizes 
net benefits”. 
Source: Own illustrations based on figures from Perman, et al., (2003).    
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zero, the benefits of pollution far exceeds the total costs of 
pollution resulting in a social efficiency loss. The fact that 
society may actually benefit from negative externalities 
such as pollution goes counter intuitive and explains why 
policy makers does not ban the emissions of Sulphuric 
oxide all together. Why is this the case and how can 
pollution be beneficial? In the case of the shipping 
industry, a complete ban on Sulphur particles in fuel would 
increase the operational costs of ship-owners to a level that 
would cripple individual firms until alternative 
technologies, such as LNG, matured.  
 
Such a scenario would not only force firms below the 
shutdown point, but also severely hinder maritime 
transport of goods, causing shortages and drastic freight 
rate increases and, consequently, a large societal loss. 
Finding the appropriate level of regulation of pollutants is 
therefore a significant requirement in order to reduce the 
adverse effects to human health and the environment, 
while at the same time ensuring that it remains feasible for 
firms to stay in business.  
 
 
 
It is important to note that the functions illustrated in 
figures 3.2 and 3.3 are standard emission curves and 
therefore reflect a general interpretation of the costs and 
benefits of pollution and emission regulations5 - the 
concrete effects of pollution in the Baltic and North Sea 
may, in reality, be different. Further, the cost and benefit 
curves depicted in these figures only illustrate the societal 
optimal level of pollution and do not explain how different 
forms of regulation may achieve a societal optimum. For 
example, the Sulphur regulation in the Baltic and North 
Sea is implemented as a technical standard that requires 
the Sulphur content of emissions not to exceed a specific 
value (0.1 %), while other environmental standards instead 
tax each harmful unit of pollutant used or emitted6.  
 
Although all regulation increases the price of the good 
produced, thus lowering the amount of the negative 
externality produced, the way society is compensated for 
the costs of pollution do, however, differ significantly 
between the two forms of regulation. For a general 
emission tax to be effective, the tariff rate must be 
                                                          
5 The standard emission curves are adopted from Perman 
et. al. (Perman et al., 2003). 
6 Several other forms of regulations exist such as the cap & 
trade system of the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Alternative determination of the optimal level of regulation  
The blue line denoted by “dD/dM” illustrates the marginal damage caused by the pollutant while the red line denoted by 
“dB/dM” illustrates the marginal benefits arising from the polluting industries and activities. The optimal level of 
pollution is found at point E where the net benefit of the pollutant is maximized. 
Source: Own illustrations based on figures from Perman et. al., (2003).    
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sufficiently high in order to lower demand to the point of 
the social optimum. Some of the societal costs are also 
compensated for due to an increase in tax revenues, which 
in turn is spent on society. In such a scenario, the firms are 
enticed to lower their emissions by adapting new 
technologies or fuel types, in order to reduce the tax 
burden, but are not required to do so. This contrasts to the 
Sulphur regulation in the ECA zone, where the adaption of 
new technological or fuel types is mandatory in order to 
avoid sanctioning. The reduction in the emissions of 
Sulphur dioxide may therefore be achieved without a 
significant reduction in the amount of production; which in 
this case is the amount of freight that is transported 
through the ECA zone. Additionally, the form of 
regulation adopted in the Baltic will it will not generate tax 
revenue as seen with other forms of regulation. In light of 
such complexities in the regulation of negative 
externalities, it is worth noting that the graphs depicted in 
figures 3.1 to 3.3 are simplified and does not emphasize all 
the aspects and impacts of the introduction of regulative 
schemes. 
 
3.1.3 The social costs in numbers 
While it is simple to illustrate the optimal level of 
emissions allowed from the point of theoretical micro 
economics, calculating both the actual costs incurred and 
benefits accrued by society is quite complicated as a 
multitude of factors needs to be taken into account. A 
recent report by Brandt, et al., (2011) written for the 
Danish Centre for Energy, Environment and Health 
examines the adverse effects to human health in Europe, 
resulting from emissions of air pollutants from different 
industry sectors.  The adverse effects of these emissions 
are calculated using a combination of air pollution models, 
data on European population densities and economic 
evaluation models and converted into both direct health 
impacts and monetary costs.  The results show that the 
impacts on human health due to air pollution from 
international ship traffic on the northern hemisphere are 
predicted to increase between 2000 and 2020 compared to 
all other industrial sectors where a decrease is predicted. In 
the study, Brandt, et al., (2011) found that international 
ship traffic on the entire northern hemisphere resulted in 
approximately 49,500 premature deaths in Europe in year 
2000 and projected this number to rise to approximately 
53,200 in year 2020. Measured monetarily, the total 
European external health related costs from international 
ship traffic on the northern hemisphere was estimated to be 
a total of 58.4 billion EUR per year in 2000 and rising to 
64.1 billion EUR per year in 2020. The external health 
related emission costs and external health related costs 
from emissions of Sulphur in Europe as a consequence of 
emissions from international ship traffic on the northern  
hemisphere and the Baltic and North Sea in year 2000, 
2011 and 2020 (projected) are illustrated in table 3.1.  
 
Although the external health related costs associated with 
shipping pollution are projected to increase in Europe, the 
initial introduction of regulation limiting the Sulphur 
content of fuel to 1 % followed by recent enhancement of 
in the Baltic and North Sea will have a diminishing effect 
on these costs increase. Consequently, the external health-
related costs from emissions from international ship traffic 
in the Baltic and North Sea are expected to drop to 14.1 
billion EUR in 2020 from a level of 22 billion EUR per 
year in 2000 equalling a reduction of almost 30 percent. 
Table 3.1: External Health Related Costs in Europe 
Illustrated are the total external health related costs from both total emissions and Sulphur in Europe as a consequence of 
international ship traffic on the northern hemisphere and the Baltic and North Sea in year 2000, 2011 and 2020 
(projected). All costs are measured in 2006 constant euros.  
Source: (Brandt et al., 2013a) 
 
Source / Year External health related 
costs from all emissions 
from shipping on the 
northern hemisphere 
(billion EUR) 
External health related 
costs from all emissions 
from shipping in the 
Baltic / North Sea 
(billion EUR) 
External health related 
costs from Sulphur 
particle emissions from 
ship traffic on the 
northern hemisphere 
(billion EUR) 
External health related 
costs from Sulphur 
particle emissions from 
ship traffic in the Baltic 
/ North Sea 
(billion EUR) 
Year 2000 58.4 22.0  27.0 11.6  
Year 2011 54.3  14.7  21.0 3.55 
Year 2020 (projected) 64.1 14.1  24.3 0.360 
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The most extreme drop in these health-related costs is 
those from Sulphur particle emissions from the Baltic and 
North Sea. These costs are projected to be reduced by 
more than 95 percent, from yearly costs of 11.600 million 
EUR in 2000 to 360 million EUR in 2020 even though the 
external health related costs from Sulphur particle 
emissions from international ship traffic on the northern 
hemisphere is still projected to amount to 24 billion EUR 
in 2020.  
 
Given its location in the middle of the ECA zone, 
Denmark, at the introduction of the regulation, will 
experience positive effect in terms of societal costs. The 
annual health related costs in Denmark from international 
ship traffic in the northern hemisphere and the Baltic / 
North Sea in the years 2000, 2011 and 2020 are illustrated 
in table 3.2. 
 
From the figure it is clear that previous Sulphur regulation 
such as the 1 % cap in 2010 already had a large impact on 
the external health related costs from Sulphur particle 
emissions. This is evident from the changes between 2000 
and 2011, and the projections indicate further reductions in 
these costs from the introduction of the Sulphur 
regulations of 2015. The external health related costs from 
international shipping on the northern hemisphere are 
projected to decrease from a level of 805 million EUR in 
2000 to 484 million EUR in 2020. The annual external 
health related costs from international shipping in the 
Baltic and North Sea alone is projected to fall to 357 
million EUR in 2020 from 627 million EUR in 2000, 
equalling a reduction of close to 43 percent.  
Although the annual reductions in the external health 
related cost from the step-wise reductions in the allowed 
Sulphur content are massive, the emissions from 
international shipping on the northern hemisphere relative 
to the total external cost from all emission sources is 
actually projected to increase in the same time period. 
Reductions in the emissions from other sectors in 
combination with a high emission level of NOx will result 
in the percentage of the total external health costs in 
Denmark, incurred by maritime traffic, to increase from a 
level of 18 percent in 2000 to 19 percent in 2020.   
 
The total benefits of pollution are generally more 
complicated to calculate. In order to compute an 
approximately correct estimate, the researcher needs 
information about how the freight rate affects the total 
economy of the country. However, the effective level of 
regulation is generally achieved when external costs of the 
pollutant exceed the abatement costs of the polluters 
(Press-Kristensen, 2014). In the context of the Sulphur 
regulations in the Baltic and North Sea, this means that the 
external health related costs from the Sulphur emissions 
must exceed the costs faced by the ship-owners operating 
within the regulated area. 
From Brandt et al. (Brandt et al., 2013b), the total health 
related external costs from emissions of Sulphur from 
international shipping in the Baltic and North Sea is 17.5 
EUR per kilogram of SO2 emissions. Comparatively, the 
removal costs of replacing a ton of the 1 percent bunker 
fuel, currently used in the Baltic and North Sea, with a ton 
of 0.1 percent Marine gas oil is approximately 11.5 EUR 
per kilogram of SO2 emissions (Press-Kristensen, 2014)7. 
This leaves a cost difference (between the external health-
                                                          
7 The 1 percent bunker fuel and the 0.1 percent MGO is in 
this example assumed to be priced at 480 and 690 EUR 
respectively. 
Source / Year External health related costs from all 
emissions from shipping on the northern 
hemisphere (million EUR) 
External health related costs from all 
emissions from shipping in the Baltic / 
(million EUR) 
Year 2000 805  627 
Year 2011 558 414 
Year 2020 (projected) 448  357 
Table 3.2: External health related costs in Denmark from maritime activities 
Illustrated are the total external health related costs from both total emissions and Sulphur in Denmark as a consequence 
of international ship traffic on the northern hemisphere and the Baltic and North Sea in year 2000, 2011 and 2020 
(projected). All costs are measured in 2006 constant euros.  
Source: (Brandt et al., 2013b) 
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related costs and the removal costs) of 6 EUR, resulting in 
a net benefit to society of 6 EUR per kilogram of 
emissions of SO2 avoided due to the introduction of the 
regulation. Conversely a total ban on the emission of 
Sulphur would cause the removal costs of the emission of 
a kilogram of SO2 faced by the polluters to be severe and 
most likely exceed the external health cost level of 17.5 
EUR per kilogram of SO2 emissions by a wide margin. 
This cost increase reflects the fact that substitute 
technologies without SOx are quite expensive. 
  
From the above external health related cost estimations, it 
is clear that the regulation, on Sulphur emissions for ship 
traffic in the Baltic and North Sea introduced in 2010, has 
had a dramatic effect on the external health related costs 
from shipping in the Baltic and North Sea. Further cost 
decreases are projected after the introduction of the new 
Sulphur regulations at the onset of 2015. These results 
indicate that environment regulations on international ship 
traffic in other parts of the world will result in major 
improvements in the health of the nearby population and, 
additionally, resulting in large reductions of external health 
related costs. 
 
3.2 INDUSTRY COST ANALYSIS   
While the introduction of the enhanced regulation of 
Sulphur emissions in the Baltic and North Seas causes a 
reduction in the external health costs of humans and 
environment alike, the requirements of maintaining a level 
of Sulphur emissions below 0.1 percent will force the 
owners and charterers of the vessels operating within the 
ECA zone to adapt new fuel strategies. Several means of 
complying with the regulation exist, but common to them 
all is a significant increase in the costs faced by the ship-
operators operating within the ECA zone.  The aim of this 
chapter is to project the costs associated with the different 
strategies which ship-owners can choose. The difference in 
terms of markets and route segments within the shipping 
industry means that the dominant strategy may vary 
between different vessels, and by deploying these cost 
projections it may be possible to illuminate which factors 
determine the feasibility of the different strategies.  
3.2.1 The adaptation of five strategies 
The different strategies of compliance faced by the ship-
owner / charterer required in order to comply with the new 
regulation can be divided into two categories: Fuel 
switching or engine retrofits.  
 
Fuel switching strategies revolve around the ship-owner 
freely shifting between standard heavy fuel oil (HFO) 
when outside of the ECA zone and ultra-low Sulphur fuels 
when entering the Baltic and North Seas. These ultra-low 
Sulphur fuels include the commonly used marine gas oil 
(MGO), marine diesel oil (MDO) and several other types 
of fuel currently under development8. These types of fuels 
are significantly more expensive than standard HFO.  
 
The ship-owner can instead decide to adopt a strategy of 
retrofitting the vessel with a scrubber, which filters away a 
large fraction of the Sulphur emissions, thereby allowing 
for the continued use of cheap high Sulphur fuels. 
Currently, several types of scrubbers exist, including both 
dry and water scrubbers with the latter coming in both 
open- and closed-looped form. Another possible retrofit is 
the installation of engine modifications and pressure tanks 
to allow the ship to be capable of operating on both LNG 
and HFO. For a company operating a large fleet of vessels, 
the introduction of the enhanced Sulphur regulations has 
the potential to increase the fuel related costs by hundreds 
of million euros. Selecting the most cost-effective way to 
reduce the Sulphur emissions to ECA-compliance levels is 
therefore of immense significance in a market of intense 
cost-competition.   
 
Due to the similarity of many of the types of alternate fuels 
and scrubber types, this analysis will only examine three 
concrete strategies of compliance deemed most likely to 
dominate the market in the long run: Fuel switching to 
MGO, retrofitting the ship with a closed loop freshwater  
scrubber, and finally retrofitting the engine to operate on 
LNG. Additionally, a strategy of non-compliance is 
included where the ship-owner continues operating on 
HFO and take advantage of the lax enforcement scheme
                                                          
8 For example, has Exxon recently announced the 
introduction of a new form of low Sulphur fuel.  This new 
fuel HDME 50, short of Heavy Distillate Marine ECA 50 
is compliant with the new Sulphur regulations by 
containing under 0.1 % Sulphur and the viscosity of the 
fuel is makes the storage and handling similar to that of 
HFO (ExxonMobil, 2014). This reduces the risk of thermal 
shocks to the engine when switching fuel reported on 
several occasions for vessels switching to MGO. Currently 
HDME is only produced by Exxon, is only stored at a few 
ports in the Netherlands and Belgium and it remains to be 
seen if the price can compete with that of MGO. Exxon 
has received a lot of interest from the shipping industry 
and both of the companies Norden and Torm mention 
HDME as a possible fuel according to Shippingwatch 
(Raun, 2014b). 
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currently reported to exist within the ECA zone. Finally, 
the ship-owner can decide to avoid operating within the 
ECA zone at all, either by terminating the vessel or 
relocating it to other parts of the world (insofar the vessel 
may continue to generate revenue for the owner). The 
economic strengths and weaknesses of these five strategies 
are illustrated in table 3.3 and further examined below. 
 
Scrubber 
By retrofitting the ship with a scrubber system, the vessel 
can continue to burn HFO when operating in the Baltic and 
North Sea ECA zones, thus keeping the bunker costs at a 
level not significantly higher than the level before 2015. 
This especially makes the scrubber an attractive solution 
for vessels operating a majority of the time within the ECA 
zone as the price for MGO remains significantly higher 
than that of HFO. Further, if the more restrictive global 
Sulphur regulation is adopted by the IMO all vessels must 
emit a maximum of 1 % Sulphur in all waters from the 
beginning of the next decade.  
 
Retrofitting the vessel with a scrubber will allow the vessel 
to continue operating on the cheaper 2.2 % or 3.5 % HFO 
in this situation. Although it is uncertain when this global 
regulation will come into effect, this study assumes such a 
global Sulphur cap by 2020.  
 
The retrofitting costs of installing a scrubber are, however, 
significant and costs may easily amount to several million 
USD, depending on the size of the vessel. This is 
especially a problem for many ship-owners as the industry 
has experienced a limited access to capital and credit in 
recent years, due to many banks trying to reduce their 
shipping-commitments (Stulgis, Smith, Rehmatulla, 
Powers, & Hoppe, 2014). Additionally, it has still to be 
determined how policy makers will form the regulation of 
waste removal from open loop scrubbers, creating 
uncertainty among ship-owners on what type of retrofit the 
significant amount of capital required should be allocated. 
 
Due to the capital requirements, a viable strategy for 
shipping companies is to postpone the decision on whether 
to install a scrubber, and either operate on MGO or take 
advantage of the currently vague enforcement procedures 
in the port states and coastal states of the ECA zone (see 
part 4). Additionally, a significant fraction of the tonnage 
operating within the ECA zone is chartered, which reduces 
the incentive of the ship-owner to allocate the capital on an 
expensive retrofit when all the operational costs are passed 
on to the charterer. The problem of moral hazard is further 
exacerbated as the charterer will have little incentive to 
pay for the retrofit and thereby make the vessel more 
valuable, unless the chartering period spans a sufficiently 
long period such that the investment yields positive 
returns. 
 
 
Strategy Strength Weakness 
Scrubber Can continue operating on HFO 
No fuel switching 
 
Moderate investment costs 
 
MGO 
 
No investment costs 
Can continue operating on HFO outside 
the ECA zone 
 
High fuel spread between HFO and MGO 
 
LNG 
 
LNG fuel is fairly cheap in EU 
 
Large investment costs 
Lack of infrastructure and refueling 
capabilities 
 
Non-compliance 
 
No need for retrofit nor fuel switching 
Current enforcement is limited 
 
Risk of bad publicity and future sanctions 
 
 
Table 3.3: Strength and Weaknesses of compliance methods 
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MGO 
MGO is an ultra-low Sulphur fuel that makes fuel 
switching straightforward, since only a few adjustments to 
the engine are required to configure a former HFO-engine 
to operate on MGO. Due to the strict Sulphur regulation 
already being in effect for vessels calling at ports within 
the ECA zone prior to 2015, these minor extensions to the 
engine may be assumed to already be installed on a far 
majority of the vessels operating within the Baltic and 
North Seas.  Additionally, the vessel will still be capable 
of operating on HFO, and MGO-compliance is therefore 
the simplest strategy of compliance to adopt. The price of 
MGO is, however, significantly higher than that of HFO, 
with a price span as high as 300 USD per metric ton. 
Adopting the strategy of MGO may therefore be 
favourable for vessels operating outside of the ECA zone 
for the majority of the time. 
 
LNG 
LNG has the potential to be a big game changer for the 
maritime industry due to the availability of natural gas on 
the world market following technological improvements 
such as hydraulic fracking and the ease of the US export 
ban. Emissions from LNG contains almost zero Sulphur 
particles and therefore further helps reducing the negative 
externalities arising from shipping operations in the ECA 
zone. For the vessel to operate on LNG, the engine needs 
to be modified and pressurized fuel tanks must be 
installed. Depending on the retrofit, the engine will still be 
able to operate on MGO, creating the possibility of fuel 
switching in case of LNG price spikes or shortages. At 
present, infrastructure for refuelling and storage of LNG is 
severely underdeveloped, which, in combination with the 
higher costs of retrofitting compared to the scrubber, 
makes the investment in LNG relatively uncertain. These 
higher retrofitting costs and infrastructure shortages further 
exacerbates the current issues of moral hazard and credit 
constraints mentioned in the scrubber section, as charterers 
will have no incentives to retrofit the vessel and financial 
institutions will hesitate lending to risky investments. 
  
Non-compliance 
The fourth response strategy is to operate using the cheap 
high Sulphur content HFO within the SECA regardless of 
the introduction of the Sulphur regulation. By doing this, 
the ship-owner avoids paying the price of retrofitting the 
ship engine and operating on alternative fuels. This means 
that the only additional costs are the fines and sanctions 
imposed by the authorities of the ECA zone port city and 
coastal states (see part 4). The viability of this strategy 
thus relies critically on the impact and magnitude of the 
sanctions associated with non-compliance and the 
frequency of getting caught ”cheating” by authorities. The 
currently inefficient enforcement scheme adopted by the 
different coastal states within the ECA zone results, in 
combination with negligible fine sizes, in non-compliance 
being an attractive strategy for credit constrained ship-
owners. 
 
Termination 
The ship-owner has the fifth option of completely putting a 
stop to operations that take place within the ECA zone. By 
exercising such a strategy, the ship-owner faces the 
different options of either relocating the vessel to alternate 
areas where no Sulphur regulation or enforcement exists, 
or terminating the vessel completely. The latter option can 
be done by either selling it on the second-hand market or 
to a scrap-yard. Such scenarios will potentially incur costs 
in the form of lost revenue, but may easily be a cost-
effective solution for the ship-owner if other areas of the 
World have an increased transport demand. This is 
especially true if the price for low Sulphur fuel reaches 
unsustainable levels, or if the vessel is simply too old for a 
retrofit to be feasible. The adaptation of such a strategy 
may only incur extra costs on the ship-owner in the form 
of opportunity costs stemming from the loss of the market 
share in the ECA zone and the subsequent changes in the 
firm’s areas of operation.  
 
The purpose if this study is to identify the most cost 
effective strategies for the ship-owner to adopt after the 
introduction of the Sulphur regulation and does not take 
the revenue aspect into account. The strategy of 
terminating the vessel, yielding no fuel related costs, is 
therefore only partially mentioned in this analysis. This is 
done through a case study on the economic rationale 
behind the withdrawal of the Stena Line Ro-Ro the 
“Trelleborg” presented in chapter 3.2.11 later in this 
analysis. 
 
3.2.2 Observed industry strategies 
In 2013 and 2014, the affected firms started considering 
which modes of compliance to choose. While uncertainties 
existed with regards to price of MGO, scrubber retrofit, 
and LNG availability, firms decided on very different 
compliance strategies in the lead-up to the effective date of 
the new regulation. 
 
In 2013, the Danish Ro-Ro and Ro-Pax operator DFDS 
decided to upgrade 11 ships with scrubbers before the end 
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of 2014 (Knudsen, 2014a). In total, 20 DFDS vessels were 
technically able to have scrubbers installed. In late 2014, 
DFDS decided to retrofit all remaining vessels (barring 
those where retrofit was not technically feasible) at a total 
cost of 150 million USD. Scandlines, another Ro-Pax 
operator, also invested in retrofitting a number of vessels 
(Knudsen, 2014b; Pathak & MEC Intelligence, 2015).  
 
Outside Denmark, large operators such as Brittany and 
Carnival have invested hundreds of millions of USD in 
retrofitting their vessels (Jones & Brittany-Ferries, 2015), 
and an analysis conducted by MEC+ in 2015 showed that 
at least 14 operators had invested in scrubber retrofitting 
(Raun, 2015). Common to most of the retrofitting firms 
were that they operated continuously in the ECA. DFDS 
and Carnival operate Ro-ro, Ro-Pax, and Pax vessels in 
loops on short or medium length routes inside the ECA.  
 
Other firms have decided to forgo installing scrubbers and 
instead followed either an MGO- or LNG-focused 
strategy. Maersk decided early on to focus on dual-fuel 
solutions, using MGO inside the ECA and heavier fuel 
solutions on open sea. In 2014, Maersk stated that this was 
because most Maersk vessels spent relatively little time in 
ECAs, and thus the dual-fuel solution would be more 
economically sound. In addition, Maersk started 
examining the possibilities of LNG-powered vessels and to 
what extent facilities in Northern Europe were ready for 
this (Knudsen, 2014b).  
Some firms operating solely within the ECA also decided 
against scrubbers. Tallink, a Baltic Ro-Pax operator, and 
Stena, a Swedish RoRo and Ro-Pax operator, both decided 
to use MGO instead of scrubbers. Stena argued that they 
could afford to wait to see the scrubber technology 
develop further and possibly retrofit at some point in the 
future.   
 
It is evident that different firms have made different 
decisions, but surprisingly, firms operating under similar 
circumstances (such as DFDS and Stena) have chosen 
different compliance strategies. At the same time, 
operators with very different profiles (such as Maersk and 
Scanlines) have settled on very different strategies for 
compliance. 
 
Impact on the cost structure 
Regardless of which compliance strategy the ship-owner 
adopts, the annual costs of operating the vessel will 
significantly increase.  Depending on which of the 
different strategies adopted, the cost structure of the ship-
owner will change in different ways. Figure 3.4 outlies the 
different cost components that constitute the total costs 
associated with owning and operating a regular transport 
ship. The total costs are divided into three segments which, 
starting from the left hand side, includes the fixed costs, 
the running costs, and the variable costs. The fixed costs 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: The Cost Structure of a Ship 
Source: Own illustration, adapted from Stopford (2009) 
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include the cost components that are independent of the 
amount of days spent at sea, such as capital costs, 
depreciation, and insurance. These are contrasted with the 
variable costs, such as bunker fuel costs, that are 
dependent on the amount of days spent at sea. “Running 
costs” is an intermediate category that encompasses costs 
which are partially fixed and partially variable. Examples 
include components such as repairs & maintenance and 
administration costs. 
 
Ship-owners complying by running on MGO or MDO will 
only experience changes in the bunker fuel cost 
component. According to the current regulation, vessels 
calling at ports located within the Baltic and North Seas 
are compelled to operate on low Sulphur fuels, and the 
small alterations that are needed to operate on these fuels 
must therefore be assumed to have been installed 
previously, causing no changes to the capital & repayment 
cost component. Conversely, adopting any of the other 
strategies of compliance that involves retrofitting, these 
cost components change significantly. 
 
The significant costs associated with retrofits of the ship 
engine causes capital and repayment costs to increase. 
Furthermore, the complexities of deploying both a 
scrubber and an LNG engine extension simultaneously 
may also adversely affect the repairs, maintenance, and 
daily operational costs. The value of the bunker 
component may, however, be affected quite differently 
depending on the retrofit. This is because the continued 
use of HFO causes the cost component to remain largely 
unaffected9. However, the price spread between HFO and 
LNG may determine whether the fuel costs increase or 
decrease if the LNG retrofit is adopted. 
 
The cost component breakdown becomes impractical when 
allocating the fines to one of the components, as fines are 
not a direct factor in the typical operational costs of a 
vessel. If the vessel is caught non-complying several times, 
the insurer will most certainly charge a higher insurance 
premium, due to the risk of the vessel being detained, 
which in turn increases the insurance cost component. As 
such, it is not straightforward to determine where fines and 
penalties go in terms of cost components. 
Due to the multiple and widely differing options available 
for the ship-owner when adopting the fifth strategy of 
withdrawing the vessel from the ECA zone, it is nearly 
impossible to pinpoint which cost components that may 
                                                          
9 The installation of a scrubber causes the fuel 
consumption to increase, although by a small margin. 
change. If the ship-owner continues to operate in another 
part of the world both the administration expenses, bunker 
costs, and port & canal dues may change significantly. 
Conversely, re-selling the vessel on the second-hand 
market will effectively cause all the components - except 
the capital costs – to be redundant.  
 
The different changes in the values of the different cost 
components as a result of a given strategy does, however, 
not allow us to infer which of these strategies results in the 
lowest total costs. A detailed analysis incorporating the 
different variables and strategies a ship-owner is faced 
with when operating within the Baltic and North Seas is 
therefore required.  
 
3.2.3 Literature Review 
During the formulation and implementation of the new 
Sulphur regulation, several quantitative studies on the 
topic were carried out. The analysis framework of these 
studies differ widely, ranging from the societal benefits of 
a reduction in Sulphur emissions (Jiang, Kronbak, & 
Christensen, 2014) to industry payback periods of retrofits 
(Andersen, Clausen, & Sames, 2011). Common to all of 
these studies, however, is the conclusion that fuel related 
costs placed on the ship-operators increase, as a result of 
either installing a scrubber or switching to alternate forms 
of bunker fuel. 
 
The first study addressing the economics of installing and 
operating a scrubber system was ENTEC (ENTEC & 
European Commission Directorate General Environment, 
2005), investigating the results of the sea scrubber trials of 
the vessel “Pride of Kent”. The study was not a direct 
comparison between the alternative fuel types, but instead 
an overview of the costs and benefits of installing a 
scrubber on board vessels operating in the ECA zone. 
 
The Danish Maritime Authority (2012) analyses the 
potential for both expanding the LNG infrastructure in 
Northern Europe, and the potential for using LNG as a 
primary fuel for vessels operating in the Baltics and North 
Sea. Both the present and future potential for LNG is 
examined and compared to the potential of operating on 
MGO and HFO using the scrubber technology.  
 
Similar to the study by the DMA, MAN (Andersen et al., 
2011) analyses the advantages of retrofitting a vessel to 
operate on LNG, contrasted with retrofitting a scrubber or 
burning MGO when operating inside the ECA zone. In the 
analysis, five containerships of sizes ranging from 2500 
  
32 
NA
VI
GA
TIN
G 
EC
A-
ZO
NE
S:
 R
EG
UL
AT
IO
N 
AN
D 
DE
CI
SI
ON
-M
AK
IN
G 
 
TEU to 18000 TEU are examined with voyage distances 
increasing with the container capacity. They conclude that 
for vessels operating a small portion of the time in ECA 
zones, the payback time for LNG is lower compared to 
that of the scrubber, but that this discrepancy tends to even 
out as the relative time spent in ECAs increases. For 
smaller vessel sizes retrofitted to operate on LNG, payback 
times may be as low as two years when navigating within 
an ECA zone more than 65 percent of the time.    
 
In a presentation on the Green Ship Technology 
conference two mutually exclusive strategies were 
compared: Either investing in a scrubber or investing in an 
LNG engine (Klimt-Møllenbach, Schack, Eefsen, & De 
Kat, 2012). The two strategies were examined and 
compared to a situation where the vessel uses MGO when 
operating in the ECA zone and uses HFO when operating 
outside. The study takes departure in a 38,500 DWT tanker 
examined for a duration of 10 years by using the 
discounted payback method with a nine percent discount 
rate. The study finds that the payback period for both 
decisions (scrubber and LNG, respectively) is reduced as 
the price of MGO, relatively to that of HFO and LNG, 
increases. Additionally, they find that the payback periods 
are reduced as the proportion of time spent by the vessel in 
the SECA zone increases. For the vessel examined, they 
find a payback time of 9 years for both the Scrubber and 
LNG solution, assuming a 13 percent sailing time within 
the ECA zone, a HFO-MGO spread of 350 USD per ton 
and a LNG cost of 550 USD per ton. 
 
Jiang, et al. (2014) investigates the costs and benefits of 
the different abatement measures available to the shipping 
industry in order to comply with the ECA Sulphur 
emission standards in the Baltic and North Sea. Contrary 
to the studies presenting the optimal strategy purely from a 
profit maximizing ship-owners perspective, their analysis 
is extended to include the socio-economic costs and 
benefits of different strategies. The analysis takes 
departure in a 5000 TEU containership operating between 
the ports of Gothenburg and Rotterdam, completing 52 
round trips per year. They find that the seawater scrubber 
system is slightly advantageous to operating on MGO, 
given that the price spread between HFO and MGO 
remains above 231 euros. This is due, in part, to the fact 
that scrubber technology is more efficient in reducing the 
emission of Sulphur. Jiang et al. conclude that the 
installation of a sea water scrubber is more advantageous 
on a new-built ship compared to retrofitting an existing 
vessel, and that a vessel with less than 4 years of 
remaining service time is unsuitable for retrofitting a 
scrubber from an economic point of view.  
 
Holmgren, et al. (Holmgren, Nikopoulou, Ramstedt, & 
Woxenius, 2014) examines whether the introduction of 
new Sulphur regulations, and the resulting higher marine 
shipping costs, will result in a transportation modal shift to 
transport by truck instead of ship. The study examines the 
 
 
 
Source: Scanpix / Iris  
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transport of goods between Klaipeda, Lithuania and the 
British East Midlands. In contrast to most other recent 
studies, Holmgren et al. only analyse this modal shift with 
respect to a switch to MGO. In order to investigate this, 
they use the Transportation and Production Agent Based 
Simulator (TAPAS) – a program used for decision-making 
and activity in transport chains, and for estimating the 
optimal managerial choice based on simulations of the 
decisions of shipments in selected consumer-supplier 
relations. Holmgren et al. conclude that, although the 
freight rates will increase from vessels operating on MGO, 
a modal shift for high value goods on the route examined 
is not likely to occur as a consequence of the increased 
bunker fuel costs. 
 
3.2.4 Analysis Framework 
In order to analyse how the different variables (such as 
vessel size, age, ECA zone mileage, and fuel type price 
spreads) will impact the feasibility of the different 
strategies examined in this analysis, this study will take 
departure in three different commercial vessels of various 
sizes operating on different routes, periodically calling at a 
hypothetical port situated in the Baltic / North Sea ECA 
zone.  
 
Ship A is a 1000 TEU feeder ship servicing the route 
between Gothenburg and Rotterdam and is therefore solely 
operating within the bounds of the ECA zone. Ship B is a 
100.000 DWT Aframax tanker servicing the route between 
Rotterdam and the major Egyptian oil terminal of Sidi 
Kerir, implying a limited time spent in the ECA zone - 
approximately 15 percent of the operational time. The 
third vessel (ship C) is a 20.000 DWT Handy-size ore bulk 
carrier, servicing the route between Rotterdam and 
Murmansk and therefore spending approximately 45 
percent of the operational time within the ECA zone. The 
specifications for each of the three vessels are outlined in 
table 3.4. 
 
Although the vessels are hypothetical and used for the 
purpose of this study, the characteristics of the vessels, 
such as fuel consumption, vessel size, and vessel 
dimensions, are representative of actual vessels of these 
types and sizes that operate in the North and Baltic Sea. 
The specifications are calculated using the ship 
specification program offered by the Danish Ship-Owners 
Association10 (Danish Shipowners’ Association, 2015). 
                                                          
10 By inserting the preferred vessel type and capacity the 
program calculates the vessels specifications such as 
The route distances and subsequent yearly nautical miles 
sailed as well as annual ECA zone port visits are 
calculated using the voyage calculator from 
seadistances.org (Sea Distances, 2015). The three vessels 
are selected in order to highlight the differences between 
the optimal strategies, given vessels of different sizes and 
ECA zone nautical mileage. 
 
We predict that a reduced amount of time spent in the 
ECA zone, the retrofit of the engine and installation of the 
scrubber should provide a relatively larger benefit to Ship 
A, compared to the other two vessels while operating on 
MGO. Non-complying might be a more cost effective 
strategy for ship B, which is spending a majority of the 
time out-side of the ECA zone and therefore less 
frequently call at ECA zone ports.   
 
From table 3.4 it is clear that the amount of fuel required 
for maintaining the average voyage speeds differ, 
depending on the type of fuel the ships are burning. By 
operating on HFO, the amount of fuel burned per nautical 
mile slightly exceeds that of MGO and LNG, while the 
installation of a scrubber causes a slight increase in the 
fuel consumption.  Consequently, the vessels can cover a 
longer distance on a full tank of LNG or MGO compared 
to that of HFO (assuming the fuel carrying capacity stays 
the same), thereby offsetting the price spread between the 
alternate fuels and HFO.  
 
In order to investigate the optimal investment strategy of 
the ship-owner, this study employs the present value 
method. Although several methods of investment 
evaluation are currently in use, the internal rate of return as 
well as the payback method are undesirable when used to 
compare alternative (i.e. mutually exclusive) investments 
(Hedegaard & Hedegaard, 2011). Although both the 
present value and annuity model are useful when 
comparing investments running over an equal duration11, 
the annuity method complicates the illustrations and 
calculations without significantly changing the outcome of 
the feasibility of the investment. The analysis is conducted 
in discrete time, with each period denoting a year from 
2015 until the vessel is either resold or scrapped. Thus, 
period 0 equals the year 2015 while the last operational 
year of the vessel is denoted as year n. 
                                                                                               
dimensions and fuel consumption compiled from data on 
the world merchant fleet. 
11 The remaining service years of the vessels are assumed 
to be constant for all the investment strategies unless the 
ship-owner decides to withdraw the vessel from service 
within the ECA zone.  
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3.2.5 Fuel Prices and Spreads 
Given that the aim of this study is to determine the optimal 
strategy of the ship-owner, estimating the total fuel-related 
costs during the remaining operational years of the vessel 
is of critical importance.  
 
This study will adopt the projected prices of residual fuel 
oil in the transportation sector until 2040 from the Energy 
Information Administration (EIA). The projections made 
by the EIA are divided into several scenarios dependent on 
various macroeconomic growth cases and given the major 
uncertainty attached to the future level of the price of oil. 
Of these alternatives, the reference case oil price was 
selected for the purpose of this study. This scenario is used 
as a reference case for all of the EIA forecasts and assumes 
the world’s real GDP to grow at an average annual rate of 
2.4 percent until year 2040, causing moderate price 
increases of bunker fuel to approximately 850 constant 
2013 USD per barrel by 2040 (EIA, 2014). 
 
The EIA expects a real price increase for HFO in the long 
run, despite a drop in the price of HFO in the short term, 
resulting in a real increase in the bunker cost of the ship-
owner. This is depicted in figure 3.7 (page 37). It is 
important to note that the price projections are those of 
HFO with a 3.5 percent Sulphur content, which will only 
be used by vessels equipped with a scrubber or ship-
owners following the strategy of non-compliance inside 
the ECA zone. Additionally, the introduction of the global 
Vessel Name Ship A Ship B Ship C 
Type Feeder 1000 TEU Aframax Tanker Handy-size bulk carrier 
Dead weight ton 13.650 100.000 20.000 
Vessel main engine yield (kW) 10.166 14.313 5.130 
Auxiliary engine yield (kW) 504 608 256 
Route Gothenburg – Rotterdam Sidi Kerir – Rotterdam Murmansk – Rotterdam 
Yearly round trips 102 14 27 
Yearly sailing distance (nm) 102.204 88.452 87.858 
 
Yearly port visits in ECA zone 204 14 27 
Average Speed (knots) 15 11.5 11.5 
Fuel consumption HFO 
(Mt/nm) 
0.062 0.092 0.040 
Fuel consumption HFO + 
Scrubber (Mt/nm) 
0.064 0.095 0.042 
Fuel consumption MGO 
(Mt/nm) 
0.059 0.088 0.038 
Fuel consumption LNG 
(Mt/nm) 
0.055 0.079 0.035 
Time spent in ECA zone (%) 100 % 15 % 45 % 
Table 3.4: Specifications of the examined vessels of this study 
Source: Own calculations and sea-distances.org 
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Sulphur regulations in 2020 is incorporated into this 
analysis. This global Sulphur cap will force ship-owners 
who are following the MGO strategy to burn 0.5 % 
Sulphur fuel oil (LSHFO) when operating outside of the 
ECA zone. 
  
It may be of consequence that the price projections are the 
prices in the U.S., and therefore subject to alterations for 
vessel refuelling in European ports. However, it is 
assumed that these differences are insignificant, given that 
HFO is a worldwide commodity.  
Because accurate data and projections of the price alternate 
fuel types are currently unavailable to the authors of this 
study, static price spreads are used as proxy-variables to 
project the prices of the alternative fuels of LSHFO and 
MGO. Although subject to large fluctuations, the prices of 
these alternative fuels are strongly correlated with the price 
developments of ordinary HFO as they are all a product of 
crude oil (DMA, 2012). 
 
MGO: Throughout the last year, the price for MGO has 
remained significantly above that of HFO. As of august 
2014 the HFO – MGO price spread was situated at 350 
USD, but several factors can influence the price of MGO 
in either direction. On July 9th 2014 the Rotterdam spot 
price for a ton of MGO exceeded that of HFO by 53 
percent increasing to 73 percent by December 9th as the 
price spread during the same period dropped from 299.5 to 
264.5 USD (Ship & Bunker, 2015). This happened as a 
dramatic fall in the global oil price was observed during 
this time span. 
 
The recent glut in the global oil price has dramatically 
lowered both the price of MGO and the MGO – HFO price 
spread. While the MGO – HFO price spread in the port of 
Rotterdam, Gothenburg and St. Petersburg were averaging 
250 USD in February 2015 falling to less than 200 USD at 
the start of 2016 (see figure 3.5).    
 
Because of the significant volatility in the MGO – HFO 
price spread observed during the last few years, two price 
scenarios are examined with a yearly average price spread 
of 200 USD and 300 USD in the low and high price 
scenarios, respectively. 
 
- The price for a ton of MGO is divided into a high and 
low price scenario with a MGO – HFO price spread 
of 300 and 200 USD respectively.   
 
0.5 % LSHFO:  Currently, LSHFO with 0.5 % Sulphur 
content is not widely distributed as this type of fuel have 
become obsolete in European waters due to the stricter 
Sulphur requirements of the ECA zones. It is, however, 
reasonable to assume that the refining costs of the 
reduction in the Sulphur content will result in a major price 
spread between LSFO normal HFO.  
 
For the purpose of this study, the price for a tonne of 0.5 % 
LSFO is therefore assumed to be 100 USD above that of 
the HFO projection prices. A price spread of 100 USD per 
ton is significantly lower than that of MGO but will still 
increase the operational costs of vessels not equipped with 
a scrubber or LNG engine capabilities after the 
introduction of the global Sulphur regulation.   
 
-       The LSHFO – HFO price spread is assumed to be 
100 USD for the purpose of this study. 
 
LNG: Few vessels are currently equipped with LNG 
engine modifications as few ports provide LNG bunker 
refuelling capabilities. The prospect of operating on LNG 
therefore relies on the vessel frequently calling at ports 
supporting such capabilities. LNG import terminals 
currently operational in Northern Europe are located in 
Belgium, the Netherlands, the UK, Norway and Sweden 
and Denmark, and as of 2011 the total LNG storage 
facilities across these countries contained 2 million m3.  
 
 
Figure 3.5: Monthly 0.1 % MGO – HFO (IFO360) fuel 
spreads from February 2015 to January 2016  
Source: (Ship & Bunker, 2016) 
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A future increase in the storage capacity is expected as the 
demand for LNG rises (DMA, 2012). As of 2012, several 
LNG production plants are being operated in Northern and 
North-Eastern Europe, with the majority situated in 
Norway and Russia. This results in an annual liquidation 
capacity of 4.8 million metric tons of gas, with future 
expansions being planned in Western Russia (DMA, 
2012). The proximity to large scale gas extraction sites in 
the North and Barents Sea, results in favourable supply 
and price conditions for LNG. Utilizing LNG as a 
maritime fuel does, however, offer great possibilities for 
the maritime sector as recent advances in technology, such 
as hydraulic fracking, has made large scale extraction 
possible in previously unfeasible areas.  
 
Similar to the price projections of HFO, this study adopts 
price projections from the Energy Information 
Administration in the reference case oil price scenario. The 
EIA does not offer projections on the price of LNG and the 
Henry Hub natural gas price is adopted as a proxy for this 
variable.  
 
The difficulties associated with the transport of gas outside 
of pipelines have caused the price of natural gas to vary 
significantly between the different regions of the World. In 
2014, the average import price of LNG in Japan was four 
times as high as that of the United States while the average 
German import price of natural gas was 9.11 USD per 
MMBtu compared with an average import price 16.8 USD 
per MMBtu for oil12 (see figure 3.6)(BP, 2015).  While the 
large price difference of LNG in Japan is explained by the 
costs of LNG transportation from Australia and the Middle 
East, the differences between the prices of Europe and the 
US are also explained by the lack of trade in natural gas 
between the two continents. This separation of the two 
markets explains the huge differences in the price 
developments of natural gas between North America and 
the rest of the World.  The recent US ease of the ban of 
exports of oil and gas has resulted in the creation of 
numerous gas liquidation plants along the US coast 
designed for export towards the Asian and European 
market. This should result in an intertwinement between 
the American and European markets, thus causing these 
prices to converge towards a fixed regional price 
difference. 
 
Even though the price developments between Europe and 
the US may converge, the abundance of gas extracted in 
North America will still result in major regional price 
differences. In order to offset these regional price 
differences in the cost estimations of this study, the Henry 
Hub natural gas price projections from the EIA are 
indexed such that the price measured in MMBtu in 2014 is 
set to a value of 1.  
 
                                                          
12 Included in both price reports are the costs of insurance 
and freight. 
 
 
 
Foto 3.6: Development of gas prices by region 
Source: BP (2015) 
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As gas starts being traded across the Atlantic, regional 
price differences should theoretically be determined by the 
costs of gas transportation and condensation, as well as 
regional taxing schemes. This is described in equation 3.1 
below, where 𝑃𝐸𝑈 denotes the price per unit of LNG, 𝐿 
denotes the cost of liquefaction per unit of LNG in Europe, 
𝐹 the freight per unit of LNG, 𝑃𝑈𝑆 the price per unit of 
natural gas in the US, and ∆𝑇 the tax difference between 
the US and EU.  
 
𝑃𝐸𝑈 = 𝐿 + 𝐹 + ∆𝑇 + 𝑃𝑈𝑆                 (3.1) 
 
Since the cost of condensation and transport are similar 
values fixed in terms of volume of gas, they do not 
influence the degree of change from one market to the 
other. In other terms, if L and F are fixed values and 𝑃𝑈𝑆 
shifts upward, 𝑃𝐸𝑈 also shifts upward at the same rate, 
where the absolute difference simply is 𝐿 + 𝐹 + 𝑇. For 
simplicity, T is assumed to be a flat rate rather than an Ad 
Valorem-tax13.  
 
If the rate of change is the same (as above assumptions 
determine), we can index a given year based on US 
forecasts and conclude that the rate of change on the 
                                                          
13 From equation 3.1 it is clear that an increase in the price 
of a unit of gas in the US will result in a similar increase in 
the price of LNG at European ports. A change from a fixed 
tax scheme to an ad valorem tax scheme would result in a 
larger price difference as the tax would change to an 
increasing function of the price increase.                         
 
European market follows the same rate of change, because 
L, F, and T do not influence the rate, only the absolute 
difference. For example, a rise in US LNG price from 1 to 
1.1 (a 10 % increase) from year 0 to year 1 would 
correspond exactly to a 10 % hike on the European 
markets regardless of the actual price. As LNG moves 
towards being a world commodity, global demand changes 
should affect European prices in exactly this way. The 
resulting price change (in real terms) should be identical 
across regional markets. 
 
A real price increase in LNG should therefore reflect an 
increase in the price of natural gas, and not cost increases 
in the liquefaction or transportation of the final products. 
This makes it possible to take into account regional price 
differences while still operating under the framework of 
the EIA price developments. 
 
Based on this reasoning, we can use the EIA forecasts in 
Europe - the indexed price projections only needs to be 
multiplied with the average price for LNG found in North 
Western Europe in 2014; the first year of indexation. The 
average price for LNG in North Western Europe was 9.6 
USD per MMBtu in 201414; multiplying this value with 
the indexed natural gas price projections yields the LNG 
bunker prices adopted for the purpose of this study. This, 
along with the price projections of the other fuels adopted 
for the purpose of this study, is presented in figure 3.7. 
                                                          
14 See The Economist, 28th of February, 2015 (The 
Economist, 2015) 
 
Figure 3.7: Fuel prices adopted for this study 
Own calculations based on EIA (2015) 
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From figure 3.7 it is clear that the price per tonne of LNG 
and 3.5 % HFO initially starts at a level of approximately 
400 USD and gradually increases at a slow pace. The 
current glut in the world price of oil causes HFO to remain 
slightly below LNG between 2017 and 2027 before 
converging towards 800 USD in 2040.   
 
As with all economic projections, it is worth taking into 
account the large degree of uncertainty attached to such 
forecasts. A multitude of factors influences the price of oil, 
making it impossible to project the price for bunker fuel 
and LNG accurately so far into the future. Additionally, 
the prices projected by the EIA are international 
projections and may therefore differ for vessels operating 
solely within the Baltic and North Sea ECA zones. This is 
especially true when forecasting the prices incurred by 
ship-owners who retrofit their ships to operate on LNG. 
Although fuel price spreads between HFO and the 
alternate fuels are adopted in this study (in line with MAN 
Diesel (Andersen et al., 2011), Green Ship (Green Ship of 
the Future, 2009) and Jiang, et al., (2014)) price 
projections on HFO are still included in order to increase 
the explanatory power of the conclusions. Thus, the fuel 
price projections from the EIA, although only indirectly 
affecting the price of the alternate fuels, are used to 
calculate the findings of this study, and it is therefore 
recommended to take the gap between theory and 
application into critical account when basing decisions on 
the results of this study. However, in general, this way of 
assessing the future prices of different fuels relative to 
each other provides a usable ballpark estimate that should 
continually be re-assessed as new data becomes available. 
 
Retrofit Costs 
Since both the scrubber and LNG ship engine technologies 
has to be tailored to the specific vessels and has not been 
widely distributed aboard the World’s merchant fleet, the 
cost and performance of the two technologies are based on 
a limited number of observations during recent years. For 
example, Green Ship (2012) reports the costs of 
retrofitting a 38,500 DWT tanker to be approximately 5.8 
million USD and 7.56 million USD for the installation of a 
scrubber and LNG engine, respectively. On the other hand, 
ENTEC (2005) reports scrubber retrofitting costs of 168 
EUR per kW installed on vessels with a main engine 
capacity of more than 15.000 kW. The retrofitting and 
new-building costs of these engines are highly dependent 
on the type of ship as well as the size of the engine, and 
single price reports are subsequently not sufficiently 
accurate for the purpose of this study. The only variable 
retrofit prices for both scrubber solutions and LNG 
solutions are those reported by DMA (2012), where 
retrofit prices are listed as a function of engine size 
measured in euros per kilowatt of engine power. The base 
retrofit costs as a function of engine power and the 
corresponding retrofitting costs for each of the vessels 
examined in this study are presented in tables 3.5 and 3.6, 
respectively. 
 
From the retrofit costs presented, it is clear that the total 
costs of retrofitting a ship amounts to several million USD, 
and the cost of retrofitting an engine to operate on LNG is 
close to 15 percent more expensive than retrofitting a 
scrubber. This large difference in retrofitting costs 
demonstrates that the price for a ton of LNG needs to be 
significantly below that of HFO for the LNG solution to 
become economically feasible compared to the scrubber 
solution, notwithstanding the current infrastructure gaps. 
Because the retrofit cost estimations are directly 
proportional to the engine size of the vessel for both 
scrubber and LNG, further modifications may result in the 
 Ship A Ship B Ship C 
Total scrubber retrofit cost 
(USD) 
4,574,700 6,440,850 2,310,500 
Total LNG retrofit cost (USD) 5,397,500 7,581,000 2,726,500 
 
Table 3.5 Approximated retrofitting costs for the vessels examined 
Source: Own calculations based on reporting’s from DMA (2012) 
 
Part Installed Unit Costs 
Scrubber   
Scrubber (incl. waste storage) USD/kWmain engine 180 
Installation Cost Scrubber USD/kWmain engine 270 
LNG: 2-stroke LNG engine   
LNG fuel gas conversion and 
supply system 
USD/kWmain engine 342 
Installation costs USD/kWmain+ auxiliary 180 
Table 3.6: Scrubber and LNG base retrofit prices 
Source: DMA (2012) 
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total retrofitting costs to become unrealistically high for 
larger vessels. For example, the total retrofitting costs for a 
4000 TEU container ship with an engine yield of 43 mega 
Watt (mW) will amount to almost 20 and 23 million USD 
for the scrubber and LNG retrofit, respectively. 
Retrofitting costs of such a magnitude would make the 
retrofitting of vessels of even moderate sizes extremely 
unprofitable, thus limiting the feasibility of the retrofitting 
strategies to smaller vessels. It is, however, worth noting 
that the listed retrofitting costs estimations are based on 
reports from a limited number of smaller sized vessels and 
therefore provides an insufficient basis for calculating the 
retrofitting costs for a wide segment of the fleet operating 
within the ECA zone. This report deems it highly unlikely 
that the relationship between the retrofitting costs and the 
engine size is characterized by strict linearity, and the cost 
estimations used in this report may therefore be subject to 
alterations when more reliable cost estimates become 
available.  
 
3.2.5.1 Fine Sizes and Frequency of Inspection 
By refusing to comply with the Sulphur regulations when 
operating inside the ECA zone and continuing to burn 
standard HFO with high Sulphur content, the ship-owner 
will face sanctioning if discovered by the authorities in the 
ports or waters of the coastal states. For the purpose of 
calculation, the sanctioning costs (the fine) imposed upon 
a non-compliant ship-owner will consist of a lump sum 
transfer. Although the fine size for non-compliance may 
amount to thousands of euro, the ship-owner’s incentives 
to comply with the Sulphur regulation critically depend on 
the frequency of inspections when calling within the ECA 
zone. A frequency variable is therefore included, which 
measures the risk of being inspected on each ECA zone 
port visit. 
 
As previously mentioned, enforcement of the 
environmental regulations is rare, and the associated fines 
consist of lump sum transfers that are of negligible 
magnitude in most of the ECA zone coastal states. Further, 
the fines vary depending on the coastal state in question, 
since neither enforcement nor fine sizes are uniform across 
borders. The Helsinki Commission surveyed Baltic 
counties and their sanction and penalty methods, and 
concluded that the current range of administrative fines 
ranges from EUR 350 to EUR 57.000 (HELCOM, 2014). 
Data from the Baltic Port Organization indicates that some 
countries are considering an increase in the impact of fines 
to as much as EUR 200.000 as a result of the new Sulphur 
regulations. Additionally, some countries will have 
punishment defined under their criminal system, where 
fines are defined case-by-case (Rozmarynowska, 2015). 
 
The frequency of inspection also varies between port 
states, and several factors have to be taken into 
consideration when trying to assess an inspection rate. 
Further, political focus on ensuring compliance may not 
always translate into actual inspection rate increases. For 
example, in 2012, Maersk line had 9.690 port calls the 
ECA zone, but only 57 port inspections were performed, 
and none of these examined the Sulphur content of the fuel 
oil carried (Press-Kristensen, 2014). This effectively 
results in an average rate of port inspection of 0.6% within 
the ECA zone, and zero inspection of Sulphur compliance 
specifically. European ports work together in the Paris 
Memorandum of Understanding (Paris MoU) where a 
targeting mechanism is used to check vessels. The goal for 
the Paris MOU is to inspect every vessel active within the 
EU at least once a year, targeting of high-risk vessels with 
historic non-compliance (Paris MoU, 2013). 
Consequentially, non-compliant vessels will have a higher 
inspection ratio on long-term operations as compared to 
compliant operators.  
 
For the analysis of fine sizes impact on vessels, a 40,000 
USD fine is adopted as a fine size – regardless of the port 
of sanctioning. In using a proxy for frequency, this model 
will assume a 10 % chance of inspection, given that the 
difficulties in defining this parameter. While an average 
inspection rate of 10 % is significantly higher than the 0.6 
percent previously experienced by Maersk Line, it is 
reasonable to assume that the inspection rate may 
gradually increase as a consequence of the Paris MOU. In 
chapter 4 the short term and long term inspection 
frequencies will be analysed in conjunction with the effect 
of fines and other punishment mechanisms. 
 
Other forms of sanctioning mentioned as possibilities by 
policymakers but not included in this analysis, are those of 
the detention of the vessel by the port state authorities as 
well as the blacklisting the vessel at the Paris MOU (see 
chapter 4.4). These alternative sanctioning measures have 
the potential to incur significant costs on a non-complying 
ship-owner but are difficult to predict due to the various 
factors influencing the financial details of the vessel. If the 
port state authorities have the option to detain a vessel, the 
loss of the cargo insurance in combination with the lost 
opportunity costs, due to the vessel not being operable, 
may reach intolerable levels. This effectively forces the 
ship-owner to comply with the Sulphur regulations, even 
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though the frequency of being controlled and sanctioned is 
negligible. Similarly, being blacklisted by the Paris MOU 
may cause the insurance premium of the vessel to 
drastically increase. 
 
3.2.6 Analytical Assumptions 
The results of the analysis rest upon a number of critical 
assumptions included in order to simplify a complex 
relationship between the multiple variables a ship-operator 
must take into account. These assumptions may simplify 
the results of the analysis, but are necessary in order to 
establish a calculable framework. In the following section, 
the assumptions and the rationale behind them are 
presented.   
Assumption I: Fuel consumption 
when calling at a port is assumed to 
be zero 
To reduce unnecessary complexity, it is assumed that no 
fuel is consumed when entering, berthing, or exiting a port. 
Although this statement clearly does not reflect the real 
world, the vessel operates at very slow speeds and 
generally consumes a negligible portion of fuel when 
calling and berthing.    
Assumption II: No regional fuel 
supply and price imbalances  
It is assumed that the type of fuel consumed by the vessel 
is readily available when calling a port and that the fuel 
price remains the same for all the ports that are included in 
this study. The price projections from the EIA are based on 
an average of prices in the US, and regional price 
imbalances are therefore not captured in the projections 
adopted by this study. Since HFO is a global commodity, 
these price imbalances should not differ significantly 
although different levels of taxation may affect these 
regional prices. It is therefore worth noting that the fuel 
prices in reality may differ, depending on the ports where 
the examined vessels are calling. 
Assumption III: MGO engine 
modifications have previously been 
installed 
For a standard engine burning HFO, a small retrofit 
averaging around 130.000 EUR is needed for the engine to 
also be able to burn MGO (DMA, 2012). Due to 
previously implemented environmental regulations, 
vessels operating within the ECA zone are forced to burn 
MGO when berthing in the ports of the zone, and it is 
reasonable to assume that the engine modifications needed 
for it to operate on MGO has already been completed. As 
such, this cost component is left out of the analysis.  
Assumption IV: Fuel consumption is 
measured from average speed 
The fuel consumption is measured from an average sailing 
speed of the vessel. Maintaining a constant speed along the 
vessels voyage is, however, highly unlikely due to the 
current, wind and wave conditions. Because fuel 
consumption is exponentially correlated with the voyage 
speed, the fuel consumption of the average speed is 
negatively biased and may therefore be higher in a real 
scenario. These volatilities, however, should be relatively 
minor in comparison to the total fuel related costs and are 
left out of this analysis for simplicity.  
Assumption V: No dual fuel for LNG 
vessels 
Once the engine has been retrofitted to operate on LNG, it 
is assumed that the vessel will operate solely on LNG. 
Although engines that are able to run on both LNG and 
conventional fuel is a technological possibility, the 
significantly higher retrofit cost compared to that of a 
scrubber will cause the LNG option to be unfeasible unless 
the mile costs of burning LNG is less than that of HFO, 
consequently making HFO fuel an economic redundancy.  
Assumption VI: Retrofit cost are 
financed without issuing debt 
The total costs of retrofitting the ships engine, including 
both the material investment and the refit, are assumed to 
be financed without issuing debt, and the CAPEX are 
therefore not divided over multiple periods or subject to 
interest rate payments. Such an assumption is of course 
highly unlikely as the retrofitting costs amount to several 
million USD, and debt and interest repayments may 
therefore cause the conclusions achieved to be positively 
biased towards the strategies of retrofitting. The reader is 
therefore encouraged to consider these financing issues 
when using the model to access the favourable strategies.    
Assumption VII: Loss of cargo space 
is assumed to be zero 
Retrofitting a ship with a scrubber may reduce the total 
cargo space of the ship. In order to estimate the total costs 
incurred by such a retrofit, the potential loss of revenue 
needs to be taken into account.  
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On a given container-carrying vessel, up to 0.3 percent of 
the cargo capacity is lost when retrofitting the vessel with 
a scrubber depending on the size of the vessel. The extra 
space needed to install LNG fuel tanks may result in a loss 
of up to 3 percent on large vessels when retrofitting the 
engine to operate on LNG (Andersen et al., 2011).  
Assumption VIII: All the vessels 
examined are not equipped with a 
scrubber or LNG engine prior to the 
introduction of the new Sulphur 
regulations 
It is assumed that the vessels examined in this study are 
previously built, and therefore not subject to any of the 
modifications relevant to the introduction of the new 
Sulphur regulations, except those required to operate on 
MGO. The costs of installing a scrubber or modifying the 
engine to operate on LNG are drastically reduced if 
installed while the vessel is being built, and reduces the 
complexities of the decision process of the ship-owner. 
Thus, it is not the focal point of this study. 
 
Assumption IX: Reported fine sizes 
and inspections rates are assumed to 
be constant regardless of year and 
ECA zone port 
It is assumed that both the inspection rate and fine size 
remains constant through the span of this analysis and 
therefore does not differ between the different ports within 
the ECA zone, nor is subject to a tightening of 
enforcement. Given the huge discrepancies in both the 
level of enforcement and means of sanctioning, such an 
assumption is highly unlikely to hold, and the feasibility of 
the strategy of non-compliance is therefore highly 
dependent on the ports at which the vessel is calling.     
 
3.2.7 Analytical Results 
The following are the results of the optimal fuel strategy of 
the ship-owner given the different vessels investigated in 
this study. This is illustrated in figure 3.8, 3.9 and 3.10 for 
ship A, B and C respectively.  
 
 
 
Source: Scanpix/Iris 
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Looking at Ship A (figure 3.8), it is clear that MGO in the 
low price scenario remains the most favourable strategy of 
compliance if less than 5 years of operational time 
remains. The strategy of non-compliance does, however, 
yields the lowest expected costs although at a very small 
margin. If more than 5 years remains, however, the 
strategy of LNG outperforms non-compliance as the 
strategy yielding the lowest expected costs. Given that the 
infrastructure supporting LNG refuelling capabilities are 
underdeveloped and not likely to provide the fuel needed 
for the vessel to operate, MGO becomes the most viable 
strategy of compliance. The installation of a scrubber 
proves superior compared to MGO after 4 and 3 years in 
the low and high price scenario, respectively. This 
corresponds to a payback time of 4 and 7 years of the 
scrubber compared to that of MGO in the low and high 
price scenarios. This insignificant cost savings of 
following a strategy of non-compliance will deter 
moderately risk-averse ship-operators from breaching the 
environmental regulations as such a small cost difference 
may not justify the risk of fines and the subsequent 
increase in the insurance premium and/or the loss of 
environmentally concerned clients.  
 
The larger engine size in combined with a reduction in the 
proportion of nautical miles travelled within the ECA zone 
and the reduced voyage speed of ship B changes the 
outcome of the most favourable strategies significantly 
(figure 3.9). These alterations in route speed and engine 
specifications result in both retrofitting strategies to 
become highly disadvantageous, and both the scrubber and 
LNG strategy are consistently the most expensive 
solutions in a time frame of more than 10 years.  
 
Figure 3.8: Total discounted fuel related costs for Ship A 
All costs are measured in constant 2013 USD with an annual discount factor of 7 %. The MGO (low) and (high) lines describe the costs for the vessel 
operating solely on MGO in the low and high price scenarios respectively while the lines labelled “scrubber”, “LNG” and Non-compliance denotes the 
corresponding strategies. The MGO - HFO fuel spreads are assumed to be 200 and 300 USD in the low and high price scenario, respectively and the 
price for a ton of low sulphur HFO is 100 USD above that of standard HFO. Additionally, the fine size is assumed to be 40000 USD with a control 
frequency of 10 percent per ECA zone port visit.  
Source: Own calculations 
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Figure 3.9:  Total discounted fuel related costs for Ship B 
All costs are measured in constant 2013 USD with an annual discount factor of 7 %. The MGO (low) and (high) lines describe the costs for the vessel 
operating solely on MGO in the low and high price scenarios respectively while the lines labelled “scrubber”, “LNG” and Non-compliance denotes the 
corresponding strategies. The MGO - HFO fuel spreads are assumed to be 200 and 300 USD in the low and high price scenario, respectively and the 
price for a ton of low sulphur HFO is 100 USD above that of standard HFO. Additionally, the fine size is assumed to be 40000 USD with a control 
frequency of 10 percent per ECA zone port visit.  
Source: Own calculations 
 
 
Figure 3.10:  Total discounted fuel related costs for Ship C 
All costs are measured in constant 2013 USD with an annual discount factor of 7 %. The MGO (low) and (high) lines describe the costs for the vessel 
operating solely on MGO in the low and high price scenarios respectively while the lines labelled “scrubber”, “LNG” and Non-compliance denotes the 
corresponding strategies. The MGO - HFO fuel spreads are assumed to be 200 and 300 USD in the low and high price scenario, respectively and the 
price for a ton of low sulphur HFO is 100 USD above that of standard HFO. Additionally, the fine size is assumed to be 40000 USD with a control 
frequency of 10 percent per ECA zone port visit.  
Source: Own calculations 
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This corresponds to a payback time of more than 10 years 
for both of the retrofits.  The few annual port visits within 
the ECA zone (14) means that the strategy of non-
compliance is the dominant strategy regardless of how 
many operational years remain. With only a few years of 
operational time remaining, this cost difference is 
marginal, but this figure eventually rises to a discounted 
cost difference of several million USD. Regardless, the 
MGO-based strategies remain the dominant modes of 
compliance, with the low price of fuel obviously being 
favourable.  
 
The relatively lower cost of retrofitting the engine along 
with the higher proportion of time spent in the ECA zone 
of ship C creates a strategy ranking much different to that 
ship B, closer resembling that of ship A (see figure 3.10).  
 
As was the case with ship A, the MGO strategy is the least 
costly strategy of compliance in the short to medium term 
in the low fuel price scenario. LNG becomes the 
favourable strategy if more than 7 operation years remain, 
thus corresponding to a payback time of 7 years.   Aside 
from LNG, the strategy of retrofitting of the ship with a 
scrubber is similarly favourable compared to MGO if more 
than 10 and 7 service years remain in the low and high 
MGO price scenarios, respectively (yielding scrubber 
payback times of 10 and 7 years compared to MGO in the 
respective scenarios). The reduced amount of ECA zone 
port visits by ship C does, however, result in a larger cost 
difference between the scrubber and non-compliance 
strategies compared to ship A. Regardless of how many 
service years remains, however, non-compliance will be 
the dominant strategy due to a combination of few ECA 
zone port visits and the limited enforcement on each port 
visit.  
 
Although only three different case ships were examined 
above, the results from the analysis indicate that retrofits 
are more favourable on smaller vessels due to the 
diseconomies of scale of the retrofitting costs reported by 
DMA (2012). Additionally, the choice between the MGO 
and the scrubber solution is highly dependent on the 
proportion of operational time spent within the newly 
established ECA zone. The calculations also indicate that 
the lax enforcement procedures in the ECA zone implicitly 
promotes the strategy of non-compliance for risk neutral 
ship-owners, who potentially gain a cost advantage vis-á-
vis compliant ship-operators. The three case vessels 
examined above are, however, not a sufficient foundation 
upon which we can draw direct conclusions on the optimal 
strategies of the ship-owners due to the different engine 
size, annual days spent at sea, time spent in the ECA zone 
and different amount of port visits subject to enforcement 
control. The next sections will further analyse the impacts 
of the three major variables on the strategic decision. 
These variables are those of the ECA navigation 
proportion, the fuel spreads, and the level of enforcement.  
 
3.2.8 The ECA zone proportion 
The results above indicate that major differences in the 
costs and optimal strategies for vessels exist, depending on 
how much time (as a proportion of total operational time) 
is spent inside the ECA zone. Given the variables included 
in this study, it is possible to calculate the total fuel-related 
costs of a specific vessel as a function of the proportion of 
time spent in the ECA zone. Figure 3.11 and 3.12 
illustrates the lifetime fuel related expenses for ship A, 
given 5 and 10 remaining operational years of the ship, 
respectively. Although changes in the proportion of 
navigation time spent within the ECA zone will inevitably 
result in changes to the vessel route and destination, it is 
assumed that the annual nautical miles sailed for each 
vessel remains constant. Additionally, changes in the 
annual number of port visits within the ECA zone are 
subject to change if the proportion of time navigating in 
the Baltic and North Sea also changes, and the strategy of 
non-compliance is therefore excluded from this part due to 
the risk of sanctioning being a function of annual ECA 
zone port visits.  From figure 3.11 and 3.12 it is evident 
that the proportion of navigation within the ECA zone has 
a significant impact on the outcome of the feasibility of the 
different strategies of compliance. 
 
If only five years of service period remains for ship A, the 
retrofit of a scrubber is advantageous to running on LNG 
under the following conditions: when a minimum of 60 
percent of the navigation time is spent in the ECA and 
price of MGO is high, or when 80 percent of the 
navigation time is spent in the ECA zone and the price of 
MGO is low. The recent drop in the oil price and the 
MGO-HFO spread cases the retrofit of a scrubber to only 
be advantageous to low priced MGO if more than 85 % of 
the time is spent within the ECA zone. 
 
If 10 operational years remain, the larger amount of time 
that the initial investment is annualized across causes the 
strategy of MGO to only remain advantageous to the 
scrubber if less than 40 and 60 percent is spent in the ECA 
zone in the high and low price, respectively. For LNG, this 
respectively changes to 20 and 35 with high and low price.  
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Figure 3.11:  Fuel related expenses over 5 years depending on ECA zone navigation for ship A 
All costs are measured in constant 2013 USD with an annual discount factor of 7 %. The figure illustrates the total discounted fuel related costs of ship 
A after 5 years given an annual voyage distance of 102,204 nm and an average speed of 15 knots. The MGO (low) and (high) lines describe the costs for 
the vessel operating solely on MGO in the low and high price scenarios respectively while the lines labelled “scrubber” and “LNG” denotes the 
corresponding strategies. The MGO - HFO fuel spreads are assumed to be 200 and 300 USD in the low and high price scenario, respectively and the 
price for a ton of low Sulphur HFO is 100 USD above that of standard HFO.  
Source: Own calculations 
 
Figure 3.12:  Fuel related expenses over 10 years depending on ECA zone navigation for ship A 
All costs are measured in constant 2013 USD with an annual discount factor of 7 %. The figure illustrates the total discounted fuel related costs of ship 
A after 10 years given an annual voyage distance of 102,204 nm and an average speed of 15 knots. The MGO (low) and (high) lines describe the costs 
for the vessel operating solely on MGO in the low and high price scenarios respectively while the lines labelled “scrubber” and “LNG” denotes the 
corresponding strategies. The MGO - HFO fuel spreads are assumed to be 200 and 300 USD in the low and high price scenario, respectively and the 
price for a ton of low Sulphur HFO is 100 USD above that of standard HFO.  
Source: Own calculations 
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Figure 3.13:  Fuel related expenses over 10 years depending on ECA zone navigation for ship B 
All costs are measured in constant 2013 USD with an annual discount factor of 7 %. The figure illustrates the total discounted fuel related costs of ship 
B after 10 years given an annual voyage distance of 88,452 nm, an average speed of 11.5 knots. The MGO (low) and (high) lines describe the costs for 
the vessel operating solely on MGO in the low and high price scenarios respectively while the lines labelled “scrubber” and “LNG” denotes the 
corresponding strategies. The MGO - HFO fuel spreads are assumed to be 200 and 300 USD in the low and high price scenario, respectively and the 
price for a ton of low Sulphur HFO is 100 USD above that of standard HFO.  
Source: Own calculations 
 
 
 
Figure 3.14:  Fuel related expenses over 10 years depending on ECA zone navigation for ship C 
All costs are measured in constant 2013 USD with an annual discount factor of 7 %. The figure illustrates the total discounted fuel related costs of ship 
C after 10 years given an annual voyage distance of 87,858 nm and an average speed of 11.5 knots. The MGO (low) and (high) lines describe the costs 
for the vessel operating solely on MGO in the low and high price scenarios respectively while the lines labelled “scrubber” and “LNG” denotes the 
corresponding strategies. The MGO - HFO fuel spreads are assumed to be 200 and 300 USD in the low and high price scenario, respectively and the 
price for a ton of low Sulphur HFO is 100 USD above that of standard HFO.  
Source: Own calculations 
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The price clearly reveals that major cost savings are 
possible on smaller vessels if the price of LNG remains 
lower than that of HFO and sufficient infrastructure for 
refuelling becomes available in the future. 
  
It is, however, worth investigating whether the larger and 
smaller engine size of ship B and C. respectively, in 
combination with the reduced voyage speeds and annual 
mileage will affect these critical ECA zone break-even 
points15. Intuitively, the different engine sizes should cause 
the retrofits to become less or more favourable, and a 
different fraction of total voyage distance within the ECA 
zone should therefore be necessary for the retrofit 
strategies to become favourable (although the reduced fuel 
consumption will also lower the direct fuel cost to 
investment cost ratio favouring MGO). Illustrated in 
figures 3.14 and 3.15, is the total fuel related expenses 
after 10 years’ operation for ship B and C, respectively.  
 
From figure 3.13 it is evident that the larger size of ship B, 
relative to that of ship A, and the higher retrofit costs 
resulting from the increased engine size increases the 
feasibility of MGO for navigation within the ECA zone. 
The total costs of both retrofits are almost identical and 
does not become favourable unless the ship B operates 
more than 45 and 70 % of the time within the ECA zone in 
the high and low price scenarios, respectively.  
Figure 3.14 reveals that the combination of a reduced 
engine size and much lower fuel consumption causes the 
critical points for ship C to be close to identical to those of 
ship A. This is despite the total costs of the different 
strategies after 10 years of ship A are almost double those 
of ship C. For ship C, the scrubber strategy is 
advantageous to MGO if more than 40 and 60 percent of 
navigation time is within the ECA zone in the high and 
low price scenarios, respectively. For the LNG strategy 
these critical points are reduced to 30 and 45 % in the 
above mentioned price scenarios.    
 
After comparing the optimal strategies for ship A, B and C 
over a 10 year period as a function of the fraction of 
navigation within the ECA zone, it is evident that retrofits 
becomes increasingly profitable as the percentage of 
voyage time spent within the ECA zone becomes greater 
and more operational years remain (note the difference 
between figures 3.11 and 3.12). Additionally, the 
retrofitting costs for both the scrubber and LNG engine 
solutions appear to be considerably more attractive on 
                                                          
15 Recall that ship B and C both operates at an average 
speed of 11.5 knots compared to 15 knots of ship A 
smaller vessels due to the lower yield of the engine 
required for propulsion and, consequently, the lower 
retrofitting costs. The price spreads between the different 
fuel types also have a large impact on the strategy ranking, 
as a price increase of MGO relative to that of HFO and 
LNG would result in the strategies of retrofits to be 
considerable more attractive for vessels with only partial 
operations within the ECA zone . 
 
3.2.9 The Role of Fuel Spreads 
From the previous chapters it is evident that the costs of 
retrofitting the vessels constitute an enormous financial 
burden to the ship-owner. In order to ensure that a retrofit 
will minimize costs in the long run, the operator must 
acquire knowledge of the future price level of the different 
fuel types. This is especially the case with the spread 
between HFO and MGO, but the spread between HFO and 
LNG becomes equally important if future development in 
infrastructure for LNG refuelling and storage facilities 
becomes reality. From the findings of the previous two 
sections, it is clear that the price of MGO needs to remain 
at the current low level in order to continuously be a 
feasible strategy for ships A and C. It is common to all 
vessels that the MGO strategy becomes less advantageous 
the more years of operation the vessel has left. This is 
because the ship operator has more time to benefit of the 
lower variable fuel costs incurred by the retrofitting 
strategies as well as the introduction of the global Sulphur 
regulation in 2020. Further, the maximum fuel spread 
needed for MGO to remain advantageous depends 
critically on the amount of navigation spent within the 
ECA. For example, the price of MGO compared to HFO 
needs to be significantly lower for MGO to become the 
favourable strategy for ship A in the long run, while MGO 
will remain the dominant strategy for ship B even though 
an increase in the same price spread may occur.  
 
Figure 3.15, 3.16 and 3.17 illustrate the total fuel related 
costs as a function of remaining service years for ship A, B 
and C, respectively, given and MGO price that result in 
MGO becoming favourable to the retrofit strategies. From 
figure 3.15, it is evident that a dramatic reduction in the 
price of MGO relative to that of the alternative fuels are 
required for MGO to become the dominant strategy after 
10 years of operation. For MGO to become advantageous 
over the scrubber strategy, a price spread of 155 USD is 
required (illustrated by the line “MGO (high)” in figure 
3.15) while a MGO – HFO price spread of only 105 USD 
is required for MGO to be dominant over the LNG strategy 
(depicted by the line “MGO (low)” in figure 3.15). 
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Figure 3.15:  Total discounted fuel related costs with alternative MGO prices for Ship A 
All costs are measured in constant 2013 USD with an annual discount factor of 7 %. The MGO (low) and (high) lines describe the costs for the vessel 
operating solely on MGO in the low and high price scenarios respectively while the lines labelled “scrubber”, “LNG” and Non-compliance denotes the 
corresponding strategies. The MGO - HFO fuel spreads are assumed to be 105 and 155 USD in the low and high price scenario, respectively and the 
price for a ton of low Sulphur HFO is 100 USD above that of standard HFO.  
Source: Own calculations 
 
 
 
Figure 3.16:  Total discounted fuel related costs with alternative MGO prices for Ship B 
All costs are measured in constant 2013 USD with an annual discount factor of 7 %. The MGO (low) and (high) lines describe the costs for the vessel 
operating solely on MGO in the low and high price scenarios respectively while the lines labelled “scrubber”, “LNG” and Non-compliance denotes the 
corresponding strategies. The MGO - HFO fuel spreads are assumed to be 520 and 600 USD in the low and high price scenario, respectively and the 
price for a ton of low Sulphur HFO is 100 USD above that of standard HFO.  
Source: Own calculations 
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For ship B, the critical fuel spreads changes significantly 
as MGO is by far the most favourable strategy of 
compliance regardless of the amount of remaining service 
years. MGO remains advantageous after 10 years 
compared to the scrubber even with a MGO - HFO price 
spread of 600 USD (depicted by the line “MGO (high)” in 
figure 3.16) while the maximum price spread allowed for 
MGO to continuously remain favourable over LNG takes a 
slightly lower value at 530 USD (illustrated by the line 
“MGO (low)” in figure 3.16).  
 
The critical fuel spreads for ship C closely resemble those 
of ship A, with a maximum MGO – HFO spread of 200 
USD for MGO to remain advantageous to LNG (illustrated 
by the line “MGO (low)” in figure 3.17) while this critical 
spread is reduced to 135 USD for the scrubber retrofit 
(depicted by the line “MGO (high)” in figure 3.17). 
 
The higher values of the critical spreads of ship C 
compared to ship A, reflects the reduced navigation time 
within the ECA zone and the corresponding reduced need 
for operating on MGO compared. These differences are 
even more profound when taking ship B into account. This  
 
clearly illustrates how the low proportion of time spent 
within the ECA zone of ship B affects the optimal strategy 
for the ship-operator, as MGO will remain advantageous 
over the scrubber even with a severe increase in the price 
spread. With even fewer operational years remaining, this 
maximum critical price spread increases even further.  
 
It is, however, also worth emphasizing the large impact the 
recent glut in the oil price has on the results of this 
analysis. A return of the price of oil and consequently the 
MGO – HFO price spread to previous high levels would 
cause the strategies of retrofits to become increasingly 
more feasible for vessels with a large degree of operations 
within the ECA zones. This is especially true for the LNG 
retrofit strategy as the LNG price may not increase at the 
same pace as that of oil. This is further emphasized by the 
fact that engines operating on LNG offer increased fuel 
efficiency16. Should the price of oil and HFO drop further 
to a level where it was on par with that of LNG when 
measured by energy content, the LNG strategy would 
                                                          
16For example, ship B only requires approximately 800 
kilograms of LNG to cover a distance of 10 nm compared 
to 950 kilograms of HFO if a scrubber is installed.  
 
Figure 3.17:  Total discounted fuel related costs with alternative MGO prices for Ship C 
All costs are measured in constant 2014 USD. The MGO (low) and (high) lines describe the costs for the vessel operating solely on MGO in the low and 
high price scenarios respectively while the lines labelled “scrubber”, “LNG” and Non-compliance denotes the corresponding strategies. The MGO - 
HFO fuel spreads are assumed to be 135 and 200 USD in the low and high price scenario respectively while the LNG – HFO spread is assumed to be -
50 USD and the price for a ton of low Sulphur is 25 USD above that of standard HFO. 
Source: Own calculations 
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become highly unfeasible compared to the scrubber due to 
the much higher retrofitting costs of the LNG engine 
conversion compared to installing a scrubber. In these 
examples, focus was on the optimal strategies of 
compliance. However, as noted above, it is evident that the 
strategy of non-compliance in some scenarios remained 
superior to that of compliance. In the next section, the 
required level of enforcement needed in order to deter 
cheating will be determined.  
 
3.2.10 The optimal level of enforcement 
From the results earlier in this analysis it was evident that 
the current low fine size in combination with a low 
frequency of enforcement results in the strategy of non-
compliance offering large cost savings compared to the 
strategies of compliance. Although it is reasonable to 
assume that a majority of the ship-owners operating in the 
Baltic and North Sea ECA zone will comply with the new 
Sulphur regulations regardless of the enforcement level, 
the risk arises that a significant number of companies may 
decide to disregard the rules in order to increase financial 
profits. Financial constraints due the recent meagre years 
in the shipping market in combination with the limited 
enforcement procedures have given ship-owners a large 
incentive to adopt the strategy of non-compliance. Thus, 
an increase in the sanctioning of non-complying ship-
owners is necessary to ensure that the SOx emission 
regulations are observed by the vessels, as well as 
maintaining an environment of fair competition within the 
ECA zone.  
 
In the framework of this analysis, there are three ways to 
ensure that non-compliance will not remain the strategy 
with the lowest expected costs. The first is an increase in 
the fine size, the second is an increase in the inspection 
ratio, and the third is a combination of the above two 
methods.  
  
An optimal level of the size of the fine is always subject to 
interpretation since some policy makers will argue that an 
infinitely high fine size will force all ship-owners to 
comply, while more moderate policymakers may argue 
that an optimal fine size just needs to ensure that the 
strategy of non-compliance will be equally as expensive as 
the cheapest strategy of abatement. Determining such an 
optimal fine size is, however, made difficult by the fact 
that ships have different specifications and routes, thus 
requiring the policy makers to adjust the optimal fine size 
for each vessel caught non-complying or alternatively 
determining the optimal fine size from the specifications of 
the vessel having the lowest incentive to comply. That is, 
the optimal fine size for a vessel operating solely within 
the ECA zone will most likely be lower compared to that 
of a vessel only visiting the ECA zone once a month. 
Additionally, fluctuations in fuel prices and retrofitting 
costs will also impact the level of such an optimal fine 
size. Taken together, this implies that it is impossible to 
determine an optimal enforcement. The complex situation 
faced by the policy makers is illustrated by equation 3.2 
below17.     
 
𝑇𝐶𝑗,𝑛
𝑁𝐶(𝐹, 𝜑) ≥ 𝑚𝑖𝑛{𝑇𝐶𝑗,𝑛
𝑆𝐶𝑅 ; 𝑇𝐶𝑗,𝑛
𝑀𝐺𝑂}                3.2 
 
𝐹 = 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 
𝜑 = 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 
𝑇𝐶𝑗,𝑛
𝑁𝐶(𝐹, 𝜑) = 𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑗 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 
𝑇𝐶𝑗,𝑛
𝑆𝐶𝑅 = 𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝑗 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠  
𝑇𝐶𝑗,𝑛
𝑀𝐺𝑂 = 𝑆ℎ𝑖𝑝 𝐽 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑀𝐺𝑂 𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑔𝑦 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 
 
Simplified, the above equation states that for a vessel with 
an optimal compliance strategy equalling total costs of 20 
million USD while having only total costs of 10 million 
for non-complying, the level of sanctioning will have to be 
sufficiently high such that the expected costs for non-
compliance will equal the 20 million USD during a similar 
time period (Stigler, 1971). 
 
The complexities of determining an optimal fine size is 
exemplified by the different fine sizes needed to deter the 
operators of each of the three examined vessels from non-
complying, illustrated in table 3.7. 
 
 From the calculated fine sizes, it becomes clear that the 
large discrepancy in the annual amount of port visits by 
ship A and the other two vessels results in major fine size 
differences. For ship A, the optimal fine size is 
approximately 40 and 25 thousand USD after 5 and 10 
years of operation, respectively, given at 204 annual port 
visits. This is increased to 200 and 380 thousand USD for 
ship B having only 14 annual ECA zone port callings.  
 
Additionally, it is clear that the optimal fine size is reduced 
for vessels A and B when a larger amount of operational 
years remains. This is caused by the larger cost savings 
achieved when operating with a scrubber due to having a 
larger amount of years to negate the significant retrofitting 
costs. For ship B the compliance strategy with the lowest 
                                                          
17 Since the LNG strategy is not readily feasible the 
strategy is excluded to compare non-compliance with the 
currently feasible strategies of compliance. 
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costs remain that of MGO and the increase in the optimal 
fine size is therefore caused by the projected increase in 
the oil price and consequently the HFO-MGO fuel price 
spread.  
It is important to note that the calculations of the optimal 
fine sizes rests on the assumption that port state authorities 
will not be able to differentiate between previously non-
complying vessels. Further, the policy makers face 
asymmetric information, as it is questionable whether 
public authorities have information regarding the 
remaining operational period of the vessel.  
 
Since it is evident that there is no level of enforcement 
which would be optimal for all vessels, it is clear that 
determining the enforcement level is as much a political 
choice as it is an economic one.  
 
3.2.11 Examining the strategy of termination: Stena Line 
As demonstrated above, the introduction of the new 
Sulphur regulations will result in a significant increase in 
the fuel related expenses of the shipping companies 
operating in the Baltic and North Sea. As formulated 
earlier, ship-operators have the possibility to avoid these 
extra costs by adopting the strategy of ceasing operations 
within the ECA zone and either relocating their assets to 
other markets or terminate operations all together by 
selling their ships. At present, a majority of the shipping 
companies operating within the Baltic and North Sea has 
opted to comply and continue operations within the ECA 
zone by installing a scrubber or fuel switching to MGO 
and relatively few changes to route networks has been 
announced. One of the shipping companies that has 
announced a reduction in their route network is Stena Line, 
who recently announced the layoff of 800 employees as 
well as the withdrawal of one of the ferries operating the 
route between Trelleborg and the Polish port of Sassnitz 
(Louise Vogdrup-Schmidt, 2014). 
The ferry being retired is the 10,882 gross ton RoPax 
“Trelleborg” commissioned in 1982 (Stena Line, 2015a). 
With a vessel age of 32 years, the “Trelleborg” is nearing 
the end of her service period and retrofitting the vessel 
because of the Sulphur regulations would therefore prove 
to be unfeasible.  
In addition to the two vessels serving the Trelleborg-
Sassnitz route, Stena Line operates two RoPax vessels 
between Trelleborg and the port of Rostock, situated less 
than 150 kilometres from the port of Sassnitz. Including 
the “Trelleborg” three vessels services the route between 
the port of Trelleborg and the northern coast of Pomerania. 
The two RoPax vessels servicing the Trelleborg – Rostock 
route are the “Mecklenburg-Vorpommern” and the 
“Skåne” at 37,987 and 28,960 gross tonnes, respectively. 
Both are built in the late 90s while the “Sassnitz” servicing 
the route to Sassnitz is both larger and newer compared to 
the “Trelleborg”.  
According to Jesper Walterson, head of corporate 
communications in Stena Line, the downsizing is the result 
of a planned cost reduction of 450 million SEK previously 
initiated. Walterson also mentions that the introduction of 
the Sulphur regulations played a major role in the decision 
process (Louise Vogdrup-Schmidt, 2014). The 
combination of the “Trelleborg” being an aging ship and 
the fact that the company operates along both larger and 
newer RoPax vessels on similar routes makes it clear that 
retiring the vessel was an obvious choice for Stena Line.  
 
Dominant strategy of 
compliance after 5 years 
Approximate optimal 
Fine Size after 5 years 
Dominant strategy of 
compliance after 10 years 
Approximate optimal Fine 
Size after 10 years 
Ship A  LNG 40.000 LNG 25.000 
Ship B MGO (low) 200.000 MGO (low) 380.000 
Ship C MGO (low) 110.000 LNG 100.000 
 
Table 3.7: Optimal Fine sizes for the ships examined 
Fine sizes are measured in 2014 constant USD. An inspection ratio of 10 percent per ECA zone port visit is assumed 
while the LNG strategy is excluded. 
Source: Own calculations  
 
 
 
 
 
The Stena Line “Trelleborg” 
Courtesy of Stena Line Public Photo Libary 
 
 
  
52 
NA
VI
GA
TIN
G 
EC
A-
ZO
NE
S:
 R
EG
UL
AT
IO
N 
AN
D 
DE
CI
SI
ON
-M
AK
IN
G 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.18: Average total costs and marginal revenue functions after the introduction of the Sulphur regulations  
After the introduction of the regulations the marginal revenue curve will never exceed the average total cost curve and 
the vessel will therefore operate with a loss regardless of the amount of cargo transported (Q).   
Source: Own illustrations.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.19: Average total cost and marginal revenue curves prior to the introduction of the Sulphur regulation  
Prior to the introduction of the regulations the marginal revenue curve exceeds the average total cost curve after the 
intersection of the curves. Operations are therefore profitable as long as the amount of cargo transported exceeds the 
intersection of the two curves. 
Source: Own illustrations.   
 
 
 
  
53 
TH
E 
M
AR
KE
T 
PE
RS
PE
CT
IV
E:
 F
IV
E 
ST
RA
TE
GI
ES
 F
OR
 S
HI
P-
OP
ER
AT
OR
S 
  
 
This illustrates perfectly how a shipping company can 
adopt the fifth strategy, namely that of termination of 
operations. 
 
The rationale behind Stena lines decision to withdraw the 
“Trelleborg” can be explained by the increase in the 
average costs of operating the vessel illustrated by the 
figures 3.18 and 3.19. Figure 3.18 illustrates the average 
total costs and marginal revenue of an ageing vessel 
operating within the ECA zone before and after the 
introduction of the Sulphur regulations, respectively. In 
figure 3.19 the extra fuel related costs shifts the average 
total cost curve upwards, while the corresponding 
increases in the freight rates adopted by the industry 
equally cause an upwards shift of the marginal revenue 
line. 
 
Although both lines shift upwards after the introduction of 
the new regulatory scheme, the average costs of the ageing 
vessel increases relatively more compared to the revenue. 
This causes the average total cost curve to exceed that of 
the marginal revenue, thereby rendering the vessel 
economically unfeasible. If the increase in the fuel related 
costs is indeed the reason for the premature retirement of 
the “Trelleborg”, the introduction of the Sulphur regulation 
in the Baltic and Nordic Seas does not only reduce the 
emission of particles into the atmosphere by improvements 
in fuel types, but also by forcing a modernization of the 
merchant fleet operating within the ECA zone. 
 
3.2.12 Implications and Conclusion 
The introduction of the Sulphur regulations in 2015 will 
result in significant increases in the annual fuel related 
costs for ship-owners operating within the Baltic and 
North Sea. The magnitude of these fuel related costs, 
however, critically depends on what strategy the ship-
owner adopts. These strategies include the retrofitting of a 
scrubber or LNG engine, substituting HFO with MGO 
when inside the ECA zone, violating the new regulations 
by continuously burning HFO, or a mix between two or 
several of these strategies.   
Throughout this analysis, three different ships of different 
sizes and routes were examined in order to demonstrate 
how the different specifications of the vessels affected the 
ship-operators’ optimal strategy in response to the 
introduction of the sulphur regulations in the Baltic and 
North Sea. The results revealed that in addition to the price 
differences between standard HFO and MGO / LNG, the 
optimal strategy depends on a multitude of factors which 
includes the costs of retrofitting the engine, vessel size and 
age, distance sailed within the ECA zone, and finally the 
severity and frequency of the enforcement of the Sulphur 
regulation.  
 
The strategy of MGO was found the be the most 
straightforward of the strategies to adopt – especially for 
aging ships where a limited number of years were 
available to compensate for the large investment costs of 
the scrubber. Because the fuel costs of substituting HFO 
with the more expensive MGO progressively increases 
with the distances sailed within the SECA (compared to 
the fixed investment costs of the retrofits), the strategy of 
MGO was found to be increasingly advantageous for 
vessels mainly operating outside of the ECA zone. The 
recent glut in the price of oil, however, even resulted in 
MGO being the favourable strategy of compliance for 
ships solely operating within the ECA zone in the low 
price spread scenario if more than 5 operational years 
remain. Additionally, it was found that for vessels 
operating a majority of the time outside of the ECA zone 
MGO will remain the dominant strategy even with a 
drastic increase in the price of MGO relative to the other 
fuel types. These results fit into the strategies adapted by 
the major global shipping companies such as Maersk and 
Hapag-Lloyd who both have chosen to burn MGO/MDO 
when operating within the established ECA zones in order 
to comply with the new sulphur regulations. 
 
The alternative strategies of compliance involving the 
retrofit of a scrubber or LNG engine becomes increasingly 
favourable compared to using MGO, as the fraction of the 
voyage days spent within the ECA zone increases. 
Additionally, the scrubber and LNG solutions are more 
favourable on vessels of smaller tonnage due to the 
proportionally larger investment costs associated with the 
retrofitting of larger vessels. Lastly, retrofits are 
favourable on younger vessels with at least 5 years of 
remaining operational time, due to having more service 
years to take advantage of the reduced operational costs of 
burning HFO or LNG.  
 
Of the two forms of retrofits examined in this study, LNG 
was found to outperform the scrubber strategy on all 
economic aspects unless only a few operational years 
remain.  LNG as the most cost effective strategy critically 
hinges on the price spread between standard HFO and 
LNG due to the retrofit cost of the engine to operate on 
LNG being higher than that of installing a scrubber. In this 
analysis, the price of LNG per energy content was slightly 
lower than that of HFO and while such a scenario is 
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plausible in some regions of the world it is by no means a 
globally applicable conclusion. Thus, the feasibility of 
operating on LNG therefore depends on the regional 
pricing of LNG. Additionally, the LNG ship fuel 
technology has not gained a wide popularity which results 
in a significant lack of infrastructure supporting LNG 
refuelling capabilities in virtually all major ports located 
within the ECA zone. While LNG remains the more cost 
effective solution of the retrofits (notwithstanding the 
associated uncertainty), the fuel related costs of operating 
with a scrubber are only marginally higher, resulting in the 
retrofit of a scrubber to be the choice for risk averse ship-
owners operating vessels with projected fuel related costs 
of MGO exceeding those of a retrofit.  
 
These results go in line with the strategies adopted by 
several ship companies operating primarily on short sea 
routes within the Baltic and North Sea such as DFDS, 
Brittany and Carnival. However, it is of importance that 
several major companies operating primarily within the 
ECA zone, such as Stena Line, has not adopted the 
scrubber strategy although parts of their fleet remain 
relatively young with many remaining operational years 
per ship. This may in part be a product of the recent fall in 
the MGO price spread combined with a ‘wait and see’-
approach, but for some companies this may also be caused 
by the chartering agreements where the ships operator is 
not the owner. This creates a situation of moral hazard as 
the ship owner will have no incentive to pay for a retrofit 
as the ship charterer will obtain all the benefits of reduced 
fuel costs. Conversely, ship operators chartering the 
vessels for a limited amount of time will have no incentive 
to pay the large investment costs and consequently 
continue operating on HFO (non-compliance) or switch to 
MGO. 
 
The fourth ship-owner response examined in this study 
was the strategy of continued operation in the SECA while 
not complying with the sulphur regulations. Even though 
the inspection rate adopted for this study exceeded past 
observations in the ports of the ECA zone (see chapter 4), 
the strategy of non-compliance was found to incur less 
costs to the ship-owner compared to both the retrofit of a 
scrubber and fuel switching to MGO. The feasibility of the 
strategy of non-compliance is reduced as the average fine 
size, inspection rate and ports visits increase, but the 
current lax enforcement results in a significant cost 
reduction for non-compliers compared to compliers. These 
results may have a profound impact on the compliant 
shipping firms operating within the ECA zone, shifting 
competition in favour of those firms who disregard 
Sulphur regulation. Such a scenario does not reward 
compliance and may end up forcing compliant ship-
owners out of the shipping market within the ECA zone. If 
compliant ship-owners are forced out of the SECA, the 
competition will not only be weakened but the emissions 
of sulphuric particles in the SECA may also remain at the 
previous level. This negates the positive effects of 
regulation that would otherwise have been achieved. It is 
therefore paramount for the maritime authorities of the 
SECA to facilitate an effective enforcement scheme such 
that competition on the SECA remains fair, as it is possible 
that several ship-operators are currently adopting a ‘wait 
and see’-approach, and refrain from complying with the 
new regulations until sufficient enforcement is 
implemented.  
 
The last strategy option of the ship operator is the decision 
to adopt the strategy of termination. This study only briefly 
touches on the choice of terminating previous routes and 
activities in the ECA zone altogether. If the ship-owner 
deems the additional costs of compliance too high, the ship 
owner can withdraw from the area by relocating to a non-
SECA region or simply sell the vessel. While such 
strategies are most advantageous for aging vessels with a 
high level of fuel consumption and where the payback 
time of the costs retrofit surpasses the remaining 
operational time of the vessel, the benefits and 
disadvantages of these decision choices remains outside of 
the quantitative analysis of this study and is therefore 
subject to further research.  
 
From the results of this analysis it is clear that no fuel 
strategy is truly dominant and that a multitude of variables 
impact the cost structures of ship operators navigating the 
ECA zone. The oil and gas prices are highly volatile and 
therefore have the potential to dramatically alter the 
conclusions of this analysis in a short period of time. The 
calculations employed here follow the dramatic 
developments in oil prices which unfolded during the latter 
part of 2015. It is, however, important to note that if the oil 
price reverts back to the 2014-levels relative to natural gas 
prices, it is possible for ship-owners to obtain extreme cost 
advantages by retrofitting the ship engines to operate on 
LNG. The reader is advised to review the calculations 
presented here as oil price projections are updated. Ship 
operators successfully anticipating the future oil and gas 
price development are therefore well equipped to secure 
huge cost savings and ensure a competitive edge in the 
industry by adopting the favourable fuel type strategies. 
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Applying a theoretic framework to describe the optimal 
regulation from a hierarchical perspective to deter non-
compliance, Gary Becker’s theory of Crime and 
Punishment can be applied. The theory seeks to understand 
stakeholders’ economical behaviour, given the conditions 
provided by the state. Stakeholder’s behaviour will reflect 
their economical rational decision process, as they seek to 
maximize their value (G. S. Becker, 1974; G. Becker, 
1968)  
 
Considering vessels as agents, they operate independently 
of ownership and governance structure. With States as the 
principals, we assumed them to act in a way that 
maximizes the chance that agents comply with the market 
they create. Theory designates that agents will consider the 
cost and benefits of all possible actions they can take. 
Non-compliance will happen if the agent gains more 
benefit from evasion, than the risk of detection and impact 
of penalization. Thus the optimal decision for a risk neutral 
agent is that the cost saved by non-compliance (A), being 
higher than the probability of detection (p) times the 
penalization (F). To capture the behaviour patterns of 
agents, a premium value can be introduced to capture if 
agents behaviour is defined as risk averse or risk seeking 
(G. Becker, 1968; Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
Risk neutral: A > pF 
Risk averse: A + c > pF 
Risk seeking: A > pF + c 
 
Regulators are motivated to limit a negative externality, 
until the marginal harm is equal to the marginal benefit. To 
ensure compliance, regulators can employ two strategies: 
increasing the detection rate (p) or the penalization (F). 
According to the theory, fines are the suitable solution 
when agents are risk averse, and if they are risk seeking 
then high enforcement is the optimal strategy (G. Becker, 
1968). 
 
Having understood the basic conflicts of interest in 
international maritime regulation and achieving 
compliance, this section seeks to conceptualize the 
regulatory environment in the European ECA. Firstly, the 
enforcement provisions of states according to the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO) will be 
presented. Understanding these provisions allows the 
reader to understand how the market is regulated and 
enforced by the states. Secondly, the EU directive on SOx 
emissions will be examined, as the directive has a high 
impact on the Baltic Sea, given the amount of European 
states around the coast. Having clarified the provisions of 
the enforcement actors and the implementation of 
legislation, the third section will elaborate on uncertainties 
in relation to the enforcement level and the corresponding 
industry response to such uncertainties. Returning to 
Becker, effective enforcement is built around penalization 
and the probability of getting caught, a tension that will be 
explored in the last part of this section. This should 
hopefully provide insights for other ECA’s around the 
world, for both states and ship-operators. 
 
4 THE HIERARCHICAL PERSPECTIVE 
AS A HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURE, REGULATION IS PERCEIVED AS GIVEN BY THE REGULATOR 
TO THE MARKET. REGULATORS MUST THEREFORE PROVIDE INCENTIVE FOR COMPLIANCE, 
BY SELECTING THE CORRECT ENFORCEMENT STATEGIES. THE SHIP OPERATORS MAXIMIZE 
THEIR UTILITY, AND THEREFORE NEED TO RECOGNIZE THEIR STRATEGIC OPTIONS. THIS 
SECTION SEEKS TO UNDERSTAND HOW REGULAOTRS ACHIEVE COMPLIANCE AND HOW TO 
CREATE INCENTIVE FOR A LEVEL PLAYING-FIELD. 
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4.1 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION LAW OF 
THE SEA ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS 
United Nations Convention Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
defines right and responsibilities of nations in respect to 
the natural resources, utilization of the ocean and 
guidelines of environmental preservation. The UN itself 
does not employ the convention, as it is operationalized by 
the IMO, the international whaling commission, and the 
international seabed authority. This report focuses on the 
IMO, as it is the “competent international organization” 
within the scope of vessel operations. To define 
enforcement efforts, Part XII, Section 6 of UNCLOS is 
concerned with the environmental protection enforcement 
of vessels. It provides environmental responsibilities and 
enforcement provisions for Flag-, Coastal- and Port-States. 
Coastal- and Port-States share some provisions, governed 
by Section 7 Safeguards, which defines states provisions 
for vessel investigation (United Nations, 1982). 
 
4.1.1 Flag state role 
Article 217 in UNCLOS states that flag states must ensure 
compliance by vessels in their registry, to the international 
rules and standards established by the competent 
international organization, to reduce the pollution of the 
marine environment. Flag states must provide ships with 
certificates proving compliance with environmental 
regulation. These certificates are in turn to be accepted as 
proof of compliance by other states, unless there is a 
credible suspicion of non-compliance.  
If a violation occurs of vessels in their registry, the Flag 
state is the responsible authority and is required to provide 
effective enforcement. This is irrespectively of where a 
violation occurs. If notified of a non-compliant vessel, the 
flag-state must provide immediate investigation in the 
matter. Penalties imposed on vessels for violations must be 
adequate in severity to discourage violations where they 
occur, this means that penalties should reflect the severity 
of the violation – ensuring a certain level of penalties 
across all flag states for violations. However, the Port- or 
Costal-state also have capabilities to provide fines 
(UNCLOS, art. 217). 
 
4.1.2 Port state role 
Article 218, Enforcement by port State, provides 
enforcement provisions for port states over vessels 
voluntarily entering port. If a port state believes that a 
vessel has violated international environmental regulation, 
it is allowed to investigate any discharges of polluting 
elements within the internal waters, territorial sea or 
exclusive economic zone of that state. Upon request, a port 
state can also investigate discharge from vessels on the 
behalf of other states, including investigation requests by 
the flag state (UNCLOS, art. 218). 
 
Investigation of vessel compliance is primarily done 
examining bunker logs. However, if these logs are 
insufficient or show non-compliance, then bunker samples 
are taken to test the quality of the bunker. The article 
provides enforcement provisions for Port-states in the 
Baltic Sea to enforce SECA regulation. It is evident that 
Port-states have the most direct physical enforcement 
power on vessels, as they constitute the gateway for 
vessels cargo (UNCLOS, art 218). 
 
4.1.3 Coastal state role 
Article 220, Enforcement by Coastal States, provides 
coastal states provisions for monitoring compliance. It 
allows inspection of vessels passing the territorial waters 
and EEZ of a coastal state, if there are clear grounds for 
believing that a vessel is non-compliant with international 
rules and regulation. This is despite the notion of Innocent 
passage (UNCLOS, Part II, Section 3), as this can be 
disregarded if evidence supports non-compliance with 
rules of prevention or reduction of pollution from vessels. 
If the coastal state is limited in actual enforcement, they 
may obtain information from the vessel, and pass on 
enforcement to port states. The impact on vessels in the 
SECA is that a costal state may, if they have a suspicion, 
investigate any boat that they believe are non-compliant. 
Coastal states can therefore act as a catalyst to increase 
overall enforcement of Sulphur emission rules (UNCLOS, 
art. 220). 
 
4.1.4 Section 7 Safeguards 
For Coastal- and Port-States, certain rules apply as to the 
proceedings on how to exercise their enforcement 
provisions. Article 226 refers to the investigation of 
foreign vessels; it states that investigation should not delay 
a foreign vessel longer than is essential. Investigation is 
seen as being limited to the examination of certificates, 
records and other documents – required by international 
rules and standards. Further inspection may be carried out 
if; there is a clear ground for believing missing correlation 
between documents and the actual condition of the vessel, 
documents are not sufficient to confirm violation or valid 
certificates are not carried (UNCLOS, art. 226). 
 
Release of investigated vessels should be made as 
promptly as possible, following reasonable procedures 
such as inspection, bonding or other financial security is 
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provided.  Only if the direct seaworthiness of the vessel is 
questionable, regarding its threat to the marine 
environment, may the vessel be detained until repairs have 
been made. This allows states to take administrative 
measures to prevent vessels form continuing their voyage, 
if they are deemed a threat to the marine environment 
(UNCLOS, art. 226).  
 
Article 228, Suspension and restrictions on institution of 
proceedings, provides the flag state with certain powers to 
counterbalance the proceedings of its registered vessels. 
Flag states may contact the Port- or Coastal-states stating 
that they will overtake the proceedings, giving some 
regulatory power to the Flag-states. The only exceptions 
are if there is major damage to the violated state in 
question, or if the flag state has repeatedly disregarded its 
obligation to enforce effectively. This ensures that Flag-
state must oblige by its obligations and cannot just be 
lenient towards vessels (UNCLOS, art. 228).  
 
4.2 SULPHUR REGULATION 
The International Maritime Organization is mandated by 
the United Nations to regulate maritime affairs, providing 
a global regulatory framework. Maritime conventions are 
developed with states, providing the IMO with a high 
degree of international legitimacy. Their framework 
provides guidelines and regulation for the maritime 
industry through conventions regarding: safety, education, 
navigation (SOLAS) and environmental concerns 
(MARPOL). 
 
MARPOL is operationalized by the IMO Marine 
Environment Protection Committee (MEPC), with Section 
VI of MARPOL focusing on Sulphur emissions. When this 
section was ratified in 2005, it provided the option to 
create Sulphur emission control areas, which were 
introduced in the Baltic Sea and around the North 
American continent.     
 
The EU Sulphur Directive was used to implement 
MARPOL Annex VI into national law of EU member 
states around the Baltic. With a large amount of the states 
surrounding the Baltic Sea are EU members, this allowed 
for harmonization of enforcement practices, perhaps 
ensuring a level playing field. The 2012 amendment 
directive works with three areas of interest for the industry 
operating in the SECA zone: Enforcement of by member 
states, Directive commissions influence on this 
enforcement and a clause regarding the Supply of bunker 
fuel (European Parliament & Council of the European 
Union, 2012). 
 
Power delegation of enforcement frequency adjustments 
by the commission is defined in article 9 of the directive. It 
states that the actual power delegation to the EU 
commission will not be until March 2017, when a report 
will be published defining this. Yet the directive commits 
Member States to establish a system of effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive penalties for non-
compliance. The former is open for interpretation, which 
explains why member states have different approaches to 
implementation of the directive.  
The penalties determined must be effective, proportionate 
and dissuasive and may include fines calculated in such a 
way as to ensure that the fines at least deprive those 
responsible of the economic benefits derived from their 
infringement and that those fines gradually increase for 
repeated infringements. (Directive 2012/33/EU Art. 11, 2.) 
Article 11, Penalties, expands on how Member states 
should impose penalties for vessels not complying with the 
emission standards set by the EU. The penalties must 
reflect the economic gain from cheating, to create a strong 
incentive for compliance. Currently many different 
penalization strategies are present in the SECA, which will 
be elaborated below.  
 
Member States shall take all necessary measures to check 
by sampling that the Sulphur content of fuels… [Sampling] 
shall be carried out periodically with sufficient frequency 
and quantities in such a way that the samples are 
representative of the fuel examined, and in the case of 
marine fuel, of the fuel being used by vessels while in 
relevant sea areas and ports. (Art. 6, 1.) 
Article 6, Sampling and analysis, dictates how member 
states must enforce control of Sulphur content of bunker 
fuels, as different Sulphur emission limits are enforced in 
the SECA. Section 1.a. dictates that sampling methods 
should be: the ships log books, bunker delivery notes or 
sampling fuel in the tanks. 1.b, provides the Commission 
with the empowerment to adopt implementing acts 
concerning the frequency of sampling, the sampling 
methods and the definition of a sample representative of 
the fuel examined. In the directives current form, bunker 
samples are deemed as the strongest proof of violation.  
Enforcement should therefore reach equilibrium within the 
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SECA, when compliance is the only viable option, if 
regulation reflects how the implementation will be in real 
life. The Commission can create a unified enforcement, by 
controlling the frequency of the enforcement and making 
sure that member states penalize policy deters non-
compliance. Critique of the directive is how states interpret 
penalties as proportionate and able to deter repeated 
infringements. The EU has the hard legislative power, 
however soft power organizations like the Helsinki 
commission (HELCOM) are important in creating the 
level playing field.  
4.3 IMPLEMENTATION OF SECA  
A list of uncertain elements affects the implementation of 
the SECA. Uncertainties arise in the regional geopolitical 
situation, the new EU commission and the role of states in 
regional forum HELCOM. The individual national 
commitments to enforcement the SECA creates 
uncertainty for the harmonized implementation. Member 
states pushing for technological innovation can increase 
enforcement by making it more cost efficient. 
  
4.3.1 EU Commission 
The current commission originally listed 10 priorities, 
where the main focus is on creation of: a stronger internal 
market, strengthening European competitiveness, creation 
of an efficient energy union and maintaining the EU as an 
important global actor. There has been some critique of the 
commission by Green10, an organization for the ten 
biggest environmental NGOs. Green10 stated in a common 
letter in 2014: “… strong concern over President-Elect 
Juncker’s attempt to downgrade the environment in 
Europe and asks the European Parliament to reject the 
Commission” (Green10, 2014). This critique was coined at 
the creation of the commission, and adaptations have been 
made to prioritize sustainability.   
 
Sulphur emissions have become a worry of the 
commission, and in November 2015 Romania was referred 
to the Court of Justice of the EU over failure to transpose 
the EU Sulphur regulations. They were referred due to the 
importance of adherence to the standard, which aligns the 
EU with the standards created by the IMO (European 
Commission, 2015b). 
 
The development and adoption of EU regulation 2015/757, 
on reduction of carbon dioxide emissions, supports that 
shipping emissions are indeed in focus. The EU legal 
framework, active for all European waters by 2018, forces 
all vessels above 5000 gross tons to monitor, report and 
verify their CO2 emissions (European Commission, 2015a, 
2015b). This scheme provides a regional monitoring, 
referred to as the MRV, which is comparable to the global 
scheme under development in the IMO. It was 
 
 
 
Source: Scanpix / Iris  
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implemented  because the EU concluded that the IMO was  
too slow in the process of creating the global system 
(Maritime Danmark, 2012).  
 
4.3.2 Regional commitment to enforce 
The Helsinki Commission (HELCOM) was established as 
an organization for protection of the marine environment 
in the Baltic through inter-governmental cooperation 
between Baltic Sea states. The commission is controlled 
by the Helsinki convention, which entered into force in 
2000. In November 2014 it published a report concerning 
the enforcement of Sulphur, which is thus able to illustrate 
states commitment and the uncertainties they identify 
(HELCOM, 2014). Since IMO rely on member states to 
enforce rules, HELCOM is an important body when it 
comes to implementation of IMO rules in the Baltic Sea. 
 
HELCOM findings identifies that there is a need for 
harmonized enforcement across states for efficient 
implementation. Deviance in assessment criteria and 
penalization of non-compliance are seen as a key 
challenge. Different penalization types include: 
administrative fines, detention and criminal prosecution. 
Harmonization is thus hard to achieve, as penalization 
impact on vessels is not equal in all states.   
 
Targeting vessels for inspections, states agree that existing 
targeting mechanism by the ports is sufficient. States 
around the Baltic Sea have signed Paris Memorandum of 
Understanding (Paris MOU), issuing guidelines and 
educating control officers to carry out inspections. Their 
system rewards quality shipping with higher intervals of 
between investigations, targeting ships based on 
movement patterns and statistical non-compliance. Some 
states identified that perhaps the system should be 
modified slightly to especially target ships operating routes 
exiting and entering the ECA, to deter non-compliance 
(HELCOM, 2014).  
 
Due to the strategic position coastal states like Norway, 
Sweden and Denmark can de-facto increase the 
enforcement level, through coastal state provisions in 
UNCLOS. They are located at key waterway junctions, 
where all traffic for the inner Baltic Sea has to pass. Since 
all ports are members of the Paris MOU, the penalization 
can be passed on to the destination ports. This however 
would require a high investment from costal countries to 
carry out this type of enforcement, where technology 
might be the best catalyst for this type of intervention. This 
alternative should be explored, as the regional Sulphur 
restrictions implementation might be a beacon for how to 
implement the global restrictions in 2020/2025. 
 
The only countries that are not affected directly by the EU 
directive are Norway and Russia. Norway, known as a 
quality shipper, will most likely provide a high 
enforcement level. Russia has shown resilience against the 
implementation of Sulphur emission restrictions within the 
negotiation process of HELCOM. However 
implementation is moving forward, as inspections have 
started from the middle of May 2015 (L. Vogdrup-
Schmidt, 2015).  
 
4.3.3 Development of Reporting and Enforcement tech 
The development of “The Common Information Sharing 
Environment for the EU maritime domain” (Maritime 
CISE) is the first step of the way towards increased 
enforcement. On top of this THETIS-S is being developed, 
as an add-on to the existing Paris MOU system. Future 
developments of the CO2 focused MRV directive could 
perhaps be used as a catalyst, to increase the overall 
monitoring of vessels.  
 
New technological developments are emerging, as demand 
is created for technology used for either proving 
compliance by the industry or improving enforcement 
possibilities by states. One technological advance that 
HELCOM deemed necessary was the need for faster fuel 
testing, due to the long waiting times with the current 
testing process (HELCOM, 2014).   
 
For states wanting new enforcement technology a few 
options have emerged, the first example being the test 
installation of sniffers under the Great Belt fixed Link 
Bridge in Denmark, by the Danish technological institute. 
Due to a direct correlation between the CO2 and SOx, the 
Sulphur content can be derived from the emission of 
vessels passing under the bridge (Køcks, 2013). The 
downside to having fixed sensors is that non-compliant 
vessels will avoid or use compliant fuels when below the 
sensor. “Project Sense” is a project currently developing 
drones, with the same sensors, to automatically investigate 
ships far from the coastline. This allows the monitoring to 
be more adaptive, and to capture all vessels deemed risky 
by authorities (Explicit, 2014).  
 
Both these technologies are in the final development phase 
and are currently not being used as enforcement 
techniques. They could however in the future provide 
better enforcement for states, given their potential to 
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monitor ships automatically and at a lower price than 
current inspection by fuel testing. The same detector 
technology has been developed to industry self-monitoring 
and reporting. This emergence is supporting the 
development of the European MRV directive, and other 
Green-shipping rating systems. This provides an option to 
move away from the traditional bunker notes as proof of 
compliance, allowing for more data to prove compliance.   
 
4.4 WILL VESSELS COMPLY IN THE BALTIC? 
The EU directive is able to influence the frequency, and 
not the fine level. This critique is important, as the Baltic 
Port Organization have investigated the administrative 
fines distributed by Baltic States for non-compliance to 
range from a few hundred Euros to over 84000 Euros 
(Rozmarynowska, 2015). Other states utilize their criminal 
system to determine fines, which makes it difficult to 
deduct how well their system is able to deal with non-
compliance. Penalization in the form of black listing is 
also a possibility. (HELCOM, 2014) There is a high 
fluctuation in fines, how they are administered and their 
impact, which provides some degree of uncertainty for 
efficient regulation.  
The Paris memorandum of Understanding (Paris MOU) 
provides all European port authorities with a targeting 
framework for vessel inspections. This system rewards the 
quality shippers with a higher interval of inspections, 
while targeting ships based on statistical non-compliance 
and movement patterns entering and exiting the SECA. 
Members of the Paris MOU commit themselves to 
inspecting 25% of the foreign vessels calling their 
harbours.  The targeting mechanism has been enhanced to 
increase Sulphur inspections of potential non-compliant 
ships within the ECA, using THESIS-S. A targeting 
mechanism like this is important when considering 
enforcement and implementation consist of a vast amount 
of different types of stakeholders, with different 
enforcement mandates for each. 
(Paris MoU, 2013; Schiferli & Hinchliffe, 2014) 
In this study it has not been possible to quantify the 
economic loss of blacklisting or reputational damage of 
vessels. Non-compliance might exclude vessels from 
certain clients, a notion proposed by Desombre as “clubs”. 
She argues non-compliant operators can be segregated to a 
secondary market. This is achieved through excludability 
from the market, forcing all stakeholders in the market to 
comply. She points out that the demand for higher quality 
shipping will require customer pressure and policy makers 
to reward compliant operators/punish non-compliant 
operators (DeSombre, 2005, 2006).  
 
4.5 LESSONS FOR ECA IMPLEMENTATION  
Taking the lessons learned in the Baltic, many things can 
be transferred to enforcement of other ECAs. Becker 
define that stakeholders as willing to comply, given that 
the value of compliance is smaller than the probability of 
getting caught multiplied by the penalization impact. This 
impact can either be monetary or market access related.   
 
It is therefore important for regulators to understand what 
operator’s behaviour and reasoning, as they must use this 
to provide the correct incentives for compliance. 
Regulators should increase enforcement until they are able 
to benefit society more than the cost of enforcement. 
Understanding the conditions vessels operate under: short-, 
long-term chartering vs. owning, as this will define the 
chosen compliance strategy by vessels. It is therefore 
important to identify the incentive structure of vessels, 
which is connected to the ownership structure. With leased 
vessels the question is thus: are ship owners are willing to 
pay for the asset improvements like scrubbers, compared 
to a compliance solution where operational costs are 
increased using MGO (Becker, 1968).      
 
Operators must also understand the actions of regulators to 
self-maximize their operations to cope with the markets 
provided by the state. In understanding the long-term 
developments of the market, vessels can gain long-term 
competitive advantages by selecting the correct 
compliance method. Without a level playing-field 
however, the compliant operators will not have an 
incentive to adapt to the new market, thus making the 
market inefficient. Business pressures to create a level 
playing field in the ECA are apparent with the Trident 
alliance, being a strong an advocate of harder enforcement. 
As seen in the next section, operators should consider the 
possibility to actively engaged with regulators to create a 
viable working market.  
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To examine the political processes that lie behind the 
environmental regulation of international shipping, this 
chapter takes departure in the Actor-Network Theory 
(ANT) to analyse how the specific values of specific 
proposals came to be. First, the report explains the 
analytical framework; second, the processes for each of the 
specific issues are outlined; third, the analytical framework 
is applied to the processes.  
 
The analytical framework is structured around two central 
concepts: the semiotic metaphor and the strategic 
metaphor. The basic assumption here is that the value of a 
given entity – such as the area covered by a SECA or the 
allowed level of SOx emissions – is constructed by 
political actors in conjunction with non-person actors 
rather than being ‘given’ by some objective measure. Non-
person actors can be anything that helps giving the value 
of the entity, such as a scientific report or a specific 
calculation (Hansen, 2005b; Law & Mol, 1995a). 
 
The semiotic metaphor describes a situation where the 
value of an entity is ‘stabilized’, meaning that certain 
actors have succeeded in giving the entity a certain value. 
The strategic metaphor, on the other hand, describes a 
situation where actors are mobilizing resources to change 
the value that was otherwise stabilized. Below, the two 
concepts are explained in more detail. 
 
5.1.1 Semiotic metaphor 
The semiotic metaphor illustrates and describes how a 
network of actors affects a social order. In this metaphor, 
the network of actors that surround it gives the entity (such 
as a rule, a norm, or the definition of a particular 
interpretation) its identity and nature. A common example 
of an entity is that of Louis Pasteur. Pasteur was a famous 
scientist, but he was also a politician and a husband to his 
wife. His identity can be any of these things, depending on 
the context from which we associate him. Usually, his 
impressive scientific discoveries come to mind first, and 
we think of Pasteur as the scientist. It is possible that he 
could have any of the other identities, but his scientific 
discoveries are so powerful that we almost exclusively 
think of him as a scientist (Hansen, 2005a; Latour, 1983, 
1993; Law & Mol, 1995b). 
 
The semiotic metaphor is thus an observed entity (which 
can be a person, a rule, a physical item or anything else) 
that has an associated network. This network creates one 
identity, while an opposing network represents another 
identity for the entity in question. This alternative network 
is still connected to the entity, but is not strong enough to 
give identity to the entity. In the example of Pasteur, we 
could see a network consisting of his scientific discoveries, 
his laboratory, and his scientific colleagues. The opposing 
network could consist of his wife, his children, and his 
responsibilities to provide for his family. While both 
networks create a context, the scientific network is much 
stronger when we, the public, think of Pasteur. 
 
Importantly, the individual actors are ‘black-boxed’. ANT 
does not try to explain how networks constitute every actor 
in turn, but rather takes for granted that some actors have 
unintelligible aims and goals. The assumption is thus that 
we can only observe, not explain, these aims and goals. 
5 THE NETWORK PERSPECTIVE  
CONTRARY TO THE HIERARCHICAL AND MARKET PERSPECTIVES, THE NETWORK 
PERSPECTIVE ASSUMES THAT ACTORS CAN FORM NETWORKS AMONG THEMSELVES TO 
GIVE MEANING AND VALUES TO CERTAIN ENTITIES. THIS CHAPTER EXAMINES THE 
PROCESSES BEHIND THE SECA-ZONES, THE PROPOSED BALTIC NOX EMISSION CONTROL 
AREA, AND THE ALLOWED PH-VALUE OF OPEN-LOOP SCRUBBERS AND SHOWS THAT AN 
ACTOR NETWORK THEORY APPROACH BRINGS ADDED VALUE TO THE UNDERSTANDING OF 
POLITICS. 
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With Louis Pasteur, for instance, we would simply take the 
identity of his wife for granted, and not necessarily 
question what networks give rise to her identity as ‘wife’. 
  
5.1.2 Strategic metaphor 
The semiotic metaphor describes the identity of the entity 
by actors in a number of networks. The strategic metaphor 
on the other hand takes actors as strategizers, who seek to 
mobilize their resources to influence the dominant identity 
of the entity. Actors deliberately try to give effect to the 
identity using ‘interessement devices’. These devices are 
resources (which are also actors, as noted above) 
mobilized in some specific way to strengthen the link 
between the strategizing actor and the entity in question, 
while links between the entity and other actors are 
weakened. If successful, this mobilization of resources 
changes the identity of the entity so that the strategizing 
actor now defines the identity. 
 
A simple example illustrates this. Suppose two actors, an 
environmental NGO and a shipping firm, are connected to 
the entity ‘emissions from container shipping’. Each actor 
wants to give an identity to emissions but have completely 
different conceptions of the value emissions have to 
society. The NGO wants to give the emissions an identity 
that implies harmfulness to the environment and large 
health damages to the public, implying that emissions have 
a negative impact on society. Conversely, the shipping 
firm thinks that emissions are a necessary evil because sea 
transport increases societal value. High emissions from 
ships allow for cheaper overall transport costs. The lower 
costs are associated with not having to clean the exhaust 
gas, implying an overall positive impact on society.  
 
Suppose that the shipping firm and its resources currently 
provides the identity of the entity such that emissions from 
ship is generally considered a good thing This is the stable 
network that we can describe with the semiotic metaphor. 
The NGO wants to challenge this perception and sending 
out a scientific report to stakeholders, clearly concluding 
that the health costs of emissions are far higher than the 
positive effects of lower transportation costs. This 
mobilization of resources (in this case information) may 
result in a change of identity, from emissions being 
‘positive’ to ‘harmful’. However, this depends on the 
strength of the report vis-à-vis the strength of the 
previously established stable network between the 
emissions and the shipping firm.  
 
 
To illustrate the semiotic and the strategic metaphors, we 
employ a simple illustrative method. Actors are shown as 
black dots, and black lines between dots represent 
agreement on a certain identity which constitutes a 
network. Two networks, as in the case of Pasteur, connect 
to the entity in question which is placed between the 
networks of actors. The mobilization of resources and the 
interessement devices are shown as arrows that cross over 
the opposing network’s link to the entity. This illustrates 
the effort to disconnect the other network’s link to the 
entity. 
 
5.1.3 The IMO Process: A brief overview 
The process to develop new environmental standards in 
IMO is long, but it can be summarized and understood 
with relative ease. 
 
Generally, IMO enacts new regulation by creating new 
conventions or amending existing ones. The members of 
the UN have voting power at the General Assembly, but in 
practice, much of the work takes place in the committees 
of the organization. Delegates supported by advisers from 
member states have seats in these committees, and each 
committee have authority over a certain policy area. The 
relevant committee in this context is the Marine 
Environment Protection Committee (MEPC). 
 
MEPC meetings, which are annual or semi-annual, cover 
specific issues, and the major decisions are taken at these 
gatherings. During MEPC meetings, working groups are 
often created to treat a specific issue where there is either 
technical uncertainty or political disagreement. These 
groups work during the MEPC meeting over the course of 
several days, and the conclusions inform the MEPC 
meeting which subsequently decides on the issue. Finally, 
MEPC has several sub-committees who specialize in 
technical deliberations in certain areas. In this context, the 
interesting one is Pollution Prevention and Response 
(PPR), which was formerly known as Bulk Liquids and 
Gases (BLG). These sub-committees meet between MEPC 
meetings and provide input to the general meetings based 
on technical information provided by members or other 
stakeholders. 
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5.2 CASE: THE ROAD TO REVISED SULPHUR 
RULES IN MEPC 
5.2.1 Background 
The process leading up to the decision to regulate global 
Sulphur emission originates in the 1970s when the 
MARPOL convention was adopted. In the negotiations 
before adoption, it was discussed whether air pollution 
should be included in MARPOL, but eventually the 
proposal was dropped. 
 
During the 1970s, it became clear that air pollutants from 
vessels were responsible for significant harm to human, 
animal, and plant life. A ministerial meeting in Geneva in 
1979, agreed on the “Convention on Long-range 
Transboundary Air Pollution”. This was the first 
international legally binding instrument concerning air 
pollution in shipping. This convention was amended 
several times to limit emissions of Sulphur, Nitrogen 
Oxides and volatile organic compounds (VOCs).  
 
It was not until 1988, however, that the IMO Marine 
Environment Protection Committee (MEPC) decided to 
include air pollution in its work programme. Eventually, 
MEPC agreed on a resolution that would allow 
amendments to MARPOL, including provisions on air 
pollution. This resulted in the adoption of MARPOL 
Annex VI in 1997. Annex VI included provisions on limits 
of Sulphur, Nitrogen Oxides and ozone depleting 
substances, as well as provisions that allowed for the 
establishment of so-called Emission Control Areas 
(ECAs). In these areas, the allowed Sulphur limit was 1.5 
% m/m instead of the global limit of 4.5 % m/m.  
 
Core Meetings in Implementation of Sulphur Regulation 
MARPOL VI ratification 
MEPC 53 
May  
July  
2005 
2005 
 
BLG 10  
MEPC 55 
BLG 11 
Apr  
Oct  
Apr  
2006 
2006 
2007 
MEPC 56 Jul  2007 
 
BLGWGAP2 Nov  2007 
BLG12 Feb  2008 
 
MEPC 57 Apr  2008 
MEPC 58 Oct  2008 
 
Table 5.1: Core IMO Committee and Sub-Committee 
meetings regarding SOx Regulation 
 
 
MEPC 53 
In May 2005, the IMO members ratified MARPOL Annex 
VI, which entered into force the following year. At the 
MEPC 53 meeting in 2005, it became apparent that there 
was a need to revise MARPOL Annex VI in light of new 
scientific studies highlighting the continued harmful 
effects of emissions (MEPC, 2005). In addition, abatement 
technologies and engine designs had developed 
considerably since 1997. Several submissions to MEPC 
argued that this should be taken into account; as such, 
developments reduced the cost imposed on ship-owners 
and shipyards. As a result, MEPC 53 instructed their sub-
committee BLG to initiate a revision of Annex VI, taking 
into account the aforementioned developments. The 
revision was estimated to take several years. 
 
BLG10 (BLG/10/19) 
At the subsequent meeting in BLG (BLG 10), the 
delegations commenced the revision process by 
establishing a working group on air pollution (abbreviated 
BLG WGAP). The working group met during BLG 10, 
featuring heavy and intense discussions over both scope 
and ambition of the new revised rules. The working group 
could not reach agreement on the issue, and only outlined 
several options for reducing Sulphur emissions (BLG, 
2006, para. 14.22 – 14.24). 
 
The plenary accepted the report of the working group, but 
because of the differences in opinion and the perceived 
lack of hard evidence or science, the plenary agreed to 
establish an intersessional correspondence group. This 
group would meet between BLG 10 and BLG 11 to discuss 
the technical matters of Sulphur emissions. In this context, 
it was emphasized that interested parties should submit 
data, information, or studies that furthered the work of the 
sub-committee. 
 
BLG 11 (BLG/11/16) 
BLG 11 reviewed the results of the correspondence group, 
concluding that the options for reducing Sulphur emissions 
could be reduced to three: lowering the global cap, 
creating Emission Control Areas (ECAs), or emphasizing 
very low caps around ports and cities along a slightly 
lower cap.  
 
Following the report, the issue was debated thoroughly. It 
was questioned whether the petroleum industry could 
provide low-Sulphur fuel for the maritime sector in the 
required quantities. The merit of changing to these 
distillate fuels was also put in question. A large number of 
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delegations stressed the need to assess the availability of 
distillate in a comprehensive study. They were opposed by 
other delegations, arguing environmental action should be 
taken swiftly.  
 
The working group on air pollution was re-established 
during the session, and the report sparked even more 
discussion and statements by delegations (BLG, 2007, 
para. 5.45). Eventually, BLG 11 determined that more time 
was needed to finalize the MARPOL draft revisions and 
another intersessional correspondence group was initiated. 
Parallel to this, the IMO secretary general established an 
informal expert group of researchers to aid BLG and 
MEPC in their considerations. 
 
BLGWGAP 2 (BLG/12/6) 
At the second intersessional working group meeting, many 
matters, especially concerning Nitrogen Oxides, were 
discussed. However, the working group did not consider 
matters of Sulphur emission levels in detail because the 
expert group commissioned by the secretary general was 
still working on it. Thus principal questions remained, 
which were transferred to BLG 12. 
 
BLG 12 (BLG/12/17) 
The outcome of the BLG intersessional working group and 
the informal expert group was presented at the BLG 12 
meeting. The working group presented proposals on a 
wide range of issues including draft proposals to NOx Tier 
II and III as well as standards for determination of fuel oil 
quality. The expert group established by the General 
Secretary provided additional scientific evidence and 
background. The groups provided these inputs to allow the 
BLG to decide on a road forward for Sulphur regulation. 
The intersessional working group report marked the 
beginning of elaborate discussions about the best course of 
action to reduce Sulphur emissions. This culminated in 
another working group that worked through the BLG 
session, presenting their results at the end of the session. 
  
This report compressed the options for limiting Sulphur 
into three distinct solutions. One solution saw emissions 
lowered through a global cap decrease, but with no stricter 
caps in ECA’s. Another solution saw ECA’s as being the 
main vehicles of emission limit. The final proposal for a 
solution utilized micro-ECA’s that would be 
geographically limited around harbours. BLG forwarded 
all of these proposals to MEPC 57. 
 
 
MEPC 57 
All of the considerations that were discussed from BLG 10 
to 12 and in various working groups were carried over into 
MEPC. Due to the high political, economic and 
environmental importance of the decision, 22 papers were 
submitted by NGO’s, member states and industry 
associations. Most notably, the European Commission 
stated that if IMO failed to impose stricter emission 
standards, the EU would retain its right to impose 
unilateral requirements in European waters. This was 
partly in response to some countries (notably Brazil) that 
argued the industry required more time to implement new 
requirements. Finland, Germany and Norway submitted a 
paper that strongly argued that it was imperative that IMO 
made a clear decision at this meeting. The alternative 
would be unilateral or regional measures imposed outside 
of the IMO framework. (MEPC, 2008b). 
  
MEPC decided to establish a three-day working group to 
finalize the draft for approval on the last day of the MEPC 
session. The substantive requirements, as well as the 
timeline for implementation of new regulation were 
deliberated. The working group evaluated all the relevant 
submissions and documents carefully, all of which either 
provided new information or argued for or against one of 
the three options. Finally, the working group agreed 
unanimously on a new set of standards which included 
more stringent global requirements, ECA requirements, 
and a markedly lower global fuel Sulphur content by 2020 
(contingent on a fuel availability study conducted no later 
than 2018). 
 
Notably, the final report of MEPC 57 emphasized the 
importance of the result, given that the large working 
group had agreed on progressive and substantial Sulphur 
standards (MEPC, 2008b). MEPC 57 approved the draft 
revisions of the working group, for adoption on MEPC 58. 
 
5.2.2 ANT Analysis of the SOx Process 
During the crucial months in early 2008, when the new 
SOx regulation was finalized, a central discussion was the 
geographical scope of the regulation. The long process had 
resulted in a few options that would constitute the basis for 
negotiation, divided into three core possibilities. Two 
options emphasizing global and regional SOx 
requirements, while one emphasized a purely global 
uniform requirement. 
 
We can identify the two networks that wanted to give 
effect to the geographical scope of the SOx regulation. 
  
67 
TH
E 
NE
TW
OR
K 
PE
RS
PE
CT
IV
E 
  
 
One network, with the main actors being INTERTANKO 
and ITF, sought to give a global identity to the SOx 
regulation. The other network centred mainly on North 
European actors such as Germany and Denmark. They 
articulated a position emphasizing global regulation and 
regional regulation in ECA-zones. This is shown in figure 
5.1. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Semiotic Metaphor before MEPC 57 
SOx-case 
 
 
INTERTANKO and ITF argued that ECA-zones and 
regional regulation in general is a worse alternative for 
several reasons. They suggested that only global regulation 
should be pursued because of immature abatement 
technology and the difficulties of enforcing different SOx 
requirements. They also highlighted the obstacles of 
differentiated regional requirements, related to fuel-
switching problems. This is illustrated as the strategic 
mobilization conducted by INTERTANKO that seeks to 
cut off the opposing network in figure 5.2. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Strategic Metaphor at MEPC 57 
Interessement device by INTERTANKO 
 
 
Germany and other Northern European countries opposed 
ITF and INTERTANKO, arguing that the environmental 
and health-related benefits from regional regulation 
outweighed the perceived complications (figure 5.3). This 
maneuver was materialized by the document submitted by 
the northern countries (MEPC, 2008h). Evidently, both 
sets of actors were strategizers who mobilized resources 
with the aim to change the identity of the geographical 
focus.  
The result of these competing influences on the 
geographical parameter was that the German/Danish 
network succeeded in changing the focus towards ECA’s 
and a global scope, which resulted in the model we have 
today. The suggestion contained in document MEPC 
57/4/30 was agreed upon by MEPC57 with only minor 
modifications, creating SOx ECA zones in Northern 
Europe and around North America. It is clear that 
INTERTANKO and ITF did not succeed in determining 
the geographical scope of SOx regulation. 
 
5.3 CASE: FORMULATION OF WASHWATER 
DISCHARGE CRITERIA 
5.3.1 Background 
Parallel with the process of Sulphur-requirements, the 
question of requirements for exhaust gas cleaning systems 
(EGCS’s) remained an important issue.  The core 
disagreement revolved around the allowable methods for 
removing Sulphur from exhaust gas. Throughout BLG 10, 
11 and 12 and MEPC 56, the delegations and respective 
working groups had tackled the issue of ‘equivalence’, 
which was a term that designated to what extent a given 
abatement method was as good as using low-Sulphur fuel 
oil. 
MEPC 56 provided the first concrete draft, which was 
based on a correspondence report with input from many 
different nations. The MEPC 56 established a working 
group tasked with discussing these different criteria for the 
EGCS, most notably the water discharge contents. The 
working group delegations discussed parameters and 
criteria extensively with references to the correspondence 
group report. With respect to pH-values for EGCS’s, it 
was agreed that technological developments and 
information would warrant further consideration, beyond 
the draft the group agreed upon.  
 
MEPC 56 approved the report of the working group and 
instructed an intersessional BLG working group to take 
into account the outcome of the MEPC working group and 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Strategic Metaphor at MEPC 57 
Interessement device by Germany and Denmark 
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provide input to the next MEPC meeting. The concrete 
draft (including substantive pH values) proposed by the 
MEPC 56 working group was forwarded to this working 
group as a secret document. 
 
Core Meetings in Determining pH Value of Scrubber Waste Water  
MEPC 59 
MEPC 60 
Jul  
Mar  
2009 
2010 
 
MEPC 61 
BLG 15 
BLG 16 
Oct  
Feb  
Feb  
2010 
2011 
2012 
BLG 17 Feb  2013 
 
PPR1 
MEPC 66 
PPR2 
Feb  
Apr  
Jan  
2014 
2014 
2015 
MEPC 67 Sep  2015 
 
Table 5.2: Important meetings in IMO Committees and 
Sub-Committees 
 
MEPC 57 
Following the BLG intersessional working group, and the 
discussions at BLG 12, it became apparent that the draft 
guidelines would provide strict pH requirements for open 
EGCS’s (open scrubbers). However, the final guidelines 
would also contain provisions to revise the criteria in the 
future, with new inputs and given potential developments. 
This condition was tied to advice given by GESAMP, a 
group of experts that permanently provides scientific 
advice to IMO and its committees. At MEPC 57, the 
aforementioned working group that also discussed the 
substantive Sulphur solutions agreed that not enough data 
and experience with EGCS operations was available to 
formulate final wash water criteria. There were no 
submissions explicitly mentioning the pH limit or methods 
of estimation of open EGCS systems, and the interim 
guidelines for exhaust gas cleaning were approved.  
 
MEPC 59 
GESAMP provided input after reviewing the interim 
guidelines, which was the basis for the following 
discussion, with no disagreement on the substantial content 
of the EGCS guidelines. However, Norway and other 
states argued that the input of GESAMP warranted careful 
consideration, as the advice touched items of principal 
character. The MEPC 59 agreed that there was a need to 
adopt the interim guidelines straightaway to give them 
effect, which would otherwise implement them in their 
current format. As such, the concerns of Norway were 
given weight and MEPC noted in their adoption of the 
guidelines (to be known from here as the 2009 EGCS 
guidelines) that the washwater criteria should be revised in 
the future.  
 
MEPC 60 
In March 2010, MEPC 60 convened, with two submissions 
regarding to the 2009 Guidelines. The first submission was 
by Norway and included a lengthy discussion on whether 
the interim requirements for EGCS’ actually conformed to 
the goal of achieving equivalence with low-Sulphur fuel 
oil. Essentially, Norway argued that the requirements did 
not adequately ensure that EGCS systems would be as 
effective at lowering Sulphur emissions as distillate fuel 
was. 
 
The second submission by IMarEST, a professional 
organisation consisting of experts and scientists in marine 
fields, discussed the implications of the exact wording of 
the interim guidelines (MEPC, 2010b). IMarEST argued 
that the time pressure imposed on the various working 
group and MEPC had resulted in the regulation not 
specifying how at-sea operations could use another method 
of measuring. They argued that at-sea operation of EGCS’ 
likely would be required to employ the same measuring 
techniques as at-harbour operations, which in reality would 
be impossible since these tests were designed for a vessel 
that was stationary at berth. In addition to this, IMarEST 
argued that at-sea operations only would require a 
minimum pH of 3.0 instead of the much more stringent 
level of 6.5. 
 
The MEPC acknowledged the two papers, but instead of 
considering them in a plenary session, the submissions 
were forwarded to MEPC 61 because of the need for 
further input. 
 
MEPC 61 
At MEPC 61, the US and France both submitted papers 
that commented the 2009 guidelines. The submission by 
the US argued that Norway is mistaken in its position from 
MEPC 60, and subsequently argues that the requirements 
for equivalence are fine. France suggested a clarification 
of collection of data on from EGCS’ by authorities. 
Without a plenary discussion, all papers on the issue were 
forwarded to the BLG sub-committee, which was tasked 
with considering amendments to the 2009 guidelines, 
specifically the wash water requirements and measuring 
methods. The target completion time for the final 
guidelines for EGCS’ was set to be BLG 15, 2011. 
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BLG 15 
The matter was not on the agenda again until BLG 15, and 
despite all papers forwarded from MEPC 60 and 61, it was 
decided to postpone the matter until BLG 17 for two 
reasons. Firstly, the delegations to BLG 15 did not want 
multiple revisions of the guidelines, which was a 
possibility if a decision was prematurely. Secondly, there 
was a need for more data, scientific evidence and input 
from interested parties.  
 
BLG 17 
The first substantial treatment of the washwater discharge 
requirements of the 2009 guidelines took place at BLG 17 
in February 2013. At this meeting, the previous documents 
(dating back to 2010 and 2011) were included, as well as 
two new submissions on the issue. 
 
The first submission was by the Danish delegation and 
contained a report carried out by the Danish environmental 
protection agency in cooperation with the private 
consulting firm COWI. The report focused on the effect of 
a low wash water pH value on the marine environment 
during at-sea operations. The conclusion of the report 
clearly indicated that even very low pH values had a 
negligible effect on the environment. Subsequently the 
Danish delegation argued that the pH requirements of the 
2009 guidelines should be reconsidered in light of this 
report. This was in part also that no other submissions, 
since 2009, had provided arguments in favour of very strict 
pH requirements. 
 
The second submission was by Interferry, which largely 
supported the information provided by the Danish 
administration. Interferry also explicitly supported 
IMarEST in their three year earlier suggestion that the pH 
requirement for at-sea operations should be 3.0.  
 
The following debate revealed a deep disagreement 
between the delegations. A number of delegations 
supported the Danish suggestion, citing the lower energy 
requirements and cost efficiency of open-loop EGCS. 
Other delegations dismissed the proposal because of the 
lack of studies considering the issue in a wider scope. 
These discussions were unfruitful, and BLG 17 forwarded 
the issue to Pollution Prevention and Response (PPR), a 
sub-committee that was to replace BLG. In addition, BLG 
17 invited all interested parties to provide information and 
studies relating to the issue. 
 
PPR 1 
In early 2014, five years after the 2009 guidelines were 
approved, PPR 1 continued the discussion including all the 
previous papers that were forwarded. In addition, Norway 
submitted a paper arguing that the wash water criteria were 
inconsistent, justifying further deliberation in a technical 
group. According to Norway, this group should be tasked 
with clarifying the guidelines before the next revision of 
the 2009 Guidelines. A number of delegations supported 
Norway in the plenary discussion, and PPR decided to 
establish this working group. 
 
 
 
 
Source: Scanpix / Iris  
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The report of the working group and the internal 
discussions it contained was not publicised. However, the 
PPR 1 forwarded the discussions and the confidential draft 
text of the working group to PPR 2 for further deliberation. 
There was no final decision on neither pH values for wash 
water nor measuring methods. Yet the draft text included a 
provision for using flow model calculations, instead of 
actual measurements (European Commission, 2014).  
MEPC 67 
Between PPR 1 and PPR 2, MEPC 67 took place in late 
2014. While revision of the 2009 EGCS guidelines was not 
on the agenda, all 28 members of the European Union and 
the European Commission submitted a joint paper on the 
matter. The paper argued that there were significant 
problems with the 2009 guidelines because they hindered 
the approval of open loop EGCS. The restrictive demands 
for at-sea operations were impossible to measure with the 
proposed measuring techniques. The joint paper argued 
that the 2009 guidelines needed to include the possibility 
of using flow model calculations to determine the pH 
value of wash water, which would ultimately better 
accommodate open loop EGCS as a viable solution. The 
EU subsequently argued that a decision should be made 
before PPR 2, and that the suggestions from PPR 1 should 
be included in the 2009 guidelines. 
 
Despite the number of parties to the submission, MEPC 67 
decided not to treat the issue, but rather forwarded the 
paper and the issue to PPR 2. Eventually, MEPC 68 agreed 
in May 2015 (based on a draft provided by PPR 2) that 
both direct measurement as well as computational 
simulation would suffice as approved methodologies. 
 
5.3.2 ANT Analysis of the pH issue 
As described above, the BLG Working Group on Air 
Pollution 2 (BLGWGAP2) constituted the first agreement 
on substantive pH-criteria for washwater discharge of 
scrubbers. This created the tie between the BLGWGAP2-
agreement and the scrubber as a technical entity. 
BLGWGAP2 consisted of a number of countries who all 
participated in the discussions and subsequently were a 
part of the agreement. Additionally, GESAMP provided 
input regarding the substantive criteria, which 
rubberstamped the pH value of 6.5 that BLGWGAP2 had 
established. When the 2009 Guidelines were finally 
approved, the pH value of 6.5 was a function of the 
relationship between the scrubber as an entity, the 
BLGWGAP2, and the GESAMP report. This stable 
relationship is illustrated in figure 5.4. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4: Semiotic Metaphor at BLGWGAP2 
pH-value case 
On the subsequent meeting, the organisation IMarEST 
submitted their paper to the IMO, arguing for a 3.0 pH 
value. Essentially, IMarEST sought to weaken or cut the 
ties between GESAMP, BLGWGAP2 and the scrubber 
that gave the scrubber the pH-criteria of 6.5. IMarEST 
used their own submission as a resource to give the 
scrubber a new pH-criterion of 3.0 instead. This strategic 
action is illustrated in figure 5.5. 
  
 
 
Figure 5.5: Strategic Metaphor after BLGWGAP2 
Interessement device by IMarEST 
 
 
It is evident that IMarEST did not succeed in disrupting 
the ties between BLGWGAP2, GESAMP, and the 
scrubber. At MEPC60, it was decided to postpone 
discussion regarding substantive revision of the 2009 
guidelines, forwarding IMarEST and effectively 
maintaining the pH of 6.5 (MEPC, 2010a, para. 4.3). 
 
IMarEST effectively created an alternative network of 
actors, that seeking to give the scrubber a new pH criterion 
of 3.0. This network was not strong enough to change the 
criterion. However, it did contest the substantive scrubber 
requirements. This is illustrated in figure 5.6. 
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Figure 5.6: Semiotic Metaphor before BLG 17 
After a series of delays, the issue is on the agenda at the 
BLG 17-meeting. In addition to the IMarEST-document, 
Denmark changes position and stops supporting the pH-
value of 6.5, and is now in favour of a lower and less 
restrictive pH-value. This is illustrated as Denmark 
changing sides from the BLGWGAP2-network to the 
IMarEST-network in figure 5.7. Denmark deploys the 
COWI-report as a resource, using it as an interessement 
device to weaken the BLGWGAP2-network in favour of 
the IMarEST-network.  
 
 
 
Figure 5.7: Strategic Metaphor at BLG 17 
Interessement device by Denmark, using the COWI report 
 
It is evident from the minutes of BLG 17 that this did not 
have the intended effect. While a substantial discussion 
took place, there was no consensus to amend the 2009 
Guidelines in favour of the 3.0 pH value. In effect, this 
meant that the 6.5 criterion was still in place and 
BLGWGAP2 still defined the value of the pH criterion. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.8: Semiotic Metaphor after BLG 17 
Many actors in a contentious case 
 
Despite the network forming around Denmark, with the 
COWI report and the IMarEST, there was a considerate 
amount of resistance against revising the 2009 guidelines 
or even agreeing upon a less strict pH criterion. Thus, the 
BLGWGAP2 network still defined the identity of the pH 
value as 6.5. The EU submission at MEPC 67 constitutes a 
strengthening of the network that supported a pH value of 
3.0. In addition, the EU submission did not contain any 
new science, but simply used the gravity of its member 
states as a resource. This is illustrated in figure 5.9, where 
the EU is an actor and a resource in itself. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.9: Strategic Metaphor before MEPC 67 
The EU uses its own power as interessement device  
 
This submission did not manage to bring the discussion 
into MEPC 67, nor did it manage to change the pH 
criterion before PPR 2. Eventually, the criterion was 
changed at MEPC 68 based on the draft agreed upon by 
PPR 2, indicating that the network built around the EU 
submission managed to redefine the identity of the pH 
value.  
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5.4 CASE: DETERMINING THE EFFECTIVE DATE 
OF NOX REGULATION 
5.4.1 Background 
The revision of MARPOL extended to a revision of the 
Nitrogen Oxide emission standards (NOx-requirements). 
Parallel with the work to revise the SOx-standards, IMO 
discussed whether, and how, to enact NOx-standards that 
were more stringent. 
 
After a long process, the IMO agreed on a set of new 
standards with three key components. First, NOx standards 
should not require retrofitting (unlike SOx-standards) 
because this is much costlier for NOx reductions. Instead, 
new regulation should only apply to ships built after the 
date of effect. Second, the standards would enact a three-
tiered set of standards. Tier I standards would be the  
lowest requirements, soon overridden by Tier II standards, 
which would apply globally. Tier III, the most stringent set 
of requirements, would only apply in designated zones 
known as NOx Emission Control Areas (NECAs). Third, 
these NECAs and the effective date for Tier 3  
requirements in these NECAs would be decided by the 
IMO.  
 
The BLG and its technical sub-groups agreed upon the 
specific limits for each tier and a procedure for approving 
Tier III NECAs was established. In addition, Tier III 
requirements were scheduled to take effect on January 1 
2016, allowing more effective abatement technologies in 
shipbuilding to be developed. MEPC 58 approved this, and 
MEPC 59 approved the NECA around North American 
waters, covering Canada, the US, and parts of the 
Caribbean. 
 
To assess the feasibility of implementing Tier III 
requirements, MEPC 62 established a technical 
correspondence group tasked with reviewing the status of 
the technology required to implement Tier III standards. 
This group reported its findings to MEPC 65, which are 
described below. 
 
Core Meetings in the NOx-case  
MEPC 65 May  2013 
 
 
MEPC 66 April  2014 
 
Table 5.3: Important meetings in IMO Committees and 
Sub-Committees 
 
MEPC 65 
MEPC 65 became an important venue for NOx 
discussions. The correspondence group reported that 
Selective Catalytic Reaction (SCR), Exhaust Gas 
Recirculation (EGR), and dual-fuel LNG technologies all 
 
 
 
 Source: Scanpix / Iris  
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are able to meet Tier III criteria (MEPC, 2013a, para. 
4.56). As such, the correspondence group recommended 
retaining the effective date of January 1, 2016. 
 
However, Russia submitted a paper arguing against the 
correspondence group (MEPC, 2013b), rejecting the 
group’s position point for point. Concerning SCR, Russia 
argued that the reduction in NOx-emissions came with an 
increase in CO2 emissions, rendering SCR unfeasible from 
a wider point of view. In addition, Russia argued that the 
costs imposed on ship-owners would be too high and that 
the correspondence group did not adequately assess the 
total costs of compliance. On EGR and LNG, Russia 
simply stated that further work was needed to determine 
the viability of these abatement strategies. In the case of 
LNG, the under- developed infrastructure to support 
operations were seen as a major constraint. 
 
Russia ultimately proposed that the effective date of Tier 
III requirements in NECAs ought to be moved from 2016 
to 2021. In addition, another technology review 
commissioned by the IMO should be carried out to 
determine whether 2021 was feasible at all. 
 
In the ensuing discussion, there was great disagreement on 
the issue. On one hand, the correspondence group and a 
number of Western countries (Denmark, Germany, U.S., 
and more) wanted to retain the 2016 date. On the other 
hand, Russia supported by a number of countries, wanted 
to postpone the effective date to allow abatement 
technologies to mature. 
 
The result of the discussion was a majority favouring the 
Russian proposal, and MEPC 65 subsequently agreed to 
postpone the effective date of NECAs. A number of 
countries reserved their position on the issue until further 
inputs to the process had been received. Effectively, this 
postponed the final decision to MEPC 66. 
 
Leading up to MEPC 66, there was some debate over how 
to go ahead in the IMO. Notably, the Danish government 
delegation and the Danish Shipowners Association (DSA) 
had divergent views on what to do. The official Danish 
position (that of the government) was support of the 
implementation of NOx standards by 2016, regardless of 
the objections. DSA, on the other hand, argued that 
appeasing Russia would make sense in order to make 
future negotiations regarding Baltic regulation easier. 
While DSA did not support the Russian proposal in itself 
(which would delay all NECAs), DSA suggested that 
opposing Russia on this issue would delay NECA rules in 
the Baltic indefinitely. DSA supported the compromise put 
forth by Norway and Marshall Islands which would retain 
date-of-effect for already designated NECAs (Raun, 
2014a). In the case of the Baltic, this put DSA on the same 
side of Russia as the compromise solution would delay the 
Baltic NECA. 
 
MEPC 66 
In the spring of 2014, MEPC 66 met to agree on the 
effective date of Tier III NECA implementation. A 
significant number of papers were submitted, with two 
submissions of particular importance. First, Denmark, 
U.S., and a number of other countries argued in a paper 
that the Russian concerns were ungrounded (MEPC, 
2013d). The paper contained technical and highly detailed 
arguments that sought to refute the Russians point by 
point. The second submission by Norway and the Marshall 
Islands suggested a middle ground as a compromise. 
Instead of postponing all effective dates to 2021, the 
NECA zones already agreed upon would retain the 2016 
date and future NECA zones would have effective dates 
based on when they were proposed. 
 
In addition, a number of papers argued for or against any 
of the three possibilities. A few submissions suggested that 
the postponement of the NECA date was unjustified in 
technical arguments (MEPC, 2014c, 2014e). Other 
submissions pointed out that the discussion about 
postponement was undermining the regulatory stability of 
the IMO. These submissions argued that the compromise 
or the original 2016 date were better alternatives. Finally, 
Russia submitted a paper that refuted the arguments laid 
out in MEPC 66/6/6, effectively defending their original 
position against the new claims. 
  
In the ensuing discussion, a majority of delegations 
supported the suggestions put forward in MEPC 66/6/6 by 
Denmark et al. The arguments were centred on the idea of 
maintaining predictability and integrity in IMO regulation 
as well as the technical arguments put forth. Delegations 
supporting the original suggestion cited concerns over 
economic viability and the effectiveness of abatement 
methods, very similar to the claims put forward by Russia. 
Finally, a number of delegations supported the 
compromise text in MEPC 66/6/10, arguing there was 
need for a pragmatic solution. 
 
After the long discussion, MEPC 66 agreed on a text that 
was very close to the suggested compromise suggested in 
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submission MEPC 66/6/10. This agreement retained the 
date for existing NECAs (i.e. the North American NECA) 
and set 2021 as date for all future NECAs.  
 
5.4.2 ANT Analysis of the NOx Emission Control Area  
Based on the process described above, two distinct 
networks can be identified. The first network aims to 
postpone the effective date for the Baltic NECA. While the 
specific actors differ in their reasoning, they all suggest  
that the best way to go ahead is to postpone NECA 
effective date. Most notably Russia, Norway, and the 
Danish Shipowners Association (DSA) are part of this 
network that supports a later effective date, even though 
they do not necessarily coordinate or support this position 
for the same reasons. For instance, Russia actually wanted 
all NECAs, both future and current; to be effective later, 
while DSA argued the Baltic NECA should be delayed to 
meet Russia halfway in order to facilitate future 
collaboration. In any case, this network seeks to delay the 
effective date.  
 
The opposite network support retaining the existing date, 
although again for a multitude of different reasons. The 
US, Denmark, BIMCO, as well as the major interest 
organizations representing business interests all wanted to 
have the Baltic NECA to take effect in 2016. The US and 
Denmark argued that the technologies available were 
adequate for meeting the NOx requirements. BIMCO and 
business interests emphasized that postponing the effective 
date would create uncertainty about IMO’s commitment 
and the institution in general. The two networks are shown 
in figure 5.10 below. 
 
The first challenge to this stable network happened when 
Russia suggested a postponement of the effective date at 
MEPC 65. Its submission (MEPC, 2013b) both contained 
the concrete proposal to postpone the effective date, but 
also a number of technical reasons arguing why this was a 
sensible proposal. 
 
It is straightforward to see the technical arguments, 
supported by Russian calculations and observations, to be 
a mobilization of resources. However, Russia also 
mobilized a structural resource. Since a future NECA in 
the Baltic must be approved by all Baltic States, Russia 
can potentially postpone the Baltic NECA unilaterally for 
however long Russia wants. The submission and the 
resources mobilized should be viewed in this light. This 
may explain why DSA and Norway to some extent sided 
with the Russians in this matter, but as the assumptions of 
the analysis, the reasons of the individual actors are black 
boxed. 
 
This interessement device is seen in figure 5.11, with 
Russia mobilizing their resources to translate the identity 
of the NOx effective date. 
 
As previously established, the Russian move succeeded in 
changing the effective date of the Baltic NECA at MEPC 
65. Denmark, US, and other actors scrambled before 
MEPC 66 to undo that decision and change the identity or 
value of the date back to 2016. 
 
In document MEPC 66/6/6, Denmark, the US, and number 
of other countries presented very detailed technical 
arguments refuting the Russian claims. In essence, the 
countries mobilized different informational resources; that 
technically and scientifically rejects the Russian position. 
However, the countries did not mobilize any structural 
resources the same way Russia did by their unilateral 
blocking power in the Baltic. 
 
In the end, a compromise was reached that effectively 
postponed the Baltic NECA despite the efforts of Denmark 
and the US. This succinctly reveals how technical 
 
 
Figure 5.10: Semiotic Metaphor before MEPC 65 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.11: Strategic Metaphor at MEPC 65 
Russia creates and interessement device 
 
  
75 
TH
E 
NE
TW
OR
K 
PE
RS
PE
CT
IV
E 
  
 
arguments may be insufficient when an actor decides to 
mobilize its structural influence. The mobilization of 
Denmark and the US is shown on figure 5.12. 
 
 
Figure 5.12: Strategic Metaphor at MEPC 66 
Denmark and others counter the Russian arguments 
 
5.4.3 Sum-up 
It is evident from the three cases that no change in 
regulation is automatic. In each of the three cases states, 
firms, or NGO’s have sought to influence the key 
parameters that the MEPC discussed. To do this, the actors 
mobilized different resources that could help destabilizing 
the networks that were in place.  
 
In the case of SOx, we saw how alliances between actors 
were important, and that a network centred on North-
European states effectively managed to define the identity 
of the geographical parameter of the regulation. In the case 
of pH-limits, it was evident that the mobilization of 
science was critical, and that the contestation was based on 
scientific reports. In the case of NOx, it was clear that 
technical arguments were insufficient to allow for the 
implementation of a Baltic NOx emission control area. 
The Russian delegation was never swayed by the reports 
and findings put forth by virtually everyone else. 
 
The key takeaway here is the recognition that what we take 
for granted now, such as the level of SOx emissions in the 
SECA, is the result of a complex political process where 
many actors try to define the entity in question. 
Shipowners should be careful to think that regulation in 
the IMO is automatically formed, and that the industry has 
little influence on what is decided. In reality, the industry 
actors have many opportunities to influence the process at 
various stages. Additionally, the chapter has shown that it 
is possible to change what is taken for granted by carefully 
dismantling the reality that is constructed by political 
entities and employing that knowledge to strategically 
change the regulation of shipping. 
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6.1 IMPLICATIONS FOR CIRCULATED 
APPROACHES AND ASSUMPTIONS 
 
6.1.1 Market 
The most fundamental insight provided by this report is 
that the strategies employed by rational ship operators are 
determined primarily by the age of their vessels, the time 
spent in the ECA-zone, the level of enforcement, and the 
price spread between different types of fuel. Obviously, 
these are important to every ship-owner operating inside 
the ECAs, and serves to underline how profound an impact 
regulation can have on business operations. 
 
This report has shown that ships that do not operate more 
than a fraction of the time in ECAs should not install 
scrubbers, because the scrubber serves no purpose the 
majority of the operational time. Similarly, ships which 
only have a few years of operational life left should not 
have a scrubber installed, since the large investment cost 
cannot be recovered in such a short period. If the price 
spread between low-Sulphur fuels and heavy fuel oil is 
larger, all ship-owners’ optimal strategies shift towards 
installing scrubbers. Additionally, if the expected level of 
enforcement is very low, shipowners profit the most from 
completely disregarding the rules or delaying compliance 
and scrubber installation until enforcement reaches a 
critical point. The Danish Shipowners Association and the 
Trident Alliance have continuously voiced this criticism. 
 
Not only shipowners, but also regulators can gain insight 
from these conclusions. The effectiveness of regulation is 
determined by the level of compliance in the industry, and 
it is obvious that a correct prediction of this compliance 
level only can be attained by carefully examining the cost 
structures and critical parameters of shipowners. In the 
present case, the most widely debated and crucial element 
is the question: What level of enforcement is necessary to 
force the entire industry to comply? As we have seen, 
different jurisdictions have applied different rules, with the 
US most notably with very high fines. But as this report 
has shown, the calculation of the optimal fine must be 
carefully balanced by a calculation of the expected cost of 
compliance that a shipowners faces. 
 
This also means that the regulator must know these 
calculations before the regulation is designed to identify 
critical parameters that may render the regulation 
ineffective. Based on the calculations in this report, we 
identified the expected price spread of fuel types as a very 
important factor for shipowners who contemplate whether 
to comply or not comply.  
 
6.1.2 Hierarchy 
The implication of employing the hierarchical view, is that 
regulation is taken as given, nested in an idea that 
regulation is an uncertainty that must be addressed by 
stakeholders. As is evident from the economic analysis, 
regulation can have a great impact on the specific 
operational costs of vessels.  From a hierarchical 
perspective, these impacts are unknowns that result from a 
black-boxed process in the IMO or other regulatory arenas. 
Thus, the main implication is that firms should strategize 
around the fact that future regulation can affect their 
current business model profitability. 
 
6 IMPLICATIONS FOR BUSINESS 
STRATEGY AND POLICYMAKING 
THE DIFFERENT CHAPTERS IN THIS REPORT HAVE EACH CONTRIBUTED TO THE 
UNDERSTANDING OF MARITIME REGULATION IN THEIR OWN WAY. WHILE EACH CHAPTER 
CONTAINS VALUABLE INSIGHT, THE OVERALL CONTRIBUTION OF THE REPORT IS OUTLINED 
BELOW. CRITICALLY, THE REPORT PROVIDES IMPLICATIONS FOR HOW TO VIEW SHIPPING 
FROM DIFFERENT THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES FOR RESEARCHERS AS WELL AS FIRMS AND 
REGULATORS. 
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The three themes that were explored in the political cases 
illustrate different aspects of these risks. The case of SOx-
regulation discussed geographical limits, illustrating the 
spatial elements of future regulation that must be taken 
into account. In the case of pH-values for scrubber 
washwater, technical specifications created uncertainty 
about certain abatement methods that affect business 
models, depending on the limits chosen. And finally, the 
case of NOx-regulation offered insight into how the 
temporal elements can drastically affect business models 
and calculations when dates-of-effect are suddenly 
changed. 
 
More subtly, an underlying theme has been the stability of 
the regulatory system, illustrated by the NOx-discussion. 
Here certain industry associations criticized IMO for 
changing the effective date, because this casted doubt 
about the reliance of the IMO in the future. Reneging on 
established agreements could potentially erode the future 
value of promises and agreements made in the IMO.  
 
From a business point of view, this means that changes in 
regulation should be accounted for when formulating 
strategies. Yet business must simultaneously take into 
account the possibility that agreements and deals made in 
bodies such as the IMO may change in the future for 
various reasons. This is crucial for business actors. For 
firms relying on a specific kind of regulation, sudden 
changes in the regulatory framework or shifts in dates-of-
entry may prove fatal (or vital) to profitability of a given 
business model. Because of this, even when we consider 
regulation as ‘given’ in the hierarchical approach, business 
interests still need to understand the risks and uncertainties 
associated with any given regulation.  
 
6.1.3 Network 
The most important insight that the three cases offer from 
a network perspective is the idea that regulation is never 
automatic. In all three cases, it is evident that a long 
process took place before an ultimate result was agreed 
upon by the member states in IMO. In each process a 
number of different actors, all with different views, sought 
strategically to influence the process to change the 
outcome in their favour.  
 
This deliberate nature of regulation means that firms or 
entire industries should understand and proactively interact 
with regulative “black boxes”. This is different from the 
reactive hierarchical view, where the regulative 
formulation process is black-boxed and response to 
regulation is only ex-ante of the process. From a network 
perspective, the proactive behaviour of firms can 
decisively change policy outcomes, depending on the 
resources mobilized in a specific network of actors.  
 
This implies two central elements worth exploring further: 
Resources and networks. Resources that can be mobilized 
in a specific strategy vary greatly in nature and can take 
many different forms. These resources are mobilized in 
order to change the entity in question. In the case of pH-
values, important scientific evidence was mobilized as 
resources by both sides. The Danish submission of the 
COWI-report is a good example: the COWI report became 
a political resource, mobilized to change the technical 
requirements for scrubbers. 
 
In each of the cases, we have observed that a group of 
actors formed a strategic coalition with a specific 
regulatory aim. Arguably, these coalitions strengthened the 
position of the involved actors and their mobilized 
resources.  
 
6.1.4 Implications for the science of Maritime Regulation 
It is evident that different approaches and modes of 
analysis yield different results. However, what is 
important, shown by this report, is that these different 
approaches provide different insights into regulation. They 
do not only differ in their results, but also in their 
fundamental ontological assumptions about the world and 
different epistemological perspectives on how we obtain 
knowledge about the world.  
 
Employing a market-based approach assumes that we can 
calculate optimal solutions for economic agents, limited 
only imperfect information. This approach is not 
concerned with the social reality of not being able to 
capture reality in economic calculations or mathematics. 
Conversely, network approaches assume that a social 
reality is constructed based on how different entities create 
meaning together, but rejects the idea that reality can be 
formalized or calculated using mathematics. 
 
From this report, it is evident that using either approach 
alone insufficiently captures the challenges and issues that 
ship-owners and regulators face in reality. Separately, 
either approach can only provide explanations to a limited 
set of problems, while simultaneously leaving out key 
assumptions. 
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Instead, this report has employed different approaches on 
the same empirical object at the same time. This has 
drastically increased the explanatory and predictive value 
of scientific inquiry because elements that a certain 
approach would be ‘blinded’ against are more likely to be 
covered by another approach. In our report, we have 
shown that regulators should not only consider ‘hard 
numbers’ when determining substantive regulation.  The 
report has revealed that subtler unquantifiable social 
process exists independently of what can be ‘objectively’ 
measured, which should also be considered for the optimal 
choice. However, without employing calculations like the 
ones done in the above chapters, a regulator or ship-owner 
would be unable to estimate the impacts of the regulation. 
 
This is important, because it challenges the notion that 
ship-owners should simply present better and objective 
science in order to change regulation. This report has 
shown that ‘objective’ scientific resources and studies 
become merely elements of a larger socio-political 
process. Those who understand that networks, shared 
meaning, and the creation of social reality are important as 
well may pass actors that assume regulation is based on 
these objective calculations. If a strategy is solely based on 
the idea that other actors will change their point of view 
when presented with new information, it is most likely 
inferior to strategies that incorporate ideas about networks 
and socially constructed realities. This report shows that a 
more complete understanding of regulation ideally informs 
any successful political strategy. 
  
A final point for research in maritime regulation is the 
uncovering of new modes of cooperation between different 
types of actors. This was very evident in the SOx case, 
where different governments allied, more or less explicitly, 
with firms with whom they shared a common interest. 
Through these alliances and coalitions, states and private 
actors could influence international regulation together. It 
is proved that in other global industries NGOs, firms, and 
states can create regulation in many different 
configurations (Lister, Poulsen, & Ponte, 2015b). It is 
sensible to consider how different forms of regulation can 
work when it comes to global shipping. Future areas of 
research could include the prerequisite conditions for 
successful private regulation, the competences of different 
types of actors, or the different modes of regulation and 
their merits.  
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The following chapter outlines the mathematics used in the case on the calculations of the total fuel related costs in the 
market perspective (see chapter 3). 
 
7.1 COSTS OF THE SCRUBBER STRATEGY 
 
 
𝑇𝐶𝑠,𝑗
𝑆𝐶𝑅 = 𝑅𝑠,𝑗
𝑆𝐶𝑅 + ∑
𝐷 ∙ 𝛾𝑠,𝑗
𝑆𝐶𝑅(𝑣) ∙ 𝑃𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝑂
(1 + 𝛿)𝑡
𝑛−1
𝑡=0
 
 
Where: 
 
𝑅𝑠,𝑗
𝑆𝐶𝑅 = 𝑆𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑗 
𝑛 = 𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙  
𝐷 = 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 
𝛾𝑠,𝑗
𝑆𝐶𝑅(𝑣) = 𝐻𝐹𝑂(𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑢𝑏𝑏𝑒𝑟) 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑠 𝑎 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 𝑣, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑗 
𝑃𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝑂 = 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐻𝐹𝑂 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡 
𝛿 = 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 
 
 
 
7.2 COSTS OF THE MGO STRATEGY 
 
𝑇𝐶𝑠,𝑗
𝑀𝐺𝑂 = ∑
𝛼 ∙ 𝐷 ∙ 𝛾𝑠,𝑗
𝑀𝐺𝑂(𝑣) ∙ 𝑃𝑡
𝑀𝐺𝑂 + (1 − 𝛼) ∙ 𝐷 ∙ 𝛾𝑠,𝑗
𝐻𝐹𝑂(𝑣) ∙ (
𝑃𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝑂|𝑡 ≤ 4
𝑃𝑡
𝐿𝑆𝐻𝐹𝑂| 𝑡 > 4
)
(1 + 𝛿)𝑡
𝑛−1
𝑡=0
 
 
Where: 
 
𝑛 = 𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 
𝐷 = 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 
𝛼 = 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑣𝑜𝑦𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝐴 
𝛾𝑠,𝑗
𝐻𝐹𝑂(𝑣) = 𝐻𝐹𝑂 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑠 𝑎 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 𝑣, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑗 
𝑃𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝑂 = 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐻𝐹𝑂 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡  
𝑃𝑡
𝐿𝑆𝐻𝐹𝑂 = 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐿𝑆𝐻𝐹𝑂 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡  
𝛾𝑠,𝑗
𝑀𝐺𝑂(𝑣) = 𝑀𝐺𝑂 𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑠 𝑎 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 𝑣, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑗  
𝑃𝑡
𝑀𝐺𝑂 = 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑀𝐺𝑂 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡 
𝛿 = 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 
 
 
 
 
7 APPENDIX A: MATHEMATICS 
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7.3 COSTS OF THE LNG STRATEGY 
 
𝑇𝐶𝑗
𝐿𝑁𝐺 = 𝑅𝑠,𝑗
𝐿𝑁𝐺 + ∑
𝐷𝑗 ∙ 𝛾𝑗
𝐿𝑁𝐺 ∙ 𝑃𝑡
𝐿𝑁𝐺
(1 + 𝛿)𝑡
𝑛−1
𝑡=0
 
 
Where: 
 
𝑅𝑠,𝑗
𝐿𝑁𝐺 = 𝐿𝑁𝐺 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑐𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑗 
𝑛 = 𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 
𝐷 = 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 
𝛾𝑠,𝑗
𝐿𝑁𝐺(𝑣) = 𝐿𝑁𝐺 𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑠 𝑎 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 𝑣, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑗  
𝑃𝑡
𝐿𝑁𝐺 = 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐿𝑁𝐺 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡 
𝛿 = 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑓𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟 
 
 
 
7.4 COSTS OF THE NON-COMPLIANCE STRATEGY 
 
 
𝑇𝐶𝑠,𝑗
𝑁𝐶 = ∑
𝐷𝑗 ∙ 𝛾𝑠,𝑗
𝐻𝐹𝑂 ∙ (
𝑃𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝑂|𝑡 ≤ 4
𝑃𝑡
𝐿𝑆𝐻𝐹𝑂| 𝑡 > 4
) + 𝜃 ∙ 𝛽 ∙ 𝐹
(1 + 𝛿)𝑡
𝑛−1
𝑡=0
 
 
Where: 
 
𝑛 = 𝑅𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 
𝐷 = 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 
𝛾𝑠,𝑗
𝐻𝐹𝑂(𝑣) = 𝐻𝐹𝑂 𝑓𝑢𝑒𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑠 𝑎 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑒𝑑 𝑣, 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑙 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 𝑠 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 𝑗 
𝑃𝑡
𝐻𝐹𝑂 = 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐻𝐹𝑂 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡  
𝑃𝑡
𝐿𝑆𝐻𝐹𝑂 = 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎 𝑡𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝐿𝑆𝐻𝐹𝑂 𝑖𝑛 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡  
𝜃 = 𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝐶𝐴 𝑧𝑜𝑛𝑒 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑠 
𝛽 = 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑒𝑎𝑐ℎ 𝑆𝐸𝐶𝐴 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡 
𝐹 = 𝑆𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑡 
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The calculations presented in the economic case study of chapter 3 are based on a calculation tool specifically designed to 
support the conclusions of the case study. This calculation tool allows researchers and industry professionals to insert the 
specifications of a vessel operation that takes place within the ECA zone in order to estimate the costs of four different 
fuel/retrofit strategies in response to the enhanced sulphur regulations. The ship and route specifications are determined 
from a wide range of input variables such as type of ship (container, bulk or tanker), vessel size, speed, fuel spreads, 
annual sailing distance, and sailing distance within the ECA zone. Integrated into the calculation tool is the ship 
calculation tool made by Hans Otto Kristensen which allows for the determination of vessel fuel consumption given user 
determined values of speed, vessel engine size, engine type and capacity utilization. This gives the calculation tool a high 
degree of prediction power while still maintaining significant customization options. The four fuel strategies examined 
are the following: 
 
 HFO with a Scrubber 
 MGO (two price scenarios examined) 
 LNG with engine modifications 
 HFO (Non –Compliance including fines) 
 
After inserting ship and route specifications, the calculation tool estimates the fuel related costs (fuel, engine 
modifications and fines) of each of the four strategies, and ranks them according to the planned service period length of 
the ship. Further, the payback period is calculated for the scrubber and LNG modifications for both retrofits and new 
builds in order to give a simple overview of the most feasible strategies of compliance. The calculation tool is available 
for download free of charge at the CBS Maritime homepage (http://www.cbs.dk/viden-samfundet/business-in-
society/cbs-maritime/downloads).         
 
The following is a guide to 
successfully utilize the program 
which includes an explanation of 
layout and cells in which data can 
be entered. Understanding this will 
provide more reliable results. The 
user interface is divided into three 
sheets with the first being the front 
page, the second page containing 
the major input as well as 
illustrating the results, and the third 
8 APPENDIX B: USER GUIDE TO THE 
ONLINE CALCULAION TOOL 
Figure 8.1:Calculation Tool Front Page 
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allowing for the modification of ship specific variable. 
8.1 INTERFACE 
The front page allows the user to select the segment of the ship from the categories Container, Bulk and Tanker. By 
clicking on the picture representing the appropriate ship segment the program automatically redirects the user to the input 
and result section. 
 
8.2 RESULTS PAGE 
The result page allows the user to insert the primary variables and presents the results of the calculations. The left side 
column labelled “Input” contains the input cells where the user can specify the primary inputs of the vessel and route. The 
“Results” section in the middle column lists the total costs of the optimal and second best strategies as a function of 
remaining service years of the vessel while the section below labelled “Investment payback period” lists the 
payback period of the retrofit strategies. The “Illustration section” on the right side columns graphically depicts the 
results achieved from the middle section by listing the total fuel related costs as a function of the remaining operational 
years of the ship. Finally, this page features two buttons; the orange button takes the user back to the front-page, allowing 
for the selection of a ship in another segment. The green button titled “Advanced Parameters” redirects the user to the 
advanced settings page introduced below. 
 
8.2.1 Input 
The input section lists the values of the most vital primary and secondary variables required to calculate the optimal fuel 
strategies. The cells in which the user is encouraged to enter specific values are marked by the colour yellow.  
The input cells require the following input: 
 
 C11: Enter the maximum DWT or TEU capacity of the vessel depending on the segment selected. 
 C12: Enter the average sailing speed when operating inside the ECA zone, measured in knots. 
 C13: Enter the average sailing speed when operating outside of the ECA zone, measured in knots. 
 C14: Enter the annual distance sailed by the vessel, measured in nautical miles. 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Calculation Tool Results Page 
Source: Own illustration 
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 C15: Enter the proportion of the annual distance sailed, spent within the waters of the ECA zone measured in 
percentages (example: for 50 percent insert the value “50”). 
 C16: Enter the depreciation rate used to discount future cost components, measured in percentages (example: for 
7 percent insert the value “7”). 
 C17: Specify what oil and gas price projection scenario upon which the HFO and LNG fuel prices are 
calculated. Enter “1” for the reference case scenario, enter “2” for high oil price scenario or enter “3” for the low 
oil price scenario. For more information about these fuel price scenarios see the U.S Energy Information 
Administration.  
 C22: Enter the risk of inspection faced by the ship when calling at a port within the ECA zone, measured in 
percentages (example: for 10 percent insert the value “10”). 
 C23: Enter the size of the fine incurred by ship-operators caught non-complying when calling at a port within 
the ECA zone, measured in USD. 
 C24: Enter the annual amount of callings at ports located within the ECA zone by the vessel. 
 
8.2.1.1 Fuel price spreads 
 
 C27: Enter the average price spread between a metric ton of MGO and standard HFO in the low MGO price 
scenario measured in USD (a positive value results in the price of MGO being higher than that of HFO, while a 
negative value results in the opposite). 
 C28: Enter the average price spread between a metric ton of MGO and standard HFO in the high MGO price 
scenario measured in USD (a positive value results in the price of MGO being higher than that of HFO, while a 
negative value results in the opposite). 
 C29: Enter the average price spread between a metric ton of LSHFO (0.5 %) and HFO (3.5 %), measured in 
USD (a positive value results in the price of low Sulphur HFO being higher than that of standard HFO, while a 
negative value results in the opposite). 
 
8.2.2 Results (strategy rankings) 
The results section is divided into two columns ranking the optimal and secondary strategies measured by total fuel 
related costs (fuel, engine modifications and fines). The rankings are calculated depending on a set number of remaining 
service years (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10 and 15) which are listed in column E. This illustrates how the rankings of the different 
strategies may change depending on the remaining operational years of the ship. A colour code is attached to each 
strategy in order to easily recognize how different input variables may change the strategy rankings. The colour codes are 
as follows:  
 
 Scrubber 
 MGO (low price) 
 MGO (high price) 
 LNG 
 Non-compliance 
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8.2.3 Investment Payback Period 
The investment payback periods are illustrated in order to give the user an easy measurement of the payback times. Both 
the scrubber and LNG strategies are compared to the default strategy of operating on MGO, in a high and low MGO – 
HFO price spread scenario, and therefore illustrate when the investment costs of a retrofit are offset by the higher price of 
MGO. 
 
8.2.4 Illustration 
The graph on the right side columns illustrates the total fuel related costs (vertical axis) as a function of remaining service 
years of the vessel (horizontal axis). The graph, using the same colour coding as the middle section, therefore serves as an 
illustration of both the optimal strategy rankings as well as the payback times (found by the intersection between the 
lines).  
            
8.3 ADVANCED SETTINGS 
The Advanced Settings page allows for further customization of the specific vessel and engine modification costs. The 
left side columns specify the costs of acquisition and installation of the scrubber and LNG modifications and are divided 
into the two sections of “Scrubber and LNG price functions” and “Predetermined Scrubber and LNG costs”. The 
columns to the right contain the sections of “Fuel specifications” and “Vessel specifications” which allow the user to 
further modify the fuel prices and future regulation as well as the specifications of the vessel such as engine, hull and 
propeller types. Finally, this page features two buttons; the green button labelled “Return to results” takes the user back to 
the results page and will include the user defined alterations to the variables. The orange button labelled “Reset to 
Defaults” resets all the variables on the sheet to their default values (this may be useful if the results show inconsistent 
results).  
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Calculation Tool Advanced Settings Page 
Source: Own illustration 
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8.3.1 Scrubber and LNG price functions:  
Most importantly, this section allows the user to determine if the scrubber and LNG modifications are retrofitted on an 
existing vessel or installed in the process of the acquisition of a new-build vessel. The section additionally contains price 
functions for the scrubber and LNG modifications, formulated as the total costs of acquisition and installation as a linear 
function of the ships engine power (adopted from the Danish Maritime Authority (2012)). The cost functions are 
formulated as costs per engine power (kW) and can be altered by the user.          
 
 C9: Select whether the scrubber or LNG extension will be retrofitted or installed on a new build vessel. 
 
 C13 / D13: Alter the default setting scrubber investment costs, measured in USD per main engine kW. Use C13 
for retrofits and D13 for new build vessels.   
 C14 / D14: Alter the default setting scrubber installation costs, measured in USD per main engine kW. Use C14 
for retrofits and D14 for new build vessels.   
 
 C16/D16: Alter the default setting 2-stoke LNG modification investment costs, measured in USD per main 
engine kW. Use C16 for retrofits and D16 for new build vessels.   
 C17/C17: Alter the default setting 2-stoke LNG modification installation costs, measured in USD per main 
engine kW. Use C17 for retrofits and D17 for new build vessels.   
 C19/D19: Alter the default setting 4-stoke LNG modification investment costs, measured in USD per main 
engine kW. Use C19 for retrofits and D19 for new build vessels.   
 C20/D20: Alter the default setting 4-stoke LNG modification installation costs, measured in USD per main 
engine kW. Use C20 for retrofits and D20 for new build vessels.   
 
8.3.2 Predetermined Scrubber and LNG costs 
Alternatively, the calculation tool allows the user to insert predetermined acquisition and installation costs of the scrubber 
and LNG modifications. For a retrofit or new-build these predetermined costs must be inserted on the left or right hand 
side respectively. If entering predetermined costs in the new-build column, be sure to enter the value “1” in cell C9 in the 
above section in order to enable new building features in the calculations.  
 
 C26/D26: Enter the scrubber investment costs for the vessel measured in USD, if the results of the 
predetermined price functions do not yield consistent results. Use C26 for retrofits and D26 for new build 
vessels.   
 C27/D27: Enter the scrubber installation costs for the vessel measured in USD, if the results of the 
predetermined price functions do not yield consistent results. Use C27 for retrofits and D27 for new build 
vessels. 
 
 C30 / C30: Enter the LNG modification investment costs for the vessel measured in USD, if the results of the 
predetermined price functions do not yield consistent results. Use C30 for retrofits and D30 for new build 
vessels.   
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 C31/D31: Enter the LNG modification installation costs for the vessel measured in USD, if the results of the 
predetermined price functions do not yield consistent results. Use C31 for retrofits and D31 for new build 
vessels. 
 
8.3.3 Fuel Specifications:  
The upper right columns contain specifications related to the fuel price forecasts and future introductions of regulation. 
 
  G9: Select the year where the global 0.5 % Sulphur cap is introduced. For year 2020 enter the value 0 and for 
2025 enter the value 1. Changing this variable will affect when vessels adopting the strategy of MGO and non-
compliance will operate on LSHFO outside of the ECA zone.  
 G12: Alter the value of the average cost of a ton of 3.5 % Sulphur HFO in European ports in 2014 measured in 
USD per ton. This value serves as the base value for the indexed fuel oil price forecasts of the calculation tool.   
 G13: Alter the value of the average cost of a ton of LNG in European ports in 2014 measured in USD per ton. 
This value serves as the base value for the indexed gas price forecasts of the calculation tool. 
 
8.3.4 Vessel Specifications:  
The lower right columns contain the advanced vessel specifications which allow the user to customize the average 
capacity utilization and advanced specifications of the vessels engine type and settings.  
 
8.3.4.1 Vessel and engine specifications  
 
 G20: Enter the average capacity utilization of the vessel in % (example: for 100 percent insert the value “100”) 
 G23: Enter the vessels main engine type. For 2-stroke enter the value “0” and for 4-stroke enter the value “1”.  
 G24: Select whether the vessel is equipped with a main engine type of tier 1, 2 or 3. Enter “1” for tier 1 engine, 
enter “2” for tier 2 engine and enter “3” for tier 3 engine.  
 G25: Select the NOx reduction technology equipped by the vessel. Enter “1” for EGR, enter “2” for SCR and 
enter “3” for other technologies.   
 G26: Select whether the engine is fuel optimized. Enter “0” for no fuel optimization and enter “1” for fuel 
optimization. 
 G27: Enter the main engine service rating measured in percentages (example: for 90 percent insert the value 
“90”). 
 G28: Select the speed tuning of the main engine. Enter “1” for normal tuning or enter “2” for low speed tuning.  
 
8.3.4.2 Fuel Consumption 
 
 G31/G32/G33/G34: Specify the fuel oil consumption at 75 % main engine service rating, measured in grams 
per kilowatt per hour. G31 specifies the fuel oil consumption when operating on HFO without a scrubber, G32 
specifies the same for the engine equipped with a scrubber, G32 specifies the same when operating on MGO and 
G34 specifies the gas consumption when the engine is equipped with LNG modifications and operates on gas. 
Entering the value of one sets the fuel oil consumption to the level as specified by the marine engineering 
calculations included in the spreadsheet.
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